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ABSTRACT
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a strategic issue. Yet, research in this area
has primarily focused on establishing a link between CSR and financial performance,
with significantly less attention given to the antecedents of CSR at the individual, firm or
industry levels. Notably, despite popular anecdotal examples that link the personal values,
beliefs or characteristics of business leaders to the socially responsible nature of their
companies, very little is actually known empirically about the relationship between
executive orientation and the corporate social strategy pursued by the firm.
The empirical research study presented in this dissertation is designed to fill this
important gap. First, I synthesize the vast literature in the general CSR domain into a new
typology of corporate social strategy (CSS) that distinguishes a firm’s approach to CSR
along its breadth and depth dimensions. Then, using an upper echelon framework based
in the strategic choice and strategic decision-making literatures, I examine the
relationship between executive orientation and variances observed in firm responses to
social and environmental issues over time. I argue specifically that an open executive
orientation, as reflected in a CEO’s worldview, and variables such as functional
background, educational specialization and international experience affect the selective
perception, interpretation and therefore choice of the breadth and depth of a firm’s CSS.
Furthermore, institutional theory is used to argue that the level of managerial discretion at
the industry level as well as general industry norms will attenuate theses relationships. In
so doing, I develop a longitudinal, multi-level, mixed determinant model of the
relationship between executive orientation and CSS.
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Random coefficient modeling (RCM) is then used to test the CEO effect on CSS
over time, by modeling the individual CSS growth trajectories of 349 firms from 19912009 using HLM6 software. With 19 years of data, over 1,000 CEOs and 6,334 firm-year
observations, this thesis represents the first longitudinal study to explicitly model the rate
of adoption of aggregate corporate social strategy (ACSS), breadth of corporate social
strategy (BCSS) and depth of corporate social strategy (DCSS) over the last two decades.
This analysis yielded three important results at the CEO, firm and industry levels.
First, the CEO effect on CSS ranges between 3-14% and evidence supports that some
aspects of an open executive orientation are indeed important determinants of initial
levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time. The findings also reveal that the overall
level of CSS has not grown substantively over the last two decades, with most firms in
2009 still engaging in a Derivative (shallow/narrow) CSS. Furthermore, unlike previous
studies that confound negative and positive CSR, this dissertation demonstrates that
industry membership is not an important determinant of the strategic choice of positive
CSS, nor are institutional pressures moderating factors in the executive orientation – CSS
relationship. This thesis thus makes significant theoretical and methodological
contributions to research in the upper echelons, CSR and institutional theory domains, as
well as has important implications for practice.

Key Words: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Corporate Social Strategy (CSS),
upper echelons, executive orientation, CEO, institutional theory, multi-level, longitudinal,
random coefficient modeling (RCM), hierarchical linear modeling (HLM)
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1
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation for Study
News reports and headlines from around the world suggest that it is becoming
increasingly risky for organizations to dismiss corporate social responsibility (CSR) as
something that lies beyond the economic and legal duties of the firm. Businesses of all
sizes (multinationals in particular) face a growing demand to become more actively
involved not only in managing the negative externalities that they may cause as a direct
result of firm operations, but also in addressing the world’s most pressing social problems
such as climate change, human rights abuses, poverty and conflict (Margolis & Walsh,
2003; Orlitzky & Swanson, 2008; Sharfman, Shaft & Tihanyi, 2004). For the last decade,
popular management books with titles such as The Ethical Imperative (Dalla Costa,
1998), Value Shift (Paine, 2003) and The Necessary Revolution (Senge, Laur, Smith,
Kruschwitz & Schley, 2008) have been making the claim that the rules of the game are
changing – businesses operating today face a new performance standard that goes beyond
economic requirements to include ethical, social and environmental considerations as
well. The argument is such that only companies that score well on both financial and
ethical dimensions can hope to achieve sustained competitive advantage or superior
performance in the long run (Paine, 2003).
Despite increasing pressures, however, businesses have adopted very different
strategies with regards to the call for an expanded social mandate (Googins, Mirvis &
Rochlin, 2007). Several large multinational corporations are “developing new policies
and practices aimed at promoting human rights, preventing violent conflict, and
contributing to more peaceful societies” (Williams, 2008: I). Microsoft, for example, has
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actively pursued business strategies that aim to serve the world’s poorest people through
investments, partnerships and programs designed specifically to solve issues such as
access to education and alleviating poverty. Other firms, however, have continued to
resist the push to engage in social issues, taking the perspective that “the only social
responsibility of business is to increase profits” (Friedman, 1970). Rival Apple, for
example, continues to face extensive criticism for its lack of transparency with regards to
the social and environmental impact of its operations.
A firm’s approach to CSR thus appears to be a matter of strategic choice, partially
rooted in whether CSR is seen as a cost or as an opportunity (Sharma, 2000; Sharma,
Pablo & Vredenburg, 1999). Indeed, the financial estimates regarding both the potential
investments and returns of social and environmental initiatives for organizations seem
immeasurable. For example, in the United States alone, businesses donated over $14.1B
to charitable causes just in 2009, with corporate charitable contributions totalling over
$100B in the last decade (Giving USA, 2010). Investments in environmental technologies
such as water productivity improvements are forecast to cost between $50 and $60B/year
for next twenty years (McKinsey Quarterly, 2010a). In the oil and gas industry
specifically, the capital investments required to meet carbon emission reduction targets
could amount to $26B/year for the next fifteen years (McKinsey Quarterly, 2010b).
However, the potential gains to be realized from CSR initiatives appear equally as
compelling. Studies have shown that firms that are above average philanthropists deliver
greater long term value to their shareholders (Brammer & Millington, 2008) and that
firms that invest in environmental programs such as waste prevention initiatives can also
profit from substantial financial gains (King & Lenox, 2002). Similarly, since 2005, it is
estimated that the world’s most ethical companies have delivered a 53 percent return to
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shareholders, outperforming the S&P 500 that logged a 4 percent loss over the same
period (Ethisphere, 2010). In several recent meta-analyses, the overall link between
corporate social responsibility and corporate financial performance has been shown, on
the whole, to be at least marginally positive (Margolis, Elfenbein & Walsh, 2007;
Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003).
Although economic contractarians continue to portray corporate social initiatives as
a misallocation or misappropriation of funds (Friedman, 1970; Margolis & Walsh, 2003),
how a firm chooses to address (or not to address) social and environmental issues can
nonetheless have an important effect on firm financial performance, either through greater
costs or greater revenues, both in the short and in the long-term. Further, regardless of
where one falls on the cost vs. benefits of CSR debate, how a firm deals with social and
environmental issues has become an important factor in the market for capital. As of
2010, one in every eight dollars invested in the US was done so through socially
responsible investment (SRI) funds, representing 12% of all assets currently under
professional management and over $3.07 trillion dollars in capital (Social Investment
Forum Foundation, 2010).
The investments, rewards and access to capital associated with social and
environmental initiatives thus render CSR a strategic issue and the decision to avoid or
pursue CSR initiatives a matter of strategic choice. A strategic issue is defined as an
emerging development that is likely to have a significant impact on a firm’s present or
future strategies (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton, Fahey & Narayanan, 1983; Julian & Ofori
Dankwa, 2008). Given the resource and revenue implications of CSR initiatives,
especially in the long-term, this definition places a firm’s plans and actions with regards
to social and environmental issues squarely in the realm of the strategic decision making
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literature (Husted & Allen, 2007; Husted & Allen, 2011). In this regard, it then becomes
essential for practitioners, researchers, investors and board of director members alike, to
understand how and why firms differ with regards to strategic choices made around CSR
issues.
1.2 Research Questions
One possible explanation for the variation in firm adoption of CSR initiatives over
time lies with values, beliefs and cognitions of its senior executives. Research in the field
of strategic issues has long studied the relationship between executive judgment and
interpretations of emerging strategic issues (Julian & Ofori Dankwa, 2008), yet
surprisingly, very little work has been done in the area of strategic leadership and CSR
(Agle, Mitchell & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Laplume, Sonpar & Litz, 2008; Maon, Lindgreen &
Swaen, 2008; Rose, 2007; Thomas & Simerly, 1994; Waldman et al., 2006a; Waldman &
Siegel, 2008; Waldman, Siegel & Javidan, 2006b; Wood, 1991). These authors point out
the paucity of research regarding the relationship between leadership and CSR, despite
decades of work in the upper echelons/strategic leadership field that has established the
important role of the CEO, Top Management Team (TMT) and Board of Directors (BOD)
with regards to strategic decision making in general and firm performance in particular
(Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella, 2009).
The link between leadership and CSR, however, has great face validity. The popular
press is replete with anecdotal examples that link the personal values, beliefs or
characteristics of business leaders to the socially responsible nature of their companies
(e.g. Anita Roddick of The Body Shop, Ray Anderson of Interface Carpets, Roy Vagelos
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of Merck). Empirically, however, Waldman, Siegel and Javidan (2006b) summarize the
importance of this research gap as follows:
“The strategic use of CSR begs the question about the potential role of the
CEO in determining the propensity of firms to engage in these activities.
CEOs are charged with the responsibility of formulating corporate strategy
and are often deeply involved in promoting the image of their respective
firms through social responsibility. Furthermore, they may dramatically
change the strategic direction of the firm, including decisions pertaining to
CSR. ... given the above ... it is somewhat surprising that there has been
virtually no systematic theoretical or empirical analysis of the relationship
between characteristics of CEO leadership and CSR” (Waldman et al.,
2006b: 1704)
As such, there is an opportunity to bridge the strategic leadership and corporate
social responsibility literatures in order to build a more testable theory of this
relationship. If one believes that the decision to invest in a CSR initiative is a strategic
decision (Husted & Allen, 2011; Waldman & Siegel, 2008) and that executive orientation
can drive strategic decisions (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), then
gaining a deeper understanding of executive orientations with regards to CSR should help
explain some of the variance observed in firm responses to social issues over time (Agle
et al., 1999). In particular, this research is guided by the following questions:
1. What is the relationship between executive orientation and the
corporate social strategy pursued by the firm over time?
2. How do firm and industry characteristics affect the relationship
between executive orientation and the corporate social strategies
pursued by the firm over time?

To explore these questions, I draw on the upper echelon perspective as well as the
strategic decision making literature to demonstrate how executive orientation affects
strategic choice and uncover how executive orientation affects the nature (breadth and
depth) of corporate social strategies (CSS) pursued by the firm. By executive orientation,
I mean an executive’s psychological characteristics such as values, beliefs and
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worldviews which are often evaluated based on observable experiences such as functional
and educational background (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Executive orientation is often
seen as a relatively fixed cognitive paradigm that encompasses one’s personal ideology
about human nature, perceptions of one’s role in society and understanding of social
reality (Tetlock, 2000), including “how the environment behaves, what options are
feasible, and how the organization should be run” (Henderson, Miller & Hambrick, 2006:
p. 448). Understanding variations in executive orientations thus holds promise to
understanding variations in CSS.
1.3 Thesis Structure
This thesis is structured as follows:
In Chapter 2, I begin with a review of the corporate social responsibility literature
in order to develop my dependent variable of interest – corporate social strategy (CSS) –
which positions a firm’s decision to invest in CSR issues as a matter of strategic choice. I
then introduce and build a typology of CSS based on a firm’s breadth and depth of
engagement in various social and environmental issues. Within the literature review, I
also summarize upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and institutional theory
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) in a manner which ties executive orientation and institutional
pressures to the choice of CSS pursued by the firm over time.
In Chapter 3, I construct a set of testable hypotheses, beginning with the overall
expected patterns of adoption of CSS by firms over time. I then discuss the executive
orientation construct in detail, focusing on CEO ‘openness’ as a unifying disposition that
can explain variations in strategic decisions about initial levels and rates of adoption of
CSS. Here, hypotheses are built around the relationship between CEO worldview,
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functional background, educational background, international experience and the
aggregate, breadth and depth of corporate social strategy pursued by firms over time. I
conclude by introducing two institutional level constructs – managerial discretion and
industry norms – as potential moderators of the executive orientation and CSS
relationship.
Importantly, the hypotheses developed in this study take a longitudinal perspective.
The large majority of the work in both the CSR (Shropshire & Hillman, 2007) and the
strategic leadership fields (Henderson et al., 2006) has thus far been cross-sectional in
design, allowing for only a static understanding of interesting correlations. However, the
concept of corporate social responsibility and other similar constructs (e.g. corporate
citizenship, business sustainability) has evolved over time (De Bakker, Groenewegen &
Den Hond, 2005) as have societal expectations and managerial interpretations of these
expectations. I therefore take a longitudinal approach to the research questions addressed
herein to account for the dynamic nature of these strategic decisions.
I then sum up, in Chapter 4, the literature review and hypotheses in a longitudinal
multi-level model (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) of executive orientation and CSS. Here, the
CEO is nested within a firm and the firm within the industry, arguing that normative,
regulative and coercive isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) also shape a
firm’s response to difficult social issues. In so doing, I make explicit why some CEOs
pursue a broader or deeper CSS than do their more constrained counterparts.
Following the literature review and hypotheses development, in Chapter 5 I outline
the methodology (data sources and collection, analytic method, operationalization of
variables) used to test the relationships hypothesized in the model. Chapter 6 begins with
descriptive and exploratory findings, as suggested by Singer and Willett (Singer &
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Willett, 2003) and then presents the results of the hypotheses testing in detail, following
the random coefficient modeling (RCM) approach recommended by Bliese and Ployhart
(2002), among others.
The focus in the theoretical development and methodological testing is thus
primarily descriptive, exploring how individual, firm and industry level variables
influence a firm’s level and rate of adoption of corporate social strategy over time.
However, this dissertation also includes a discussion section, Chapter 7, which delves into
some of the more interesting implications of the findings in more detail. I wrap up with
necessary limitations and directions for future research (Chapter 8), anticipated
contributions to theory, methods and practice (Chapter 9) and a short conclusion (Chapter
10).
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, I review the literature on corporate social responsibility (Section
2.1),

including

two

primary

approaches

(aggregated

and

disaggregated)

to

conceptualizating CSR (Section 2.2) and illustrate how these two approaches can be
combined into a new typology of corporate social strategy that centers on strategic choice
(Section 2.3). I then follow by briefly introducing the upper echelon (Section 2.4) and
institutional theory (Section 2.5) lenses that will be used to build my hypotheses in
Chapter 3.
2.1 Defining Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
The debate around what is and what is not CSR stems from a broader
philosophical argument regarding the “appropriate” role of business in society (Swanson,
1995). While some researchers believe that the only social responsibility of business is to
increase profits (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2001; Karnani, 2011), others have argued for a
broader interpretation of a firm’s responsibility to the societies it serves including not
only its direct stakeholders (e.g., employees, customers, suppliers), but also broader
interpretations of society as a whole (Freeman, 1984; Schwartz & Carroll, 2008),
including the powerless, the environment and even the non-human (Laplume et al., 2008).
To date, there is no general consensus of either the definition (Carroll, 1999) or
the scope of corporate social responsibility (De Bakker et al., 2005). Many discussions,
however, begin with some variation of Carroll’s (1979; 1991) four part classification of
the obligations business has to society which include economic, legal, ethical and
discretionary (philanthropic) activities. Others have adopted Wood’s (1991) definition of
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corporate social performance (CSP) that includes "a business organization's configuration
of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies,
programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal relationships" (p.
693). Overall, however, it is assumed that a business’ primary responsibility is to first
make a profit and to obey the law (economic and legal duties) and that CSR and CSP
encompass those activities which ‘go beyond’ these economic and legal duties, including
being ethical and a good corporate citizen (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Even seminal
work in stakeholder theory places the primary obligation of the firm in the economic
rather than ethical domain (Walsh, 2005).
Defining CSR has thus been complicated by these different interpretations of
CSR, as well as a myriad of largely analogous concepts (Margolis & Walsh, 2003;
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Schwartz & Carroll, 2008). To demonstrate, in addition to the term
CSR, similar constructs are often used (sometimes interchangeably) to study the impact
of business on society including: CSP (Corporate Social Performance), CSR2 (Corporate
Social Responsiveness), ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance programs),
corporate citizenship, social issue management, stakeholder management, triple bottom
line accounting, as well as broader terms such as business ethics, values-based
management, moral management, ethical decision making, community relations and more
recent terminology such as business sustainability, social innovation, positive social
change activities, social entrepreneurship, creative capitalism, the enlightened profit
motive, corporate moral responsibility and bottom of the pyramid strategies (BOP).
Furthermore, there are entire streams of research on specific domains of CSR including
corporate philanthropy, diversity, ethical and environmental issues.
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This plethora of definitions of corporate social responsibility has led to an equally
wide variety of operationalizations of the construct itself (Peloza, 2009; Wood, 2010). In
reviewing 127 studies on the relationship between corporate social performance and
corporate financial performance (otherwise known as the CSP-CFP debate), Margolis and
Walsh (2003) identified no fewer than 47 measures of CSP ranging from the more often
used Kinder, Lyndenberg, Domini (KLD) index scores and Fortune reputation ratings, to
more narrow interpretations of CSP such as the firms that make the “Working Mothers
list of ‘Most Family Friendly’ companies”. Many of these same variables have also been
used to operationalize analogous constructs including corporate citizenship and
stakeholder relations and reviews of the literature often overlap. Laplume et al. (2008),
for example, state that “the most popular operationalization of stakeholder management is
a multifaceted measure derived from the KLD index” (p. 1167), which is also one of the
most popular operationalizations of CSR (Harrison & Freeman, 1999).
Although Orlitzky et al. (2003) in their meta-analysis of 52 CSR studies conclude
that this variety of measurement methods is irrelevant given that it serves to strengthen
the overall positive relationship between CSP-CFP, the lack of construct validity is
problematic for the advancement of theory in this area in general and more specifically to
the analysis of antecedents and determinants of CSR. In addition, it leaves practicing
managers and senior executives without a practical tool with which to assess the overall
CSR profile of their firms; to wit, in a recent United Nations Global Compact (UNGC)
survey, 31% of CEOs indicated that the different definitions of CSR were a major barrier
to implementing an integrated and strategic company-wide approach to environmental
and social issues. This number is up from 22% of CEO’s who made this same claim just
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three years ago, indicating that the field is getting more, not less, confusing (UNGC &
Accenture, 2010).
2.2 Conceptualizing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
Germane to this discussion then is how one conceptualizes CSR, as an allencompassing construct or as a very particular activity (e.g., corporate philanthropy).
Very broadly, it can be argued that research in the field of CSR has generally taken one of
two routes - either an aggregated or disaggregated approach. The fundamental difference
between the two streams of research lies with how CSR is conceptualized, and therefore
treated and measured. While the aggregated approach assumes that all activities that lie
beyond a firm’s economic and legal responsibilities can be defined as CSR (McWilliams
& Siegel, 2001), the disaggregated approach examines each of these activities as isolated
CSR initiatives.
In this section, I review each of these approaches in turn and then suggest that the
aggregated and disaggregated perspectives can be combined into a new typology of a
firm’s CSR initiatives, which I define as Corporate Social Strategy (CSS). Because CSR
is normally considered as the independent variable in social issue research (Margolis &
Walsh, 2003), many of the studies reviewed here draw on the CSR-CFP debate. However,
this discussion is then followed by a review of the upper echelon literature and how the
values and cognitions of senior executives may affect strategic choices around CSR issues
as a dependent variable.
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2.2.1 CSR: The Aggregated Approach
The aggregated approach to defining and measuring CSR conceptualizes CSR as a
basket of activities or initiatives that address a firm’s interactions with all of its
stakeholder groups beyond the firm’s primary responsibility to shareholders. This
approach treats any initiative not directly mandated by law or by the firm’s duty to
maximize shareholder profits as analogous (e.g. corporate philanthropy, voluntary
emission standards, work/life balance programs) and thus implicitly assumes that a broad
array of CSR initiatives can be amalgamated into one total CSP score (Choi & Wang,
2009; Mattingly & Berman, 2006). More than half of the studies reviewed by Margolis
and Walsh (2003) in their analysis of CSP-CFP research, for example, took this
aggregated perspective.
In these studies, CSP is operationalized using measures such as the KLD index
(Hillman & Keim, 2001), Fortune Reputation Rating (Thomas & Simerly, 1994), mutual
fund screens (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000), or other surveys of social responsibility
(Sharfman, Pinkston & Sigerstad, 2000). These amalgamated or composite scores often
combine a firm’s total social and environmental performance - negative, neutral and
positive - into a single CSP measure that includes varied initiatives ranging from the
number of women on the board to production of military weapons. The underlying
assumption is that a firm’s response to social issues as well as their participation in
ethically controversial industries together “capture the domain of what management
scholars consider to be CSR” (Waldman et al., 2006b: p. 1714).
The difficulty with this approach, however, is three-fold. First, summing a firm’s
CSP strengths and weakness within a single composite score (e.g., Waddock & Graves,
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1997; Waldman et al., 2006b) can completely obscure the actual corporate social
performance of the firm (Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Strike, Gao & Bansal, 2006). For
example, if a firm scores a “1” in community relations, but a “-1” in human rights, its
overall CSP score will be “0”, which is equivalent to suggesting a firm is in not engaging
in any CSR initiatives when it clearly is; so not all zeros are zero. Second, the aggregated
approach assumes that firms that are doing nothing lie on the same continuum as firms
that have chosen to pursue one, some or many CSR initiatives. However, if we accept the
definition of CSR as those activities which lie beyond the economic and legal
requirements of the firm (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), it seems conceptually illogical to
include firms that have chosen not to engage in any social, environmental or other
stakeholder issues as having participated in any CSR; so zero is also not the same as one.
On the other hand, if a firm has made the decision to include a CSR agenda in their
overall strategy, a third difficulty with the aggregated approach is that it masks important
nuances in the actual corporate social strategies pursued by the firm; in the end, not all
one’s are equal.
To illustrate, Table 2.1 provides the CSP ‘scores’ of six hypothetical firms using
several typical KLD categories that have been used in a variety of aggregated studies
(e.g., Agle et al., 1999; Berman, Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999). In the case presented
below, one can easily see how firms with the same CSP score may actually be engaging
in very different CSR initiatives. As can be seen in Table 1, each of the hypothetical firms
in this study has earned a total CSP score of “6”, which is a sum of all of the strengths
and weaknesses across CSR areas.
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Table 2.1: Mapping Corporate Social Initiatives
Area 1

Area 3
CommEmployee
Firm
Diversity
unity
Relations
Relations
1
2
3
4
5
6

6
6
0
-4
-2
1

Area 2

0
6
3
4
4
1

0
0
3
2
4
1

Area 4

Area 5

Area 6

CSP Score

Environment

Human
Rights

Special
Products

Sum

0
-6
0
2
-2
1

0
0
0
0
0
1

0
0
0
2
2
1

6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00
6.00

Under aggregated models of assessing CSP, each of these firms would be deemed
to have an equal CSP record. However, this method clearly masks that these firms have
indeed pursued very different corporate social strategies. First, some firms have both
positive and negative ratings in different categories which do not get separately identified
in the composite CSP score (Firms 2, 4 & 5). Second, even for firms that have only
positive scores, these may be an amalgam of both strengths and concerns (e.g. Firm 3
may actually have six strengths in the diversity category, but three weaknesses, thus
rendering the net score for this area a +3). Lastly, strategic decisions regarding which
stakeholder or social areas have seen investments and how deep these investments have
been, are also hidden in the overall CSP score. Firm 1, for example, has focused all of its
attention in one category (employee relations issues), while Firm 6 has taken a broader
approach and invested in all six areas. Similarly, Firm 1 has also engaged in a deeper
social strategy having earned six strengths in employee relations while Firm 6 has only
earned one, thus engaging in a much shallower social strategy with regards to this
particular area.
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Yet, in most research that has assumed the aggregated approach (e.g., David, Bloom
& Hillman, 2007; Deckop, Merriman & Gupta, 2006), the CSP of each of these firms
would be treated equally; there is thus no objective way to discern which of these firms is
actually engaging in the greatest amount of corporate social strategies, has the broadest
range of CSR commitments or has invested the most against any particular stakeholder or
social issue. The aggregated approach thus seems insufficient to address questions
regarding the overall CSR strategy pursued by the firm from a strategic choice
perspective.
2.2.2 CSR: The Disaggregated Approach
On the other extreme, the disaggregated approach to measuring CSR looks at only
one of the specific categories of activities at a time in order to obtain a more ‘objective’,
third-party assessment of a firm’s CSP ‘behaviours’ (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Here, CSP
measurements might include items such as philanthropic donations (Galaskiewicz, 1997),
levels of toxic emissions (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006) or degrees of environmental
responsiveness (Sharma, 2000).
Research has shown, however, that each of these different measures may have a
different impact on CFP. For example, Orlitzky et al. (2003) found that studies that used
environmental performance as a proxy for CSR had an overall lower correlation with CFP
than studies that used the more aggregated reputation or survey measures of CSR.
Similarly, Gao (2008) found that corporate environmental performance (CEP) and CSP
are distinct constructs that have different evolutionary trajectories, different managerial
perceptions and therefore differential impacts on firm performance. In contrast, studies
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that have used charitable contributions as a proxy for CSR have had some of the highest
correlations with CFP (Orlitzky et al., 2003).
This suggests that the disaggregated approach, while providing perhaps the most
concrete and informative evidence for the relationship between CSP and CFP,
nonetheless demonstrates that different initiatives will have a different impact on firm
performance, without providing any indication of how these initiatives might affect firm
performance when combined. If charitable contributions are positively correlated with
firm performance, and environmental performance less so, and a firm is pursuing both,
what will be the overall affect of the two corporate social strategies on CFP? Further,
these studies often include firms that have not engaged in any CSR initiative, thus also
confounding firms with no CSP with firms that have some or more CSP.
In summary, neither the aggregated nor the disaggregated approach appears to
sufficiently capture the domain of corporate social strategy. Rather, both of these
approaches in combination can be seen as two related dimensions of a firm’s overall CSS.
The aggregate approach acknowledges that CSP is a multi-dimensional construct (Agle et
al., 1999) and thus attempts to capture, to some degree, the breadth of CSR activities that
a firm has chosen to pursue, from more narrow or focused strategies to a portfolio of
more broad or diversified strategies. The disaggregated approach, on the other hand,
focuses on the depth of commitment or engagement in a specific CSR activity (Brammer
& Millington, 2008), from relatively shallow to very deep participation in various
initiatives. In the following section, I outline how these two dimensions can be combined
into a typology of corporate social strategies that incorporates the strengths of both the
aggregated and disaggregated approaches to CSR measurement as well as demonstrate
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how the absence of any social or environmental programs is also a strategic choice that is
conceptually distinct from firms that choose to pursue even one CSP initiative.

2.3 Corporate Social Strategy (CSS): Defining a New Typology
Provided that the strategic leadership of the firm has decided to engage in CSR, the
nature of a firm’s CSR portfolio can be evaluated with regards to two dimensions –
breadth and depth of strategies deployed - which answer the following questions: (1) is a
firm’s portfolio of social strategies focused on a specific narrow issue or diversified to
address a myriad of social problems?; and (2) what is the firm’s depth of commitment to
the specific initiatives in which they engage? I argue that the combination of these
dimensions define the boundaries of a firm’s corporate social strategy (CSS) (Mazutis,
2010). 1 The two dimensions of this construct are now explored in greater detail.

2.3.1 Breadth of CSS (Narrow Strategies vs. Broad Strategies)
The senior executives of a firm may choose to pursue either narrow or broad
corporate social strategies. In distinguishing between CSR and CSP Barnett (2007:797)
takes issue with the equivocation of terms and asserts that “firms are not imbued with a
certain CSP state… Rather, firms make investments that, over time, aggregate into certain
CSP postures. These investments are CSR.” Similarly, I argue that one can observe the
decisions to invest in CSR over time as indicative of the firm’s overall corporate social
strategy. Adopting the classification from traditional strategic analysis (Porter, 1980),
firms with a narrow or focused corporate social strategy choose to invest in just one, or at
1

An abridged version of section has been published in the Academy of Management Proceedings for 2010
(Montreal, QC).
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least a very limited, number of stakeholder or social issues. This may be because this is
where a CEO or TMT sees it can make the greatest impact, or it could be because the
nature of the issue itself presents with a greater sense of urgency from more legitimate or
powerful stakeholders (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). Regardless of motivation, firms
with a narrow CSS are “built around serving a particular target very well, and each
functional policy is developed with this in mind” (Porter, 1980: 38). For example, a CEO
might choose to focus on its employee diversity policy, specifically investing in this
narrow stakeholder target so as to more effectively or efficiently achieve some measure of
positive outcomes with this particular stakeholder group.
In contrast, leaders of firms with a broader corporate social strategy will invest in
more than one stakeholder or social issue. McWilliams and Siegel (2001) suggested that
"managers should treat decisions regarding CSR precisely as they treat all investment
decisions" (p. 125); some will choose to commit to a narrow CSR strategy, while others
will invest more broadly, funding initiatives that target multiple stakeholder and social
issues. The CEOs and TMTs of these firms may be trying to gain an insurance-like
benefit from addressing a range of stakeholder needs (Godfrey, Merrill & Hansen, 2009).
Alternately, they may perceive their obligations to society as going beyond economic and
legal mandates; trying to be both responsive to the social concerns of multiple
stakeholders and also to mitigate the real and potential adverse effects of its business
activities (Porter and Kramer, 2006).
Porter and Kramer (2006) summarize the strategic decision regarding the breadth
dimension of CSS as follows:
“For any company, strategy must go beyond best practices. It is about
choosing a unique position – doing things differently from competitors in a
way that lowers costs or better serves a particular set of customer needs.
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These principles apply to a company’s relationship to society as readily as
to its relationship to its customers and rivals” (Porter and Kramer, 2006: p.
91; emphasis added).
A CEO’s choice of a narrow vs. broad CSS can therefore be viewed as a reflection
not only of how he/she sees the firm’s relationship to its stakeholders specifically, but
also to how the senior leadership sees the firm’s relationship to a broader society in
general.

2.3.2 Depth of CSS (Shallow Strategies vs. Deep Strategies)
Similarly, “an adequate theoretical framework [of CSR] must distinguish not only
the component relationships inherent in a firm’s overall social posture but also the
relevant importance of each component” (Barnett, 2007: 812). Here I suggest that one can
also assess a firm’s CSS by its depth of commitment to particular stakeholder and social
issues. A CEO of a firm that engages in just one initiative targeted to one stakeholder
group can be said to have a shallower depth of commitment to this issue than a CEO of a
firm that has numerous initiatives aimed at the same stakeholder group or than the CEO
that has numerous initiatives aimed at a broad array of stakeholder and social issues. A
CEO who has engaged in no CSR related initiatives cannot be said to have either a
shallow or deep commitment as the firm effectively has no commitment to CSR.
In the CSR literature, this depth of commitment has often been portrayed on a
continuum of social responsiveness as illustrated in Table 2.2 below (Carroll, 1979;
Wood, 1991). Carroll (1979), for example, suggested that corporate managers have
strategic choice with regards to fulfilling the economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic
responsibilities to society and on how to respond to a wide variety of stakeholder and
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social issues including consumerism, the environment, discrimination, product safety,
occupational safety and shareholder concerns. For example, when facing either a
stakeholder or a social issue which may fall beyond a firm’s economical or legal
requirements, a leader can choose either to do nothing until mandated by law (reactive
strategy), wait and bear the consequences (defensive strategy), acquiesce to consumer
pressure (accommodating strategy) or seek to develop solutions that will address the issue
before it arises (proactive strategy). By inference, those CEOs adopting a reactive or
defensive posture have a shallower depth of commitment to stakeholder and social issues
than those CEOs that take a more accommodating or proactive stance.

Table 2.2: Continuum of Corporate Social Responsiveness
Authors
Carroll
(1979)
Hunt &
Auster (1990)
AragonCorrea (1998)
Henriques &
Sadorsky
(1999)
Buysse &
Verbeke
(2003)

Do Less
Reactive

Defensive

Beginner

Firefighter

Noncompliance

Compliance

Reactive

Defensive

Reactive

Prevention

Maon et al.
(2010)

Accommodating
Concerned
Citizen
Compliance
Plus

Elementary

Diminishing

SelfProtecting,
Compliance
Seeking

Proactive
Pragmatist

Proactivist

Leading Edge

Excellence

Accommodative

Proactive

Leadership

Defensive,
Compliance

Zadek (2004)
Googins et al.
(2007)

Do More

Managerial,
Strategic

Civil

Engaged

Innovative

Integrated,
Transforming

Capability
Seeking

Caring,
Strategizing

Transforming

Others have put forth alternate typologies regarding this continuum of corporate
social responsiveness (Maon, Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). For example, Zadek (2004)
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suggested a firm’s path to social responsibility starts with a defensive posture and
eventually moves through several stages including compliance, managerial, strategic and
finally a civil strategy regarding stakeholder and social issues. Similarly, Hunt and Auster
(1990) labelled these stages of CSR as beginner, firefighter, concerned citizen, pragmatist
and proactivist. However, empirical research has not yet born out a stages approach to an
overarching concept of CSR, as there are only a few examples of firms with the deepest
level of commitment to CSR across all stakeholders groups which is postulated to exist at
the right hand side of this continuum (Googins et al., 2007).
Part of the problem, however, might be in the conceptualization of the CSR
continuum as stages of a firm’s CSR development rather than as measures of its depth of
commitment to particular stakeholder or social issues. For example, Googins et al. (2007)
found that no single firm had achieved the “transforming” stage of CSR as engagement
with different social and stakeholder groups are often at different stages of development
(from elementary to engaged, innovative and, more rarely, integrated). As such, a firm
may be deeply committed to a CSS that addresses a particular stakeholder issue (e.g.
employee diversity programs), but not at all engaged in other social issues (e.g. recycling
programs). Under traditional measures of CSR, it would be difficult to label the overall
CSS of this firm as reactive, defensive, accommodating or proactive as it may be
proactive in one area and reactive in another. Only select studies make use of the
continuum as it relates to a particular CSR domain (Aragón-Correa, 1998; Henriques &
Sadorsky, 1999)
The stages problem has also been suggested to mask the fact that some firms can
perform extraordinarily well with regards to some social issues and extraordinarily poorly
with regards to others; paradoxically being both corporately socially responsible and
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corporately socially irresponsible at the same time (Strike et al., 2006). As such, it is
argued here that rather than attempting to classify a firm’s overall “stage” of CSR
development as reactive, defensive, accommodating or proactive, a firm’s CSS is better
assessed by understanding the depth of commitment of its CEO and TMT to strategic
actions pertaining to specific stakeholder or social issues.
In summary, I propose that a firm’s overall corporate social strategy (CSS) can be
evaluated based on these two dimensions - breadth and depth - suggesting a simple
typology as depicted in Figure 2.1 below (Mazutis, 2010). The nature of the CSS chosen
(broad or deep) can therefore be seen as a strategic decision along these two dimensions.

Figure 2.1: Typology of Corporate Social Strategies
Deep
Dedicated
(Deep/Narrow)

Devoted
(Deep/Broad)

Derivative
(Shallow/ Narrow)

Diffuse
(Shallow/Broad)

Depth of CSS

Shallow

Disengaged
Narrow

Broad
Breadth of CSS

A Derivative CSS suggests that the strategic leadership of a firm has chosen to
pursue a narrow strategy, aimed at only one or a limited few stakeholder or social issues,
and has done so in only a cursory manner. In this quadrant, we’ll likely find companies
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that are resisting greater societal pressures for broader corporate involvement and may
only symbolically invest in specific CSR initiatives in order to appease more vocal
stakeholders. Although firms with a Derivative CSS may have acquiesced to specific
industry norms by implementing one or two CSR initiatives, overall, these firms do not
have a particularly strong commitment to CSR in general. In contrast, firms that have a
Dedicated CSS, may still focus on only one or two stakeholders or social issues, but yet
do so with multiple initiatives with the specific goal of serving that stakeholder or social
need well.
If the CEO/TMT of a firm chooses to pursue a broader breadth of CSS, investing
in a variety of different stakeholder or social issues, their commitment may still be either
shallow or deep. A Diffuse CSS suggests that a firm is pursuing a broad breadth of
stakeholder or social issues; however, its depth of commitment to any one issue is fairly
shallow. These firms are engaging in very limited amount of initiatives targeting each
issue, although the total number of issues addressed is large. In contrast, executives that
are pursuing both a broad and a deep CSS, participating in a variety of different
stakeholder and/or social issues with numerous initiatives in each category can be said to
be following a Devoted CSS. These firms are committed to addressing the needs and
demands of a broad range of stakeholders and/or actively participating in addressing a
broad range of social issues.
Importantly, CEOs and TMTs may also choose not to engage in any stakeholder
or social issues at all and thus not fall into any of the above CSS categories. In these
cases, I argue that the firms are considered to have a Disengaged CSS. The decision not to
participate in any CSR activities is nonetheless a strategic decision and no activity is
inherently conceptually different than some or lots of activity; one cannot evaluate no
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activity in terms of its breadth or depth as both are zero. The decision not to invest in any
corporate social strategies can therefore be seen as a strategic statement of a firm’s
relationship with society (Porter & Kramer, 2006) and should be treated as conceptually
and empirically different than firms who are actively pursuing CSS.
The typology derived herein can thus be used to assess the nature of a firm’s CSS
both at a particular point in time, as well as the nature of a firm’s CSS trajectory over
time (Barnett, 2007). By incorporating the breadth and depth dimensions, the typology
allows for the evaluation of organizational change in CSS as an adaptive process (Short,
Ketchen, Bennett & du Toit, 2006) which may occur by either adding within a category
(growing in depth) or expanding across categories (growing in breath) over time. In turn,
these different growth trajectories may then be examined for different antecedents and/or
different outcomes.
Assuming that firms can and do vary with regards to the corporate social strategies
they choose to pursue (disengaged, derivative, dedicated, diffuse or devoted), the question
then turns to why the strategic leadership of some firms choose to pursue a greater breadth
or a greater depth of corporate social strategies over time than do other leaders. As
introduced in Section 1.1., a possible explanation for the variation in a firm’s CSS lies
with the executive orientation of the firm’s CEO. As this typology is rooted in strategic
choice, in the next section I review the upper echelon perspective drawing particular
attention to how executive orientation impacts the strategic decision making process,
including decisions regarding participation or resource allocation to social and other
stakeholder issues.
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2.4 Upper Echelon Theory
Upper Echelon or strategic leadership theory posits that a firm’s strategic choices
can be seen as a reflection of the values and cognitions of its CEO and top-managementteam (TMT) (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Based on bounded rationality, the theory
suggests that leaders at the top of the organization interpret external pressures through a
set of cognitive lenses that limit their field of vision and affect the manner in which they
perceive changing environmental situations (Finkelstein et al., 2009). These filters
ultimately shape how CEOs and TMTs make strategic decisions, including how they may
react to changing rules of legitimate firm behaviour. 2 While understanding the
relationship between top executive orientation and organizational performance is the
ultimate goal of upper echelon theory, various observable experiences (e.g. demographic
variables) are more often used as proxies for actual managerial cognitions in empirical
investigations of selective perception (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004).
Managerial cognition thus encompasses the decision maker’s cognitive base as well
as his/her values (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). One’s cognitive base includes
knowledge/assumptions about future events, alternatives and the consequences of those
alternatives, while one’s values are the “principles for ordering [these] consequences or
alternatives according to preference” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984: 195). Traditionally, the
terms managerial cognition and executive orientation have been used somewhat
interchangeably in the upper echelon literature, consisting of some combination of
psychological and demographic factors that, in addition to values, may include one’s

2

Note: The discussion on cognitive lenses is not meant to imply that this process is necessarily detrimental
to the firm. In fact, in many situations (e.g., dynamic environments), selective perception can result in
cognitive heuristics or shortcuts that allow for more efficient information processing and ultimately faster,
more efficient strategic decisions.
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cognitive model, cognitive style or personality as well as observable experiences such as
age, tenure, formal education and functional background amongst others (Finkelstein et
al., 2009). Figure 2.2 below depicts the model of strategic choice from the upper echelon
perspective.
Figure 2.2: Strategic Choice Under Bounded Rationality

Source: Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. 2009. Strategic Leadership: Theory and Research on
Executives, Top Management Teams, and Boards. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 45

Executive orientation is thus a complex construct, encompassing both psychological
processes and observable demographic characteristics and has alternately been referred to
as executive mindset (Geletkanycz, 1997), cognitive paradigm (Henderson et al., 2006)
and managerial worldview (Tetlock, 2000). In all cases, however, the underlying
assumption is that individuals embody a deep spectrum of values or beliefs – religious,
political, philosophical, social and cultural – that can influence strategic decision making
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in organizational contexts as much as in personal contexts (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
Although subtle, executive orientation then differs from more malleable psychological
constructs such as attitudes or leadership styles. Attitudes and leadership styles can
largely be adapted to changes in external stimuli, while executive orientation will shape
how external stimuli are perceived, interpreted and enacted (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
Prior research on executive orientation has tended to focus on a limited subset of
“cognitive factors” or a select few demographic proxies in order to explore possible
relationships between CEO (or TMT) characteristics and specific strategic choices.
Again, by strategic choice, I mean decisions regarding issues that have the potential to
impact a firm’s strategy (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Dutton et al., 1983; Thomas &
McDaniel Jr, 1990). The manner in which strategic issues are diagnosed and interpreted
at the top levels of the organization thus helps inform variances in the strategic decision
making processes. Henderson, Miller and Hambrick (2006), for example, use CEO tenure
(a demographic variable) as a proxy for a CEO’s cognitive paradigm (a psychological
variable) and test how this affects firm performance under different degrees of industry
dynamism. Similarly, several studies have shown that longer tenured CEOs are more
likely to engage in defender strategies characterized by stability and efficiency than
shorter tenured CEOs who are more likely to undertake prospector strategies related to
increased levels of innovation (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
While informative, this demographic approach falls short of explaining the
underlying nature of executive orientation and how this might affect strategic choice.
Certainly not all long tenured executives share the same values, beliefs, worldviews or
personal ideologies. To wit, research shows that top managers may construct very
different interpretations of the same strategic issue even when exposed to the same
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stimuli (Thomas & McDaniel Jr., 1990) and that top management commitment and
support of CSR specifically will vary because of this (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999). A
key component of upper echelon theory then is that executive beliefs, values and
cognitive structures as well as individual experiences, which together inform the
construct of executive orientation, will influence the process of selective perception and
interpretation thus influencing the choice of strategic response (Finkelstein et al., 2009),
including strategic response to stakeholder and social issues.
The dependent variables in most of the upper echelon studies, however, are more
“traditional” strategic decisions such as investments in innovation (Bantel & Jackson,
1989), research and development (Barker & Mueller, 2002) or acquisitions (Hitt & Tyler,
1991). Some work has also been done to understand how cognitive factors such a CEO’s
“commitment to the status quo” might affect strategic choices such as persistence and
conformity to firm strategy (Geletkanycz, 1997). However, very little is known about
how business leaders evaluate and navigate investment decisions with regards to broader
stakeholder and societal issues (e.g., Waldman et al., 2006b).

In fact, Finkelstein,

Hambrick and Cannella’s (2009) new compendium of strategic leadership research does
not include a single mention of CSR, business sustainability, corporate citizenship or
other analogous constructs.
Of course, the upper echelon perspective is not limited to the values and cognitions
of the CEO, but also posits that the TMT as a “dominant coalition” will also affect
strategic decisions and organizational outcomes (Finkelstein et al., 2009). However,
extant research has demonstrated that there is a significant homogeneity of TMT
perceptions with regards to their organization’s environment (Sutcliffe & Huber, 1998)
and that the beliefs of a focal upper echelon executive are related to the beliefs of other
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members of the organization's upper echelon team (Chattopadhyay, Glick, Miller &
Huber, 1999). Further, research suggests that CEO effects on firm-level outcomes are
stronger than those of non-CEO members of the executive team (Bertrand & Schoar,
2003). Jensen and Zajac (2004) went so far as to suggest that measuring the TMT as an
aggregate unit of analysis can mask important relationships between individual elites,
such as the CEO, and corporate strategy. Coupled with a myriad of other theoretical and
methodological difficulties regarding measuring the executive orientation of the TMT
(Cannella & Holcomb, 2005), the CEO specifically is considered the unit of analysis
herein for the sake of logical simplicity.
I now turn to a review of the work done in the field of institutional theory which has
relevance to both discussions pertaining to corporate social responsibility as well as to the
concept of managerial discretion in the upper echelons tradition; institutional theory will
be used to argue for the moderating effects of industry norms and managerial discretion
on CSS.
2.5 Institutional Theory
Organizations are said to be limited in their strategic actions by external
constraints and institutional pressures toward conformity (Oliver, 1991). The institutional
argument centers on the idea that there are enduring institutions in social life that effect
the thoughts, feelings and behaviors of individuals and collective actors (Lawrence &
Suddaby, 2006). These institutions consist of the “cognitive, normative, and regulative
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott,
1995) which therefore affect the strategic, legal and ethical norms inherent in decisions of
corporate social responsibility.

Due to mimetic, coercive or normative isomorphic
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pressures to conform to taken-for-granted social rules, firms will tend to imitate the
behavior of other firms in order to gain or maintain legitimacy and increase their chances
for survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For example, in a study of firms in the oil and
gas, mining and forestry industries in Canada, Bansal (2005) found that institutional
mimicry (e.g., conducting an environmental audit in response to industry norms) was
positively associated with corporate sustainable development over time.
Legitimacy-seeking is therefore a central concept in institutional theory and is
defined as what is “appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values
and beliefs” (Suchman, 1995). At the individual level of the CEO, particularly salient is
the notion of moral legitimacy which rests on judgments about whether an activity should
or ought to be pursued (Suchman, 1995). Here, one could argue that regulatory,
normative and cognitive institutional pressures constrain a CEOs ability to pursue
strategies that might deviate from the norms of the industry lest he/she risk harming the
firm’s legitimacy.
Laws, regulations and other structural characteristics of the industry will impose
coercive isomorphic pressures on the firm to comply with accepted standards (DiMaggio
& Powell, 1983). Once a firm is established, maintaining legitimacy involves choosing
strategies that protect existing accomplishments (Suchman, 1995). If the environment is
turbulent or uncertain, mimetic isomorphic pressures will further push firms to copy the
actions of successful organizations within their field. Normative forces such as formal
education and professional networks will further constrain organizational choice as
organizations strive to ensure they provide similar benefits and services as other
competitors in the industry (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
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The institutional perspective and the upper echelon perspective are thus often
positioned as opposing theories regarding the role of agency in driving strategic actions
(Wasserman, Nohria & Anand, 2001). However, recent work has sought to marry the two
perspectives to demonstrate that CEOs and TMTs have strategic choice with regards to
how to deal with these institutional pressures (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Oliver (1991), for
example, presented a typology of organizational responses to institutional pressures that
ranged on a continuum from passive to active responses including: acquiescence,
compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation. The passive end of the spectrum can
be seen as traditional responses to environmental pressures as explored by institutional
theorists (imitation, compliance, accommodation) while the more active end incorporates
a perspective that is closer aligned to strategic choice (e.g.: contesting rules and
requirements). This is not dissimilar to Carroll’s (1979) original typology of firm
responses to stakeholder issues discussed earlier in this chapter. The reactive and
defensive end of the corporate social responsiveness continuum is informed by
institutional theory while accommodating and proactive strategies are informed by
strategic choice.
Most recently, Nadkarni and Barr (2008) demonstrated that managerial cognition
at the upper echelon level mediates the relationship between industry level factors
(velocity, or the speed and unpredictability of changes in the industry specifically) and the
speed of strategic response to changing environmental conditions. The mediation
argument was built around the logic that “top managers develop subjective
representations of the environment that, in turn, drive their strategic decisions and
subsequent firm action” (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008: 1395). The authors showed that top
managers differed with regards to their attention focus towards external environmental
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factors, both the task environment (aspects of the environment that have a direct impact
on the firm such as competitors, suppliers and customers) as well as the general
environment (more macro level dimensions of the environment such as social,
demographic, economic and political factors). Given that social issues in particular are in
the domain of the general external environment, it is therefore logical to deduce that top
management will also develop different subjective representations of these issues which
will impact the strategic decisions they make about how best to address these issues.
Bridging institutional theory with the upper echelon perspective therefore, one can see
how a CEO’s response to industry norms regarding corporate social responsibility will
also vary.
In the following section, I review the few studies that have looked at both
psychological and demographic determinants of CSR in general (including analogous
constructs such as corporate citizenship or stakeholder management) as well as
disaggregated CSR initiatives (such as philanthropy, environmental stewardship or ethics
programs). Further, I look at how industry level institutional pressures may impact this
relationship. In the process, I build a set of hypotheses that link executive orientation to a
firm’s preferred breadth and depth of corporate social strategy. The review is closely tied
to the issue interpretation literature where “the beliefs, ideologies, personal investment
and commitment form what we term the ‘values’ that managers hold, [which] play an
important role in the issues management process, specifically in the evaluation phase of
issues management” (Sharfman et al., 2000: p. 145). As such, the hypotheses build on a
broad review of empirical work done on different aspects of the strategic decision making
model and CSR. Yet, they also incorporate the element of time in a manner that goes
beyond the existing literature.
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Building on the literature review presented in Chapter 2, in this chapter, I
construct a set of hypotheses that begins with defining the expected trends in the
dependent variable - corporate social strategy, specifically the expected patterns in the
adoption of CSS by firms over time (Section 3.1). I then move to explain the variance in
these different rates of adoption over time from the upper echelon perspective, focusing
specifically on CEO openness as a predictive executive orientation (Section 3.2). I
conclude by presenting the expected moderating effects of managerial discretion and
industry norms (Section 3.3) on the relationship between an open executive orientation
and CSS from the perspective of institutional theory.
3.1 Patterns of Corporate Social Strategy over Time
Before examining the link between executive orientation and the rate of adoption
of corporate social strategy over time, two assumptions must be further developed: 1) that
there is a discernable pattern in the overall levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time
and 2) that there are significant variations between firms in their initial levels and rates of
adoption of CSS that can potentially be attributable to executive orientation.
Surprisingly, very little is known to date with regards to the role of time on the
rate of adoption of CSS (Bansal, 2005; Barnett, 2007; Shropshire & Hillman, 2007).
Rather, most studies of antecedents and outcomes of CSR, CSP or other like constructs
remain cross-sectional in design, or use multiple year averages, thus implying that firm
level CSS profiles are relatively stable over time (e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, 2000;
Strike et al., 2006). This is not unlike broader research in strategic management that, until
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recently, has often either neglected the role of time all together, or relegated it to ‘error’
when exploring firm level determinants of financial performance (Misangyi, Elms,
Greckhamer & Lepine, 2006; Short et al., 2006), leaving many open questions about the
function of time on patterns of strategic change.
Moving beyond cross-sectional relationships, the focus herein is on the
phenomenon of strategic change with regards to corporate social, environmental and other
stakeholder related issues. By strategic change, I mean “a difference in the form, quality,
or state over time in an organization’s alignment with its external environment” that
involves significant changes in resource deployments (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997: p.
49). Strategic change is an important construct in strategy research and fundamental to
discussions of firm performance in so far as adapting to environmental changes is seen as
a necessary condition of firm survival (Boeker, 1997; Porter, 1980). In the context of
today’s hypercompetitive dynamic contexts, ensuring continual fit between strategy and
environment becomes even more critical to competitive advantage (Wiggins & Ruefli,
2005).
Yet, consensus regarding how firms should manage stakeholder and social issues
remains elusive such that firms and their top managers have been left to understand,
interpret and choose a response to social and environmental issues without a clear
understanding as to which initiatives are most likely to yield benefits to the firm (Husted
& Allen, 2011). Historically, issues pertaining to CSR have been both complex and
difficult to address (Bansal, 2003, 2005; Margolis & Walsh, 2003) and are therefore
likely to illicit feelings of anxiety or uncertainty amongst some executives that enforce
the status quo. Research has shown that individuals will perceive issues as highly
ambiguous in situations where there is little access to information or where the
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information is highly inconsistent (Dutton et al., 1983) as is often the case regarding
information about CSR. In these instances, “uncertainty may repel rather than encourage
broad and varied interest in issues” as it affects an individual’s personal assessment
regarding the probability of being able to take action or to resolve an issue (Dutton &
Webster, 1988: p.671). In contrast, the more certain the context of strategic decision
making and the higher the perceived feasibility of strategic issue resolution the greater the
breadth and the diversity of issue interest (Dutton & Webster, 1988).
However, Rivoli and Waddock (2011) suggest that on the whole, over time, the
ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding a social or environmental issue subsides as
activities that would have once been considered ‘unheard of’, become normalized,
expected and even required by organizations. This temporal dynamism, they argue,
follows the pattern of a public issue life cycle, where an issue (e.g. child labour) first gets
put forth by an interest group, then gains media attention and awareness with the general
public, building pressure on organizations until finally solutions get codified into practice
(Rivoli & Waddock, 2011). Although at early phases in this dynamic process, firms have
considerable amount of discretion in terms of their response to the social issue, as the
importance of an issue or a stakeholder group gains power, legitimacy or urgency, the
salience of the issue to the strategy-environment fit increases (Mitchell et al., 1997) and
mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures induce more widespread institutionalization
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Although this evolution may be very slow, especially around highly contested
areas such as same sex partner employee benefits (Chuang, Church & Ophir, 2011) and
environmental responsibility (Hoffman, 1999), on the whole, we would expect that both
the overall levels of CSS as well as the rate at which firms adopt CSS should be
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increasing over time (Bansal, 2005). First, the pressures on firms to address or redress
negative externalities have grown over the last two decades (Waddock, Bodwell &
Graves, 2002); these have ranged from issues regarding exploitative labour practices in
the early 90s to ethical collapses at major corporations such as Enron, WorldCom and
Tyco in the early 2000s, from increased calls for environmental responsibility post Al
Gore’s “An Inconvenient Truth” (2006) to the most recent progress on formal legislative
equality for same sex couples. As such, the sheer breadth of social, environmental and
other stakeholder issues that now face organizations is of a magnitude unforeseen even a
decade ago (Paine, 2003).
With the increased transparency that has accompanied the internet boom, the
strength of stakeholder group pressure on firms to adopt CSR practices has also increased
during this same time frame (Waddock et al., 2002). While a firm may have been able to
keep their CSR profile relatively private in the early 1990s, by the mid-2000s,
stakeholders began to associate silence in this domain with something to hide. For
example, the sheer number of emerging global standards, codes and principles (e.g. the
United Nations Global Compact, ISO 14000, Fair Labour Guidelines etc.) has created an
expectation of corporate accountability and transparency in social, environment and other
stakeholder issue reporting, strengthening the normative pressures on all firms to comply
(Bansal, 2005; Matten & Moon, 2008; Waddock et al., 2002).
This increased access to information and increased pressure from employees,
suppliers, NGOs, communities and governments to be more socially responsible has
progressed such that a new set of social, environmental and ethical rules has come to
dominate discussions of the role of business in society (Googins et al., 2007; Paine,
2003). As Barnett (2007) explains: “When expectations of CSR increase, the value of the
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status quo necessarily declines” (p. 807). The increased value of positive stakeholder
relations has also been reflected in the market for capital: investors are now more than
ever looking to socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, with one in every eight
dollars, or over $3 trillion currently invested with companies that have passed this screen
(Social Investment Forum Foundation, 2010). Bird and colleagues (2007), for example,
found that the market’s attitude toward CSR activities has changed over time, with an
increased interest in diversity, employment and environmental issues in particular. In
order to meet increased stakeholder demands and to maintain access to capital, it is
logical to expect that, in general, the depth of commitment to social or environmental
issues by firms will have increased over time. Given that both the scope and the scale of
social issues facing the firm have grown over the last several decades, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Corporate Social Strategy follows a linear increasing
trajectory over time, such that (a) the aggregate corporate social
strategy, (b) the breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) the depth of
corporate social strategy pursued by firms, on average, will increase
over time.
However, despite overall increases in CSS over time, the individual response of
organizations to the increasing pressures may nonetheless differ such that the overall
levels and rates of adoption of social, environmental and other stakeholder programs
varies both within firms and between firms and industries over time (Googins et al.,
2007). Change within organizations is difficult (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), and change
with regards to shifting stakeholder pressures may be even more so (Hoffman, 1999). As
such, despite arguments that a great deal of homogeneity exists in firm’s responses to
social and environmental issues, as noted in the introduction, some firms appear to have
embraced expanded notions of corporate social responsibility, while others take the
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perspective that the only social responsibility of business is to increase profits (Friedman,
1970).
Basu and Palazzo (2008) suggest various cognitive, linguistic and conative
differences that can be observed in organizational sensemaking around CSR issues that
can explain observed variations in a firm’s CSR ‘character’. For example, organizations
have different identity orientations (individualistic, relational and collectivist) that will
affect how they think, as an organization, about social and environmental issues.
Similarly, Barnett (2007) suggests that firms develop varying capacities to deal with
stakeholder issues which in turn will affect their CSR efforts over time. Further, research
using the stages approach as detailed in Section 2.3.2, imply that at any point in time
firms will differ with regards to the approach taken (e.g., reactive, defensive, proactive)
to a variety of social and stakeholder domains (Maon et al., 2010). As such, it follows
that:
Hypothesis 2: Firms will differ significantly in their initial levels of (a)
aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social
strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy.
Hypothesis 3: Firms will differ significantly in their rates of adoption of
(a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social
strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy over time.

One of the main drivers of this variance has been hypothesized to rest with the
firm’s senior leaders (Waldman et al., 2006b; Wood, 1991). As such, I now turn to a
detailed exploration of the relationship between executive orientation and CSS.
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3.2 The Effect of Executive Orientation on Corporate Social Strategies: The Role of
CEO Openness
As introduced in the literature review, executive orientation is a complex construct
that includes both psychological and social factors such as a CEO‘s values, beliefs,
cognitions, attitudes, personality traits and worldviews as well as demographic proxies
that reflect variations in executive life experiences, such as educational, functional and
international background (Finkelstein et al., 2009). These factors combine to inform a
CEO’s executive orientation which in turn shapes the process of selective perception,
interpretation and construed reality that affects strategic decisions as depicted in Figure
2.2 (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
I argue here that CEO openness in particular can be used as a unifying concept
that combines a diverse set of research on both CEO cognitions as well as demographic
proxies that have been shown to influence strategic choice in organizations. Research on
individual openness has a rich history in numerous disciplines, including psychology
(Judge, Bono, Ilies & Gerhardt, 2002; Schwartz, 1996), sociology, organizational
behaviour (e.g., Berson, Oreg & Dvir, 2008), political (Sowell, 1987) as well as ethical
philosophy, where openness was first associated with the virtue of wisdom by the ancient
Greeks (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Furthermore, although not always explicitly
classified as a value, trait or other cognitive disposition, CEO and TMT openness has
been extensively invoked in the upper echelons and strategic change literatures as a
predictor of strategic decisions in organizations (e.g., Datta, Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2003;
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).
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In this section, I begin by reviewing the research on openness in general – first as
‘openness to change’ which has been shown to be a universal motivational value by
Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz &
Boehnke, 2004) amongst others, and second as ‘openness to experience’ which has been
demonstrated to be one of the Big Five personality traits emerging out of the field of
psychology (e.g., Judge, Piccolo & Kosalka, 2009). I then move into an exploration of
various CEO characteristics that have shown to be reflective of an open executive
orientation (liberal worldview, functional background, educational background and
international experience)(Finkelstein et al., 2009), building a series of direct effect
hypotheses linking an open executive orientation to the initial levels and rates of adoption
of CSS by firms over time. I conclude with a discussion of possible moderators of the
relationship between executive orientation and CSS.
3.2.1 Openness to Change
Individual openness to change has been extensively studied as a motivational
value that drives individual behaviour (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). By motivational value, I
mean desirable, transituational goals that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives
(Schwartz, 1996: p.2), exerting internal pressure for individuals, including executives, to
behave in a certain way (Illies & Reiter-Palmon, 2008). Values are “enduring beliefs that
a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to
an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state” (Rokeach, 1973) and “conceptions
of the desirable that influence the way people select action and evaluate events”
(Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987: p. 550). As such, values are important drivers of behavior and
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can be prioritized in a hierarchical manner such that preference is given to certain values
over others (Locke, 1991; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).
Schwartz (1996) and his colleagues have identified and validated a set of ten
universal values that can be found across a broad range of social, religious and cultural
groups. As depicted in Figure 3.1, these universal values are further distinguished along
two axes: openness to change (stimulation, self-direction) vs. conservation (tradition,
conformity, security) as well as self-enhancement (power, achievement, hedonism) vs.
self-transcendence (universalism, benevolence). The circular structure of these values has
been confirmed in various studies that support the finding that competing dimensions do,
in fact, form polar opposites to each other (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2005;
Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). This means that pursuing opposing values simultaneously is
unlikely given competing motivational cores (Locke, 1991) -

for example, seeking

excitement and novelty (pursuit of stimulation values) is likely to circumvent behaviours
that restrain actions and inclinations (pursuit of conformity values) which lie on opposite
poles of the structure (Schwartz, 1996: 4).
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Figure 3.1: The Structure of Value Systems

Source: Schwartz, S. 1996. Value priorities and behavior: Applying a theory of integrated value systems. In
C. Seligman, J. M. Olson and M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The Ontario Symposium: Vol. 8. The psychology of
values (p. 1-24). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, p. 4.

Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the research that has looked into the
relationship between individual values and some facet of corporate social responsibility
or related construct focuses on the self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement poles. For
example, the self-transcendence values of benevolence and universalism have been linked
to ethical and socially responsible behaviour and attitudes (Crilly, Schneider & Zollo,
2008; Fukukawa, Shafer & Lee, 2007; Illies & Reiter-Palmon, 2008; Shafer, Fukukawa &
Lee, 2007), while self-enhancement values such as power and achievement, appear to be
positively related to destructive decisions in scenarios involving bribery, coercion,
deception, theft or discrimination (Fritzsche & Oz, 2007; Illies & Reiter-Palmon, 2008).
Similarly, several authors have suggested that personal idealistic/altruistic motives or
benevolence values need to be taken into account as managerial drivers of CSR initiatives
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(Choi & Wang, 2007; Hemingway & Maclagan, 2004). Egri and Herman (2000) found
that managers in the environmental sector in particular attributed higher importance to
self-transcendence values as compared to managers in general. Agle, Mitchell and
Sonnenfeld (1999) also argue that a CEO’s self vs. other direction values should help
determine the strength of stakeholder salience in organizations.
Because values influence how people evaluate situations and make choices
regarding these situations (Feather, 1995; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004), it seems evident that
individuals who are motivated by self-transcendence values will evaluate, interpret and
make different decisions regarding CSR than individuals who are motivated by selfenhancement motives. Less clear, however, is how the opposite poles - openness to
change vs. conservation values - may affect individual perceptions and interpretations of
corporate social responsibility (Crilly et al., 2008). Schwartz (1996) describes the
opposing dimensions of openness vs. conservation as the “conflict between emphases on
own independent thought and action and favoring change versus submissive selfrestriction, preservation of traditional practices and protection of stability” (p. 5).
Openness to change thus encompasses self-direction and stimulation values while
conservation values include security (safety, harmony and stability of society, of
relationships, and of self), conformity (restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses
likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms) and tradition
(respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or
religion provide the self) (Schwartz, 1996: p. 3).
In the few CSR/ethics related studies that have included the openness to change
and conservation axes, associations between an individual’s openness and ethical, social
and environmental decision making have been mixed: some have found no relationship
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between openness/conservation and ethical decision making (Fritzsche & Oz, 2007),
while others report both marginally significant negative relationships between traditional
values (as part of the conservation construct) and support for corporate and environmental
accountability (Fukukawa et al., 2007) as well as positive relationships between
conformity and the importance of being ethical and socially responsible (Shafer et al.,
2007).
This may not be all together surprising, as CSR is an inherently ambiguous
concept (see Section 2.1) and challenges traditional perceptions of the role of business in
society (Friedman, 1970). As a result, no overarching consensus on how firms should
manage stakeholder and social issues has emerged, rendering issues related to CSS as
both complex and difficult to address (Bansal, 2003, 2005; Margolis & Walsh, 2003). In
this scenario, adoption of CSR policies may be perceived by some strategic leaders as an
opportunity and by others, as a challenge to the existing status quo. For example, CSS
may incorporate contested ‘new’ initiatives supporting a diverse workforce, including
protection and promotion of women, visible minorities and gay/lesbian rights. CEOs with
an open executive orientation may embrace the adoption of these initiatives, while others
may perceive the pursuit of these policies to be in conflict with their conformity and
tradition values. “Leaders who possess strong security values focus on the creation and
preservation of clear and explicit practices. To maintain stability and order these leaders
are likely to employ set routines and to determine clear and strict rules and procedures”
(Berson et al., 2008: p. 618-619) that serve to maintain the status quo.
The strategy literature is replete with examples that investigate both the
determinants and the outcomes of senior leadership commitment to the status quo.
McClelland, Liang and Barker III (2010) summarize a CEO’s commitment to the status
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quo as a belief in the enduring correctness of current organizational strategies and
profiles. As such, conservation values which are tied to security, conformity and tradition
values may slow adoption of new CSR policies such that firms run by CEOs with a less
open executive orientation may have narrower and shallower corporate social strategies.
For example, in a study of 35,000 European respondents, Schwartz found support
that individuals driven by openness to change values were more likely than individuals
driven by conservation values to support the statement that “gay men and lesbians should
be free to live their own life as they wish” (Schwartz, 2005: p. 3-4). Similarly, expanding
the firm’s mandate into the realm of environmental issues may also require openness to
change. To wit, Egri and Herman (2000) found that environmental managers displayed a
greater degree of openness to change than did other corporate managers.
The competing openness to change vs. conservation poles of the universal system
of values thus has the potential to inform hypotheses regarding executive orientation and
corporate social strategies. As openness to change implies a broader scope regarding the
selective perception and hence interpretation process, an open executive orientation may
affect both the choice of extending the depth of CSS in an area (e.g., adding gay/lesbian
rights to existing diversity efforts) and expanding the breadth of CSS outside more
traditional approaches to CSR (e.g., from a singular focus on philanthropy, to instigating
environmental initiatives).
3.2.2 Openness to Experience
Parallel to the discussion of openness to change as a motivational value,
psychologists have recently converged on a five factor model of individual personality
traits which include openness to experience. The Big Five personality traits, as they are
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often called, are said to capture, on the whole, most of the salient dimensions of various
existing personality inventories (Judge et al., 2002; Judge et al., 2009) and include:
openness to experience, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion and emotional
stability. Similar to individuals who are open to change, individuals who are open to
experience are said to display curiosity, creativity and flexible thinking (Thoresen, Bliese,
Bradley & Thoresen, 2004), tend to be imaginative, nonconforming, unconventional and
autonomous (Judge et al., 2002) and intelligent, perceptive, tolerant, cultured and
inquisitive (Judge, Thoresen, Pucik & Welbourne, 1999). Furthermore, “because of their
broad interests, divergent thinking, and receptiveness to a wide range of stimuli, CEOs
with high openness to experience are likely to develop broad fields’ of vision by
considering multiple strategic perspectives” (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010: p. 1056).
Strategy researchers have long called for a more comprehensive use of personality
theory in strategic leadership research (Cannella & Monroe, 1997), yet the area remains
underdeveloped (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010).

Rather, the trait-based approach to

leadership, which dates back to the 1930’s and 1940’s, fell out of favour with Stogdill’s
(1948) influential review that concluded that there was little theoretical justification to
link personality characteristics to effective leadership (Peterson, Smith, Martorana &
Owens, 2003).
However, in a recent meta-analysis, Judge and colleagues (2002) found evidence
that the Big Five personality traits are, in fact, to varying degrees, both determinants of
leadership emergence and of leadership effectiveness in general (Judge et al., 2002). As a
result, trait-based theories of leadership have recently seen a resurgence of interest, with
new studies on the organizational effects of executive dispositions such as narcissism
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) and hubris (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005) as well as direct
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tests of CEO Big Five personality traits on various organizational outcomes. For example,
Peterson et al. (2003) found that CEO openness was significantly related to TMT risktaking and intellectual flexibility, while Nardkarni & Herrmann (2010) demonstrated that
it was related to strategic flexibility. At the manager level, openness to experience has
been shown to be a key factor in risk tolerance (along with low risk aversion and
tolerance for ambiguity) which was then found to be positively related to coping with
organizational change (Judge et al., 1999).
The Big Five personality trait of conscientiousness also has some similarities to
the motivational value of conservatism in that conscientiousness reflects the degree to
which someone is committed to established rules (Peterson et al., 2003). As CEO’s high
on conscientiousness “rely almost exclusively on known strategies and selectively ignore
new and unique strategies that challenge their existing assumptions, they are likely to
develop narrow fields of vision and selective perception bias that predisposes them to
ignore environmental stimuli that do not match existing assumptions” (Nadkarni &
Herrmann, 2010: p. 1053). Of all of the Big Five personality traits, CEO
conscientiousness was the only disposition found to inhibit strategic flexibility at the firm
level (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010).
Both openness to change and openness to experience are thus pertinent to the
discussion regarding the degree to which a CEOs field of vision will include CSR as
either an opportunity or a threat (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003), in turn affecting
strategic decisions both regarding the overall depth of commitment to CSS as well as the
rate of adoption of social and environmental initiatives over time. For example, Sharma et
al. (1999) demonstrated that the variance in environmental responsiveness strategies can
be attributed to how managers interpret environmental issues. If managers perceive the
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environmental issue as an opportunity, they pay more attention to information about the
potential gains from environmental initiatives and develop a more proactive
environmental strategy. In contrast, other managers “clearly expected a loss to accrue
from issues having to do with the natural environment” (Sharma et al., 1999: p.100) and
were therefore less open to pursuing deeper engagement on environmental issues.
In summary, research has suggested that executive openness to experience is an
antecedent to strategic change and that one might expect individuals high on openness to
experience, “in a strategy-making context, to be more prone than closed individuals to
undertake proactive strategies whose outcomes are unknown” (Mullins & Cummings,
1999: p. 470). In what follows, I extend the link between openness and strategic change
in organizational and institutional environments to decisions pertaining to social,
environmental and other stakeholder issues.
3.3 Openness as an Executive Orientation
Combining elements of openness to change and openness to experience, in the
upper echelon literature, CEO openness is characterized as an executive orientation that is
“a composite of such facets of CEO personality as awareness of multiple perspectives,
valuing discourse and debate, and openness to new ideas” and has been described as “a
virtual prerequisite for adaptability to changing circumstances” (Finkelstein et al., 2009:
p. 149). Recently, CEO openness to change has been conceptualized as a combination of
CEO age, tenure and education level (Datta et al., 2003) or age, tenure and functional
background (Musteen, Barker III & Baeten, 2006). However, CEO openness has been
effectively gauged by several characteristics of which the most pertinent to a discussion
of CSS include: functional background, functional breadth, international experience and
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educational specialization which are discussed in this section. I begin, however, by
introducing a less studied characteristic that may be an even more direct reflection of
CEO openness – CEO liberal worldview.
3.3.1 CEO Liberal Worldview
A particularly salient, yet overlooked, line of inquiry with regards to individual
openness originates in both the political science and psychology literatures. Here, an
extensive body of research illustrates the sharp differences in issue perception and
interpretation of individuals who embrace a liberal vs. conservative political worldview
(Haidt & Graham, 2007; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003; Thorisdottir, Jost,
Liviatan & Shrout, 2007). According to motivated social cognition theory, individuals
embrace a conservative worldview in a desire to avoid change, disruption and ambiguity
(Jost et al., 2003; Thorisdottir et al., 2007). Furthermore, a conservative ideology serves
to reduce fear, anxiety and uncertainty and helps rationalize inequality amongst
individuals. In contrast, people with a liberal ideology have been found to score higher on
measures of ‘openness to experience’ and ‘uncertainty tolerance’ demonstrating different
psychological needs that subsequently affect the management of uncertainty and threat
(Fay & Frese, 2000; Thorisdottir et al., 2007). As such, the openness to change vs.
conservation values divide has been explicitly likened to the liberal vs. conservatism
chasm in the political and psychology literatures (Feather, 1995) and may be an important
predictor of CEO interpretations of CSR issues as opportunities or threats.
With regards to understanding the variations in interpretations as they pertain to
CSS in organizations, Tetlock (2000) found evidence that conservatives are more likely
than liberals to endorse the dominant shareholder model of corporate governance over the
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broader stakeholder model. Further, conservatives were more likely than liberals to
support policies that boost profits but hurt racial minorities and the poor (Tetlock, 2000).
These worldviews extended to employee evaluations of senior leadership as well. For
example, he found that conservative employees “judged top management more
favourably when it favoured a monistic accountability regime centered around
shareholders” while egalitarians (liberals) attributed “the most positive traits to top
managers who endorsed the pluralistic regime of accountability to stakeholders” (p.314).
Tetlock (2000) concluded that the stand one took on the shareholder/stakeholder debate
“reflected abstract political sympathies (property rights of well-capitalized principals
versus human rights of economic underdogs)” (p.314) and that political ideology emerged
in his study as a consistent predictor of “the value spins that managers placed on
decisions” (p.293).
In this way, one can understand individual judgement and cognitive bias as
stemming from deep epistemological and ideological world views (Tetlock, 2000: p. 296)
that can, in turn, predict managerial reactions to a broad assortment of issues. Yet,
surprisingly, the political science and psychology literatures on the subject of political
ideologies have not hitherto been integrated into the upper echelon perspective. In fact,
despite a rich history of assessing the political contributions of organizations in the
strategy field (under the umbrella of non-market strategies)(Hillman, Keim & Schuler,
2004), very little has been done to understand the nature of individual political
dispositions of top executives (Burris, 2001).
However, following the logic of motivated social cognition theory described
above, it could be argued that CEOs, who identify with a more conservative philosophy,
are less likely to be open to embracing the changing nature of the social, ethical and
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environmental demands being imposed on businesses at the turn of this century (Paine,
2003). Despite calls for increased corporate social responsiveness, research has suggested
that “between 1980-2000, goal ambiguity for publicly traded U.S. corporations [in fact
has] greatly diminished…an emphatic culture of “shareholder value” emerged. In the
past, a broad set of corporate objectives – such as increased size, stable employment, and
corporate “citizenship” – had been viewed as plausible goals for firms to pursue…, but in
more recent years the maximization of shareholder value became paramount” (Hambrick,
Finkelstein, Cho & Jackson, 2004: p. 319). In this context, deviating from the shareholder
primacy norm requires an individual openness to change, openness to new experiences
and a tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty.
I contend that this openness to change and tolerance for ambiguity is more likely
found in CEOs with a liberal vs. conservative worldview. “The core ideology of
conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated
by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat”
(Jost, 2003: 339). Fay and Frese (2000), for example, found that conservatives had more
difficulty adapting to the “new requirements that evolve with tomorrow’s jobs” (p.171),
including issues pertinent to CSR such as a woman’s right to work. In a meta-analysis of
88 samples, across 12 countries which included over 22,000 cases, Jost et al. (2003)
confirmed that several psychological variables including intolerance of ambiguity,
uncertainty avoidance, fear of threat and loss all predict politically conservative
worldviews.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that these psychological variables, especially
political ideology, are fixed in theories of personality, epistemic and existential needs and
ideological rationalizations (Jost et al., 2003) and are thus mostly ingrained and stable
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over time (Burris, 2001). From an upper echelon perspective, Henderson et al. (2006)
went so far as to argue that “although a CEO’s paradigm may show some elasticity when
faced with the need for change, it will be the rare executive who can greatly transform his
or her mindset, aptitudes, and skills” (p.447). Given that an individual’s worldview, in
particular his/her political ideology reflects differing degrees of openness, and therefore
affects the selective perception and interpretation of external stimuli, a CEOs liberal vs.
conservative worldview is likely to affect the overall scope, breadth and depth of a firm’s
corporate social strategy. As such, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: Firms run by CEOs with a liberal worldview will have a
higher initial level of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth
of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy
than firms run by CEOs with a conservative worldview.
Hypothesis 5: Firms run by CEOs with a liberal worldview will have a
higher rate of adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b)
breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social
strategy than firms run by CEOs with a conservative worldview.

3.3.2 Functional Background
It has been suggested that CEO’s openness to change in particular can also be
ascertained by understanding their functional background (Musteen et al., 2006), with
most research pitting CEOs from output functions (e.g., marketing, sales) against CEOs
with a dominant career background in throughput functions (e.g., accounting, finance)
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). Specifically, because careers in marketing or sales emphasize
growth and require an openness to new product and market opportunities, executives with
a dominant background in output functions are more likely to be open to initiatives that
require risk and change, such as R&D (Barker & Mueller, 2002) or international
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acquisitions (Matta & Beamish, 2008). In contrast, executives who have a dominant
career history in throughput functions “have a more conservative stance toward change
because of the emphasis that the throughput functional areas place on maintaining
control, improving efficiency and adherence to planned targets” (Hambrick & Mason,
1984; Musteen et al., 2006: p. 606)
Although there have been contradicting studies on the role of functional
experience in selective perception (e.g., Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Walsh, 1988), there is
enough evidence to suggest that executives from specific functional backgrounds are
likely to rely on cognitive heuristics or shortcuts especially in cases where the strategic
stimuli is ambiguous and executives have less time to consider it (Finkelstein et al.,
2009). As such, CEOs with a dominant functional background in throughput functions
may specifically resort to established rules, regulations and procedures and are thus less
likely to be willing to look at initiatives that broaden or deepen a firm’s commitment to
CSR. In fact, in the few studies that have looked at the relationship between functional
background and CSP, it has been shown that firms that have scored high on CSP
measures are more likely to be lead by CEOs with backgrounds in output functions such
as marketing, research and product development vs. throughput functions such as
engineering, accounting and finance (Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009; Thomas & Simerly,
1994).
A CEOs career history is also determined by the variety of functions to which
he/she has been exposed, with the greater the breadth of functional experience, the greater
the exposure to different modes of thinking, problem interpretation and solution
generation (Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996). The willingness to work at various different
functional positions can also be seen as a direct reflection of an individual’s openness to
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experience as well. With regards to CSP in particular, research has demonstrated that the
breadth of a CEO’s functional background in ‘stakeholder’ functions (marketing, sales,
operations, R&D, public relations, medical/education/government service) is, in fact,
related to CSP strengths (Manner, 2010), while in the general management literature,
Geletkanycz and Black (2001), found that functional diversity is negatively associated
with commitment to the status quo (or positively associated with strategic change). A
CEO’s breadth of functional background thus supports arguments regarding the
broadening effects of job rotations on the receptivity to new ideas, new ways of thinking
and operating which may be pertinent to expanding notions of a corporation’s role in
society.
Interestingly, Beyer et al. (1997) found that functional background, while not
necessarily related to an executive’s selective perception, is related to selective
imperception concluding that “functional experience does not increase managers’
attention to related information but instead tends to restrict the areas of information to
which they pay attention…managers’ functional experience tends to narrow their
cognitive processing” (p.730). Functional conditioning can therefore serve to either
broaden or restrict the areas to which one pays attention and thus the subsequent
strategies one chooses to pursue; executives with a more diverse functional background
will have a broadened field of vision thus perceiving and acting on a broader set of
stakeholder or social issues. Executives with a less diverse functional background, on the
other hand, may be prone to selective imperception, not perceiving the saliency of certain
stakeholder or social issues and thus disengaging from corporate social strategies. This
again, suggests that a CEO’s functional background may explain why some firms do, or
do not, pursue stakeholder or social issues in varying degrees over time such that:
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Hypothesis 6: Firms run by CEOs with dominant functional experience
in output functions will have a higher initial level of (a) aggregate
corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social strategy and (c)
depth of corporate social strategy than firms run by CEOs with dominant
functional experience in throughput functions.
Hypothesis 7: Firms run by CEOs with dominant functional experience
in output functions will have a higher rate of adoption of (a) aggregate
corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social strategy and (c)
depth of corporate social strategy than firms run by CEOs with dominant
functional experience in throughput functions.
Hypothesis 8: Firms run by CEOs with a greater breadth of experience
in multiple functional areas will have a higher initial level of (a)
aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social
strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than firms run by
CEOs with a narrower breadth of experience in multiple functional
areas.
Hypothesis 9: Firms run by CEOs with a greater breadth of experience
in multiple functional areas will have a higher rate of adoption of (a)
aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social
strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than firms run by
CEOs with a narrower breadth of experience in multiple functional
areas.

3.3.3 International Experience
A CEO that has lived or worked abroad has demonstrated, to a degree, openness
to experience and research has shown that a CEO’s level of international experience can
have a direct or indirect affect on firm level strategies including level of diversification
and financial performance (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Carpenter, Sanders &
Gregersen, 2001; Daily, Certo & Dalton, 2000; Finkelstein et al., 2009). For example,
Carpenter and Fredrickson (2001) demonstrated that the international experience of the
TMT is positively related to a firm’s global strategic posture which includes the
proportion of foreign sales, foreign production and geographic diversity. Similarly, Roth
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(1995) found that CEOs with international experience had a strong positive impact on
firm performance in cases with high international interdependence (vs. low
interdependence) and Herrmann and Datta (2002) found that CEO international
experience was positively related to the strategic choice of full-control foreign market
entry (greenfield investments or acquisitions) over shared-control entry (joint ventures,
contractual agreements).
The logic behind these arguments is that CEO or TMT international experience
brings with it increased skills and abilities to manage in different cultures and contexts
that diminish the “idea of foreign” with regards to individual values and cognitive
orientations (Herrmann & Datta, 2002). This reduces levels of uncertainty and broadens a
CEOs perception of external stimuli (Finkelstein et al., 2009). “Executives often report
that their international assignment experience has lasting impacts on their worldviews and
how they manage their firms” and that “their perceptions and personality take on a more
international orientation resulting in a global mindset as a result of exposure to different
value systems and institutional environments” (Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009: p. 476).
Slater and Dixon-Fowler (2009) suggest that international experiences may also lead to
increased interest in world political and social issues, greater open-mindedness and an
increased sense of responsibility and empathy that can lead to greater corporate social
performance. Testing the relationship between CEO international experience and an
aggregate score for CSP, Slater and Dixon-Fowler (2009) found support for this positive
relationship.
As such, I argue that CEOs with international experience are better equipped not
only to manage the financial challenges of competing in global markets, but also to
address ambiguous and complex global social challenges such as human rights, the
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environment, peace, conflict and justice. This increased cognitive ability will thus allow
CEOs with international experience to better navigate distal, ambiguous, indirect, and
unpredictable social and environmental issues. Having been exposed to business in an
international environment, CEOs with international experience will therefore also have a
broader selective perception and issue interpretation filter than CEOs with a purely
domestic resume, allowing them to enact both broader and deeper corporate social
strategies over time. As such, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 10: Firms run by CEOs with international experience will
have a higher initial level of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b)
breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social
strategy than firms run by CEOs without international experience.
Hypothesis 11: Firms run by CEOs with international experience will
have a higher rate of adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy,
(b) breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social
strategy than firms run by CEOs without international experience.

3.3.4 Educational Background
Various studies have suggested that an executive’s educational background will
shape the nature of the strategies they choose to pursue and may thus also be important to
strategic decisions pertaining to CSR. Educational background might refer to both the
amount of formal education obtained (high school through to graduate school) as well as
the nature of the degree obtained (e.g. law, business, engineering etc.). Studies often
suggest that the greater the level of education obtained the greater an individual’s level of
cognitive ability (Hitt & Tyler, 1991). For example, various authors have found that key
strategic decision makers with higher levels of education are more willing to engage in
complex resource allocation decisions such as investments in innovation (Bantel &
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Jackson, 1989; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981) or diversification (Wiersema & Bantel,
1992). Datta, Rajagopalan and Zhang (2003), for example, argue specifically that CEO
educational background is a key component of openness to change and found in turn this
is negatively related to strategic persistence (a similar construct to commitment to the
status quo). Similarly, Schwartz (2005) also found a direct negative correlation between
greater levels of education and traditional conservation values which are diametrically
opposed to openness to change.
However, we might expect to find a different relationship between the nature of
the degree obtained and openness to change. Although cognitive ability may increase,
certain specializations (e.g., MBA, JD/LLB) may in fact reinforce conservation values
over openness to change values. In reviewing the effect of an MBA education on strategic
choices in particular, Finkelstein et al. (2009) conclude that the behavior of MBA
educated executives does in fact differ from executives without MBAs in that they are
more likely to follow “financial textbook guidelines” to avoid big losses or mistakes. This
seems to imply that an MBA education may influence strategic decisions such that these
are more conformist to trends in the industry (Finkelstein et al., 2009: p. 110).
With regards to CSR in particular, scholars have suggested that business school
agendas have contributed, in part, to the ethical and moral collapse witnessed in the early
years of this century by promulgating an “ideology based gloomy vision” of the selfinterested profit-maximizing homo economicus and his/her role in society (Ghoshal,
2005). The popular press mirrors this perspective in that executives with MBAs are
assumed to pursue greedy or selfish wealth accumulation over a broader stakeholder or
social issue participation approach to management. For example, in a recent editorial
about the causes of the current financial crisis, the Economist scathed:
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“Most of the people at the heart of the crisis—from Dick Fuld at Lehman
Brothers to John Thain at Merrill Lynch to Andy Hornby at HBOS—had
MBAs after their name (Mr Hornby graduated top of his class at HBS). In
recent years about 40% of the graduates of America’s best business schools
ended up on Wall Street, where they assiduously applied the techniques that
they had spent a small fortune learning. You cannot both claim that your
mission is “to educate leaders who make a difference in the world”, as HBS
does, and then wash your hands of your alumni when the difference they
make is malign” (Economist, September 24, 2009)
.
In a similar vein, research has shown that both undergraduate business students
(McCabe & Treviño, 1995) and graduate business students are more likely to cheat than
students in other disciplines (McCabe, Butterfield & Treviño, 2006). Similarly, a series of
experiments in the area have demonstrated that economics students are more likely than
other students to free-ride, keep more resources to themselves, defect in a prisoner’s
dilemma game, donate less to charity, be more corruptible and make choices that benefit
themselves rather than their companies (Ferraro et al., 2005).

Economics training

emphasizes the assumption of self-interest as a predictor of how people will behave and
thus also acts as a strong norm that in turn influences students to behave in a selfinterested manner (Daboub, Rasheed, Priem & Gray, 1995; Krishnan, 2008).
Having reviewed the extensive literature in the area, Ferraro et al. (2005) conclude
that “the argument and empirical implication are straightforward: one effect of economics
training is to strengthen beliefs in the pervasiveness, appropriateness, and desirability of
self-interested behaviour, which, in turn, should lead to exhibiting more self-interested
behaviour” (p.14). Although economics training and MBA training differ, they share
many of the same underlying assumptions about the nature of human behavior (Ghoshal,
2005) such that enhancing shareholder value becomes more important for MBA students
over the course of their training than does serving customers or employees (Pfeffer,
2005). Ghoshal (2005) goes so far as to argue that the management theories espoused by
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business schools have actively “freed business students from any sense of moral
responsibility” regarding the consequences of their strategic decisions on broader
stakeholder groups and society as a whole.
Other research has corroborated this claim, showing specifically that MBA
students, regardless of functional background (production, sales, marketing, finance etc.),
tend to pay less attention to human resource (HR) issues (Beyer et al., 1997). Similarly,
MBA students were less ethically sensitive to issues affecting societal issues than agent or
principal issues (Simga-Mugan, Daly, Onkal & Kavut, 2005). Perhaps most shockingly,
Williams, Barrett and Brabston (2000) found that TMTs with more MBAs moderated the
relationship between firm size and corporate illegal activity, such that TMT with more
MBAs had more Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) violations than TMTs with fewer MBAs.
Finkelstein et al. (2009) therefore suggest that executives with MBAs may have a
cognitive bias against the “softer” side of business, which includes HR, employee and
other stakeholder issues. This is speculated to be related to the nature of the MBA
curriculum which emphasizes the financial (aka “rational”) business imperatives over the
people dimensions of business relations. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) demonstrated, for
example, that “CEOs with MBAs appear to be on average more aggressive, choosing to
engage in a higher level of capital expenditures, hold more debt, and pay less dividends”
(p. 1204) than CEOs without MBAs.
In the end, Finkelstein et al. (2009) suggest that: “left unanswered in all this is
whether the shareholder maximization ethic of MBA-educated executives affects the
firm’s attention to other stakeholders, such as customers, employees, and communities”
(p. 110). Given the above research however, it would be logical to propose that MBA
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curricula do in fact emphasize shareholder maximization above all other responsibilities
promoting the economic norm of self-interest as the dominant paradigm. As such, in a
process of selective perception or imperception similar to that of continuous narrowing of
focus related to functional background, executives with MBAs will be less likely to pay
attention to stakeholder or social issues and therefore less likely to invest in broad or deep
corporate social strategies. Given this research, I would expect that:
Hypothesis 12: Firms run by CEOs with MBAs will have a lower initial
level of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate
social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than firms run
by CEOs without MBAs.
Hypothesis 13: Firms run by CEOs with MBAs will have a lower rate of
adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of
corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than
firms run by CEOs without MBAs.
A similar argument can then be made for other degree programs that may also
induce a conservative approach to dealing with stakeholder or social issues. Like the
effects of functional background, specialization in a field such as law, may also affect an
executives’ selective perception, interpretation and choice in the strategic decision
making process (Hitt & Tyler, 1991). CEOs from these highly specialized educational
backgrounds have gone through an educational process that ensures they will “view
problems in a similar fashion, see the same policies, procedures and structures as
normatively sanctioned and legitimated, and approach decisions in much the same way”
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: p. 153). Although they belong to professional associations
that mandate ethical behaviour, they nonetheless are subject to strong normative forces to
maintain the status quo. As a result, they may be less open to change regarding social and
environmental programs than CEOs from a less specialist educational background.
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Although little empirical work has been done to distinguish the impact of
particular specialist degrees on firm level outcomes, some research has shown that
executive degree type will effect strategic choice (Hitt & Tyler, 1991) and that
educational specialization heterogeneity among the TMT members is necessary for
changes in corporate strategy (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). In addition, Barker and
Mueller (2002) found that CEOs with legal degrees were less likely to spend on R&D
arguing in a footnote that legal programs are more likely to attract individuals that are
less open to innovation in general. With regards to CSR, no research of which I am aware
has looked at the impact of a law degree on the levels or rate of adoption of CSS.
However, Manner (2010) found that CEOs with bachelors degrees in the humanities
rather than in economics/management were more positively related to corporate social
strengths, arguing that this type of educational background provides the broader
perspective required to face stakeholder decisions. As such, I expect that:
Hypothesis 14: Firms run by CEOs with law degrees will have a lower
initial level of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of
corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than
firms run by CEOs without law degrees.
Hypothesis 15: Firms run by CEOs with law degrees will have a lower
rate of adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of
corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than
firms run by CEOs without law degrees.

Having examined the individual CEO characteristics reflective of an open
executive orientation and their relationship to CSS, I now turn to a discussion of potential
moderators.
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3.4 The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion and Industry Norms
Despite the predicted direct effects between CEO openness and CSS, there are
nonetheless moderating factors that may dampen the strength of these relationships. Here,
I examine two such possible moderators: managerial discretion and industry norms.
3.4.1 Managerial Discretion
There is long debate in organizational studies regarding the actual magnitude of
the effect of strategic leaders on firm level outcomes, with one side arguing for the critical
role of the CEO in shaping strategic decisions and the other claiming that leaders are so
constrained by environmental factors that their effect on performance is almost trivial
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Wasserman et al., 2001). In seeking to bridge the gap between
the strategic choice perspective and more deterministic organizational theories such as
institutional theory, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) introduced the concept of
managerial discretion which they define as the “latitude of options top managers have in
making strategic choices” (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998: p. 179). This latitude of action is
then said to vary by industry, explaining differences in the effect of strategic leadership
on organizational outcomes given that CEOs operating in particular environments may
have to make choices in contexts that have inherently more constraints than others. For
example, some industries, such as banking, insurance, diversified finance, transportation,
utilities and pharmaceuticals, are de facto more highly regulated than others (Burris,
2001). A firm’s actions in these industries will, by definition, be more constrained than
firms in less regulated settings.
The degree of managerial discretion is derived from three sources: (1) individual
level characteristics (e.g. tolerance for ambiguity, internal locus of control), (2)
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organizational level factors (e.g., firm size, age, capital intensity) and (3) environmental
determinants such as product differentiability, market growth and demand instability
(which are predicted to be positively associated with discretion) as well as industry
structure, quasi-legal constraints and powerful outside forces (which are posited to be
negatively associated with managerial discretion) (Finkelstein et al., 2009). By
understanding these multi-level sources of constraint researchers are better poised to help
explain why CEOs might “matter” more in some contexts and less so in others
(Finkelstein et al., 2009).
Most research on managerial discretion, however, has focused on individual (e.g.,
Buchholtz, Amason & Rutherford, 1999) or firm level determinants of discretion (e.g.,
Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Geletkanycz, Boyd & Finkelstein, 2001; Shropshire &
Hillman, 2007), thus largely neglecting the role of industry level constraints on
managerial discretion (Dutta & Beamish, 2009; Wasserman et al., 2001). For example,
Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) use multiple firm-level dimensions including sales growth,
R&D intensity, advertising intensity, sales growth volatility and capital intensity to
measure managerial discretion and its effects on CEO compensation finding a positive
correlation. Similarly, Geletkanyz, Boyd and Finkelstein (2001) controlled for managerial
discretion using only the firm level variable of capital intensity, also finding a positive
relationship to CEO compensation. Within the CSR literature, research supports that
firms are much more likely to experience large-scale shifts in stakeholder management
strategies when afforded greater latitude in decision making by these same firm level
factors (Shropshire & Hillman, 2007).
However, these studies do not adequately address how managerial discretion is
shaped by the degree to which a firm’s operating environment allows for variety and
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change at the firm level and the degree to which the organization itself is amenable to an
array of possible actions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987: p.379). Yet, research has
demonstrated that industry level determinants such as opportunity scarcity and resource
availability can constrain the level of CEO impact on firm performance as well as other
firm-level outcomes (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Wasserman et al., 2001). For
example, Dutta and Beamish (2009) recently found support that the environmental
determinants of managerial discretion (industry level product differentiability, market
growth, demand instability and industry structure) will effect a multinational manager’s
choice of foreign market entry mode (joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary), while
Wasserman, Nohria and Anand (2001) found that the degree of the “CEO effect” does in
fact vary by industry, concluding that in some contexts, such as communications
equipment manufacturing, CEOs have a lot more impact on firm performance than they
do in other industries, such as electric power generation. This research suggests that
industry level managerial discretion should not be treated just as a control variable, but
rather as an important determinant of firm behaviour.
This has also been demonstrated in the corporate social responsibility literature,
where research has found that institutional constraints will limit managerial discretion
over corporate social responses (Greening & Gray, 1994). In some industries, the level of
managerial discretion is high, and thus managers have greater latitude of action with
regards to stakeholder and social issues. In other industries, this discretion will be low
(Phillips, Berman, Elms & Johnson-Cramer, 2010). Despite the general tendencies within
the industry, studies have shown that top management commitment to social and political
issues allows the firm to adopt policies to address these issues even within the
institutional constraints imposed by the environment (Greening & Grey, 1994). Similarly,
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Aragon-Correa and Sharma (2003) suggested that reactive environmental investments
may be driven by regulatory pressures but that proactive approaches to environmental
strategy will “involve firm initiatives based on managerial discretion” (Aragón-Correa &
Sharma, 2003: p.74). Characteristics of the environment such as uncertainty, complexity
and munificence will influence the “latitude of options” a CEO will have in the
development of the firm’s strategy vis-à-vis a particular stakeholder or social issue.
The varying degrees of managerial discretion at the industry level have some
natural parallels to the literature on individual behaviours under strong vs. weak situations
(Mischel, 1977). “Strong situations are those in which most actors construe the situation
in the same way, most draw similar conclusions as to appropriate responses, and most are
motivated and able to respond” while “weak situations…are those in which there is
ambiguity about the meaning of the situation and the appropriateness of various
responses, where incentives for any particular response are unclear, and where
individuals’ ability to respond may vary” (Mullins & Cummings, 1999: p. 464). Mullins
and Cummings (1999) outline multiple industry level antecedents to situational strength
that include traditional measures of managerial discretion such as environmental
uncertainty and industry structure, suggesting that situational strength moderates the
relationship between executive’s openness to experience and proactive changes in the
firm’s strategy. The Mullin and Cummings (1999) model is not dissimilar to the one
proposed here where managerial discretion will moderate the relationship between
different measures of executive orientation and corporate social strategy.
In summary, even though the general level of managerial discretion may vary by
industry, the individual CEO will still have some degree of choice of strategic response to
stakeholder and social issues. If the level of managerial discretion in an industry is high,
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the impact of the CEO on corporate social strategies will be greater than if the level of
managerial discretion in the industry is low and there are thus greater institutional
constraints limiting executive action. Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho and Jackson describe
this mechanism as follows:
“In the face of increased discretion, executives make decisions on the
basis of their own personalized interpretations of the situations they face,
rather than by simply conforming to industry norms and conventions.
Managerial dispositions will play a larger role in determining the actions
and profiles that emerge from organizations. When this occurs, executive
characteristics (either psychological or demographic) become
significantly stronger predictors of organizational outcomes” (Hambrick
et al., 2004: p.339)
Given the above, I hypothesize that managerial discretion at the industry level will
moderate the strength of the relationship between CEO openness and CSS such that:
Hypothesis 16: The relationship between the executive orientation and
the initial status of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of
corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy will
be stronger in industries characterized by higher levels of managerial
discretion.
Hypothesis 17: The relationship between the executive orientation and
the rate of adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b)
breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social
strategy over time will be stronger in industries characterized by higher
levels of managerial discretion.

3.4.2 Industry Norms
Similar to the degree of managerial discretion, or latitude of action, at the industry
level, I argue that institutional pressures will also moderate the relationship between
executive orientation and corporate social strategy. Research suggests that CEOs may
become attached to the status quo as dictated by industry central tendencies around
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industry strategic norms (Carpenter, 2000; Haynes & Hillman, 2010) such that coercive,
mimetic or normative isomorphic pressures may also influence strategic decisions
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).
Recently, Campbell (2007) put forth an institutional theory of CSR which spelled
out many of the conditions under which some firms are likely to behave in more socially
responsible ways than others including economic conditions such as the overall health of
the economy and institutional conditions such as state regulations, industry-self regulation
practices, pressure from Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or other social
movement organizations and norms within professionalized settings. The central premise
here is that “firms are embedded in a broad set of political and economic institutions that
affect their behavior” (p.948) including the institutionalization of the shareholder primacy
norm. Campbell (2007) goes so far as to suggest that “the imperative of maximizing
profit and shareholder value is the root cause that may prevent corporations from acting in
socially responsible ways” (p. 952). Normative pressures in this regard imply that
“managers seek to act in ways that are deemed appropriate by other managers and
significant actors in their environment” (p. 958). If the norms in the industry are thus to
favor shareholder profit maximization over a stakeholder approach to management, it will
be more difficult for executives to choose to participate in broader or deeper CSS.
The norms of a particular industry around stakeholder management and social
issue participation may thus serve to constrain strategic choice. For example, if not a
single firm in an industry has adopted a proactive environmental policy, being the first
firm to do so carries with it significant risk, both in terms of legitimacy, but also with
regards to a potential loss of competitive advantage. Because corporate social strategies
involve financial commitment, choosing to pursue a stakeholder or social initiative has
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implied trade-offs and opportunity costs. Deviating from industry norms is therefore
fraught with difficulty.
At the industry level, institutional theory would thus seem to suggest that the
corporate social strategies of firms within that industry would be relatively similar to one
another given coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures. For example,
Shropshire and Hillman (2007) found that when an industry as a whole experienced a
shift in stakeholder management practices, firms within that same industry where 1.5
times more likely to also enact a significant change in their own stakeholder management
practices, demonstrating mimetic isomorphism. Other research supports that firm level
social performance is at least, in part, influenced by the industry in which they operate
(Brammer, Pavelin & Down, 2006; Garcia-Castro, Ariño & Canela, 2010).
As such, we might observe that particular industries share similar CSS profiles
(disengaged, derivative, dedicated, diffuse or devoted). This aggregate similarity of CSS
will then serve to constrain the behavior of individual firms and the strategic choices of
individual CEOs. I argue here that a CEOs executive orientation will still affect the
strategic choice of CSS. However, the industry level of CSS will serve to attenuate the
relationship between executive orientation and CSS such that:
Hypothesis 18: The relationship between executive orientation and initial
status of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of
corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy will
be stronger in industries with higher mean levels of CSS.
Hypothesis 19: The relationship between the executive orientation and
the rate of adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b)
breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social
strategy over time will be stronger in industries with higher mean levels
of CSS.
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Having argued for the direct effects of CEO executive orientation on CSS, as well
as the moderating effects of managerial discretion and industry norms, I now present the
multi-level model before moving on to measurement and testing of the hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 4: A LONGITUDINAL, MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF EXECUTIVE
ORIENTATION AND CORPORATE SOCIAL STRATEGY

In the previous sections, I reviewed the literature on CSR, upper echelons and
institutional theory building hypotheses regarding the relationship between an open
executive orientation and a firm’s corporate social strategy. What emerges then is a
longitudinal, mixed determinant, multi-level model of the relationship between executive
orientation and corporate social strategy over time.
Both Wood (1991) and Clarkson (1995) argued that the work conducted under the
broad umbrella of CSR has not been careful in ensuring the use of proper levels of
analysis. This multi-level model starts with the individual level drivers of CSR by
articulating the demographic factors inherent in the established construct of executive
orientation, specifically as it relates to CEO openness to change and experience. This
open executive orientation is then linked to CEO selective perception, interpretation,
construed reality and ultimately strategic choice of CSS (Finkelstein et al., 2009;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). At the firm level, through the mechanism of selective
perception (or imperceptions), executive orientation will affect a company’s choice of
breadth and depth of CSS ultimately resulting in disengaged, derivative, diffuse,
dedicated or devoted CSS profiles. At the industry level, institutional norms will attenuate
the relationship between the executive orientation and CSS. Given the multiple levels of
analysis, a mixed determinant, cross level model is appropriate (Kozlowski & Klein,
2000). Figure 4.1 visually depicts the mixed-determinant model, specifying these
multiple-level predictors of a single-level outcome.
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Figure 4.1: A Longitudinal, Multi-Level Model of Executive Orientation and CSS
Figure 4.1: A Longitudinal, Multi-Level Model of Executive Orientation and CSS
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The organizing principle behind the model, therefore, is that executive orientation,
through the process of selective perception, affects the strategic choices pursued by the
firm and therefore the total aggregate, as well as the breadth and depth of corporate social
strategy in which the firm engages. Importantly, this model explicitly includes change, in
that executive orientation is also predicted to affect a firm’s rate of adoption of CSS. To
date, no other model in the CSR domain, of which I am aware, does this.
It is critical in longitudinal, multi-level models to be very clear about the units of
analysis (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010). Here, despite a focus on the CEO, the unit of
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analysis is nonetheless the firm given that the outcome variables occur at the firm level.
As such, I am interested in both the intra-unit change over time in CSS (within firms) as
well as the inter-unit differences in change over time between firms and the inter-unit
difference in change over time between industries. As depicted in the model, I suggest
that an open executive orientation, as captured by a liberal worldview, output functional
background, greater breadth of functional experience, educational specialization and
international experience, can help predict both initial firm levels of CSS as well as the
change in CSS over time. Further, the model differs from extant research in this domain
as it is meant to highlight that CEOs of firms make choices regarding the corporate social
strategy they pursue; not only is the total CSS important, but the breadth and depth of
CSS pursued over time may also vary significantly.
Although multi-level theories and models are complex, there has been an increased
call for their use in the study of organizations (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson & Mathieu, 2007).
Theoretically, several authors have already attempted multi-level theories of CSR and like
constructs (Starik & Rands, 1995). For example, Aguilera, Rupp, Williams and Ganapathi
(2007) put forth a multi-level model of CSR which focuses on different motives for CSR
at the individual, organizational, national and transnational (intergovernmental and NGO)
levels. The role of the CEO and TMT in this model is also to direct strategic decisions
with regards to CSR as upper echelons have “the most direct power to influence the
firm’s engagement in CSR by developing corporate strategy and allocating resources to
different firm programs and practices” (Aguilera et al., 2007: p. 845). However, Aguilera
et al. (2007) do not incorporate the process of selective perception in this strategic choice.
Rather, they argue that “first and foremost, managers will implement CSR initiatives
when these align with their instrumental interests of enhancing shareholder value and
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increasing firm competitiveness and profitability so that managers can ensure firm
survival and raise their compensation packages, which are generally tied to profitability”
(p.847). This suggests that CEOs will only act if they see an instrumental value to
themselves of the proposed CSS. In contrast, rather than speculate on motives, I argue that
an open executive orientation will affect the selective perception and interpretation of
stakeholder and social issues which will in turn affect strategic choice.
Aguilera et al.’s (2007) model does, however, account for some field level
motivators such as governments and NGOs in determining a firm’s propensity to engage
in CSR (although it neglects the important role of industry norms). Bamberger (2008)
specifically points out the need for increased multi-level theorizing that includes context
theorizing, so that one can understand how firms are influenced by the phenomena in
which they are nested. Context theorizing requires researchers to build situational
conditions directly into theory, as I have done here. A multi-level model of strategic
leadership and corporate social strategies thus answers numerous calls for increased use
of multilevel theorizing in strategic management (Bamberger, 2008, Hitt et al. 2007,
Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).
In the next section I turn to the methodology used for testing the model and the
hypotheses.
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

This chapter outlines the choice of research method (Section 5.1), the research
design and analytic method (Section 5.2), sample creation (Section 5.3) and the
measurement of dependent, independent and control variables (Sections 5.4 – 5.6).
Decisions with regards to data lag-structures are also discussed (Section 5.7) before
moving on to the analysis of the data and findings in Chapter 6.
5.1 Choice of Research Method
Chief executives are “notoriously unwilling to submit themselves to scholarly
poking and probing” (Hambrick, 2007: 337) limiting the number of appropriate research
methods available for inquiry. For example, several studies that cross the upper
echelon/CSR streams have used survey methodology (e.g., Agle et al., 1999; Dennis,
Buchholtz & Butts, 2009; Sharfman et al., 2000) or experimental designs (e.g., Rose,
2007). However, response rates for both of these methods are usually low (Cycyota &
Harrison, 2006) 3 which limits not only reliability, but also specificity as one cannot
adequately test for industry effects. There are further difficulties with survey research,
specifically as it relates to the study of social responsibility which is likely to illicit
positive response bias, and to experimental designs using student samples which may or
may not be representative of actual executive behaviours (e.g., Beyer et al., 1997).
Nadkarni and Barr (2008) summarize the issue by stating that: “measuring top managers’

3

For example, Agle et al.’s (1999) survey of CEO values and stakeholder salience had an n=80 (13.6%
response rate); Sharfman et al.’s (2000) survey of CEO economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic values in
the chemical industry had an n=129 (22% response rate); Dennis et al.’s (2009) survey of CEO’s attitudes
towards philanthropy had an n=84 (17% response rate). Similarly, Rose’s (2007) experiment using board of
directors was limited to an n=34.
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cognition is a difficult task; cognitive structures cannot be measured directly and the very
act of asking individuals to reveal their beliefs can change them” (p.1404). In light of
these limitations, survey and experimental methodologies were ruled out for this study.
Given the difficulty in obtaining access to top executives as well as the difficulty
in directly observing executive orientation, archival analysis is often the preferred method
for upper echelon research (Hambrick, 2007). Although there has not been much research
into the link between strategic leadership and CSR, those studies that are most closely
related to this one have used archival analysis (e.g., Manner, 2010; Slater & DixonFowler, 2009; Thomas & Simerly, 1994). Furthermore, archival analysis has been
extensively used in strategy research (Finkelstein et al., 2009) and, most importantly, to
measure many of the independent variables used in this study including functional
background, educational background, international experience and tenure (Finkelstein et
al., 2009). These constructs are therefore well established in the literature, rendering
archival analysis an efficient and effective method to test the hypothesis. Lastly, archival
analysis is the only method that explicitly allows for an objective study on the adoption of
corporate social strategies over time.
5.2 Research Design and Analytic Method
The research design is therefore a quantitative study based on longitudinal
archival data collected from various sources (detailed in the following sections). Given
that the model is cross level, including a time varying dependent variable that is affected
by covariates at different levels, the research design calls for statistical testing using a
multilevel growth model (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). Because of the repeated yearly
observations of the dependent variable (total, breadth, depth of CSS) which are nested
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within firms within industries, traditional regression analyses are inappropriate as they
violate certain conditions required for testing (Hoffman, Griffin & Gavin, 2000).
Specifically, OLS regression requires that observations are i.i.d. (independent and
identically-distributed random variables). In this study, the data violate the assumption of
independence of observations in two ways: First, because a longitudinal data set was
built, consisting of up to 19 years of data for each firm, one cannot assume that the firmyear observations are independent of each other. By definition, a firm’s prior year social
performance will be related to next year’s social performance. Similarly, over the 19 year
period, each firm has several CEOs which are also not independent of the firm.
Second, the hypotheses regarding industry norms clearly indicate that a firm’s
choice of corporate social strategy will be influenced by the overall approach to CSS in
the industry and thus observations within industries are also related. This can be assessed
by evaluating the Intra-class Correlation (ICC) which measures group-level variance.
Clarke and Wheaton (2007) explain that “when there is little group dependency (ICC <
.2), single-level (ordinary least squares [OLS]) regression can yield unbiased estimates of
the fixed effects, but as the ICC increases, standard errors from OLS estimated
coefficients are biased downwards…making multilevel modeling the preferred method.”
(p. 314). In this study, the variance related to CSS at the firm level needs to be treated
separately from the variance in CSS at the industry level and hence both OLS and GEE
approaches can be problematic.
As such, a random coefficient modeling (RCM) strategy was used to test the
hypotheses. RCM is also commonly referred to as linear mixed modeling (LMM) or

79
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) (Hofmann, 1997; Hofmann, Griffin & Gavin, 2000) 4
and, when used with longitudinal data, also referred to more generally as growth curve
modeling (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010; West, Welch & Galecki, 2007). As a
methodology, RCM allows for the explicit modeling of the overall change in the
dependent variable(s) over time as well as the modeling of predictor variables and crosslevel interactions as required by this study’s hypotheses (Short et al., 2006). Put
differently, RCM allows for both descriptive and explanatory longitudinal research in that
it can be used to illustrate how a phenomenon has changed over time as well as to model
the determinants of this change process through tests of theoretical predictor variables
(Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010). Furthermore, because the relationships are modeled
independently at each level, the structure of the data does not rely on the i.i.d. assumption.
The use of multi-level RCM in strategy research in general is a relatively new
(e.g., Holcomb, Combs, Sirmon & Sexton, 2010; Misangyi et al., 2006; Short et al.,
2006). However, RCM is being used with increasing frequency in organizational
behaviour to study, amongst other relationships, the impact of leadership on individual
performance (Day, Sin & Chen, 2004), the role of the big five personality traits on
individual sales growth (Thoresen et al., 2004), the effect of various predictors of initial
newcomer performance on group performance improvement (Chen, 2005), and to model
the determinants of variations in unit-level absenteeism over time (Hausknecht, Hiller &
Vance, 2008).
In the field of CSR, the use of multi-level RCM is still rare, but not without
precedent. For example, Martin et al. (2007) tested managers’ propensity to bribe using
4

Many authors use HLM to describe the overall methodology when, in fact, HLM is better described as a
statistical package used for RCM.
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HLM methods, arguing for the need to partition the variance between firm and country
level predictors of behaviour. Similarly, Kassinis and Vafeas (2006) used HLM to assess
the toxic emissions of manufacturing plants suggesting that one could not assume that
plants within counties and counties within states are independent. Both of these studies,
however, remain cross-sectional. No research to date, of which I am aware, has used an
RCM methodology to assess the role of individual, firm and industry effects on the initial
levels and growth trajectories of corporate social strategy over time, although there have
been calls to apply RCM methods to the study of CSR (Short et al., 2006).
Because the steps involved in an RCM analytic method are quite detailed, the
specific models tested are introduced alongside the findings in Chapter 6. This is done
after the data, sample and variables are explained in the next sections.

5.3 Sample Creation
Data from the Kinder, Lyndenberg, and Domini (KLD) index was used to construct
the initial sample of firms for this thesis. The KLD database is acknowledged as the most
commonly used (Deckop et al., 2006; Waldman et al., 2006b), most complete (Hillman &
Keim, 2001) and the best source for information about firm level social performance
(Sharfman, 1996; Waddock, 2003). KLD analysts evaluate corporations on more than 280
data points to arrive at a ratings system designed to provide a snapshot of the company’s
environmental, social and governance related performance every year providing ratings
for every firm along seven different categories including: community, corporate
governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and product.
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Within these categories, KLD tracks a variety of CSR items that it considers either
areas of strength or concern and assigns these items a binary measure of either “1” or “0”
to demarcate either the presence or absence of the area of strength or concern. For
example, for the Community Relations category, KLD assigns a “1” or “0” to firm level
actions that demonstrate strengths in this area including charitable giving, innovative
giving, non-US charitable giving, support for housing, support for education, indigenous
peoples’ relations, volunteer programs and other. Areas of concern under the community
relations category include investment controversies, negative economic impact, problems
with indigenous peoples' relations, tax disputes and other. Technically, a firm can
therefore earn up to seven “strengths” in community relations as well as five “concerns”. 5
The KLD data used in this dissertation cover the period from 1991-2009,
however, the number of firms rated each year has varied. Prior to 2001, KLD focused on
firms listed in the S&P 500 or the Domini 400 Social Index. However, since 2001, KLD
has added CSR ratings for all firms belonging to the Russell 1000 Index and since 2003,
all companies on the Russell 2000 Index such that the most recent KLD data include
social performance information for the 3,000 largest US firms by market capitalization.
Given the longitudinal nature of the research question in this study, the sample
construction proceeded in various steps. First, to construct the initial population, the
corporate social performance information for all firms measured by KLD was
consolidated for the entire 19 year period from 1991-2009. To ensure enough within-firm
5

KLD also provides scores on six ‘exclusionary’ screens which are comprised of concerns related to
industry-based involvement in “controversial business issues” such as alcohol, gambling, firearms, military,
nuclear power and tobacco. Although some researchers have used these screens as evidence of social issue
participation (Hillman & Keim, 2001), they are not categories that are representative of the CSR choices
facing firms in most industries and are thus often excluded from aggregated measures of CSP (e.g., Agle et
al, 1999).
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time variability (to model the growth trajectories), this data was then sorted such that only
firms assigned social ratings for fifteen or more years were kept in the sample. This
preliminary screening for longitudinal data yielded a sample of 365 firms and 6,647 firm
year observations. In the second step, the financial information for these 365 firms was
obtained from COMPUSTAT and merged with the corporate social responsibility data
from KLD. This dataset was then manually inspected to ensure data compatibility in
terms of company name, ticker and other key identifiers that may have changed over the
study period. Of the initial 30 unmatched firms, data on 15 companies were ultimately
found in COMPUSTAT, thus only reducing the sample by 15 firms or from 365 to 350
companies. As a last step, the CSR and financial data was merged with CEO
identification information obtained through COMPUSTAT’s Execucomp database. If the
CEO information was not available through Execucomp, missing data was obtained
through other sources as detailed in the measures section below. At this stage, only one
additional firm needed to be eliminated given incompatible data leaving a final data set of
349 firms.
The final sample is thus an unbalanced panel, where the number of firms
measured in each year varies from a low of 303 in 2009 to a high of 347 in 1995,
resulting in 6,334 firm year observations. Although the design was intended to capture
only firms with 15 or more years of data, in the end, observations per firm range from 12
years to 19 years with the average number of years of data per company at a robust 18
years. Within each firm, on average, the number of CEOs over the 19 years is 2.9 so that
the final data set includes information for 1,008 CEOs. The clustered longitudinal design
for the first industry is visually depicted in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Structure of the Clustered Longitudinal Dataset
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The 349 firms were then assigned an industry classification based on the 4 digit
SIC code as defined by COMPUSTAT. As done in previous research in the CSR area
(Surroca, Tribó & Waddock, 2010; Waddock & Graves, 1997), the industry
classifications were then reduced to 12 primary sectors using their 2 digit SIC. Although
alternate methodologies exist for industry classification (e.g. 5 sectors, 1-digit NAICS
code), the final industry classification used herein was selected in order to best replicate
the most cited study in this area (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Furthermore, this
methodology continues to be used in recent studies (Surroca et al., 2010). The final
breakdown of the number of firms in each industry classification is detailed in Table 5.1
below.
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Table 5.1: Industry Classification
Industry
Mining/Construction
Food/Textiles/Apparel
Forrest/Paper/Publishing
Chemicals/Pharma
Refining/Rubber/Plastic
Steel/Heavy Manufacturing
Computers/Auto/Aero
Transportation
Telephone/Utilities
Wholesale/Retail
Financial
Hotel/Entertainment/Services
Totals

SIC
100-1999
2000-2399
2400-2799
2800-2899
2900-3199
3200-3599
3600-3999
4000-4799
4800-4999
5000-5999
6000-6799
6800-9799

# of Firms
#
%
16
4.6%
24
6.9%
32
9.2%
38
10.9%
7
2.0%
41
11.7%
62
17.8%
11
3.2%
26
7.4%
38
10.9%
33
9.5%
21
6.0%

# of Firm Years
#
%
288
4.5%
444
7.0%
580
9.2%
696
11.0%
126
2.0%
759
12.0%
1128
17.8%
202
3.2%
474
7.5%
675
10.7%
580
9.2%
382
6.0%

349

6334

100.0%

100.0%

Various archival sources were used to gather data related to the firm and CEO
independent variables. These, as well as the measures for the dependent variables, are
detailed in the following section.

5.4 Dependent Variables
Corporate social strategy was measured in three ways: Aggregate CSS (ACSS),
Breadth of CSS (BCSS) and Depth of CSS (DCSS) using KLD strength measures. As
introduced in Section 5.2, the KLD database has been used extensively as a measure of
CSR, however, no consensus has emerged to date with regards to the appropriate
operationalization of the construct (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). To illustrate, Appendix A
provides a snapshot of over thirty different studies that have taken advantage of the KLD
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database; although early studies converged on a simple sum of strengths and weaknesses,
the heterogeneity of subsequent operationalizations is evident.
Recent studies, however, have demonstrated that CSR and CSiR (Corporate Social
Irresponsibility) are in fact two separate and distinct constructs (Strike et al., 2006) and
that summing KLD strengths and weaknesses therefore masks important information
about a firm’s CSR posture (for example, a firm can score a +2 in diversity, and a -2 on
the environment and thus end up with a CSR score of zero). As such, there have been
recent calls for all new CSR analysis to treat the two constructs separately (Mattingly et
al., 2006). This approach has face validity given that the strengths measures capture
specific firm-level decisions to engage in different types of CSS which are therefore a
more direct measure of strategic choice than a combined strengths/weaknesses score,
where weaknesses are often measured as fines or penalties. The use of KLD strengths
separately has therefore become the preferable methodological treatment of KLD data
(Godfrey et al., 2009; Kacperczyk, 2009) and is the approach taken in this study.
Aggregate CSS (ACSS). In order to assess the overall trends in CSS over time, I
begin with an aggregate score of CSS which includes the KLD strengths in six
dimensions: diversity practices,

employee relations, community relations, the

environment, human rights and the product quality categories (a proxy for consumerfocused initiatives). As is common in prior research, the corporate governance dimension
is not included as the items measured are not deemed to reflect strategic choices regarding
CSS initiatives. A list of the individual items measured in each dimension can be found
in Appendix B.
An important consideration in longitudinal studies is to ensure that the underlying
construct being measured is operationalized in a consistent manner over time (Ployhart &

86
Vandenberg, 2010). Within the KLD database, the total number of CSS initiatives in each
category has varied over the years as social and stakeholder issues have become more or
less salient to the underlying notion of corporate social responsibility. For example, the
total number of CSS initiatives measured by KLD in 1991 in the six areas was 27 and
included items such as no lay-off policies in the employee category (dropped in 1994) and
positive operations in South Africa in the Human Rights category (dropped in 1995). On
the other hand, as other issues grew in importance (e.g., progressive gay/lesbian policies
which were added to the diversity score in 1995) these were incorporated into the KLD
measures such that the total number of initiatives in the six areas recorded had grown to
34 by 2009. As such, a simple count of the total number of CSS initiatives over time
might artificially capture changes in measurement rather than actual changes in growth in
CSS participation. As such, a firm’s ACSS is measured as a percentage of CSS initiatives
the firm participated in out of the total possible CSS score for that year. In this manner,
ACSS is able to capture the relative strength of engagement in CSS as well as model the
growth of a firm’s engagement in ACSS over time.
Note that while some studies apply a weighting scheme to the different
dimensions of CSR (e.g., Waddock & Graves, 1997), a more common approach is to give
each dimension equal importance (e.g., Bouquet & Deutsch, 2008; Garcia-Castro, Arino
& Canela, 2008; Hillman & Keim, 2001). Given the focus on assessing the overall growth
of CSS over time, there is no a-priori rationale to suggest prioritizing particular subcategories over others. Furthermore, research has demonstrated that there are no statistical
differences in results obtained with weighted or un-weighted measures (Hull &
Rothenberg, 2008).
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Breadth of CSS (BCSS). As with ACSS, simple count data could mask underlying
changes in measurement rather than actual changes in the breadth of a firm’s CSS. As
such, I created a measure of CSS dispersion based on Palepu’s (1985) entropy measure of
diversification. The entropy measure for BCSS was constructed as follows. Consider a
firm has decided to participate in N CSS areas. Let Pi be the share of the ith area in the
total number of areas in which the firm participates. Then:
N

Breadth of CSS = ∑ [Pi ln(1/Pi)]
i=1

where Pi is the share of total strengths in area i and ln(1/Pi) is the weight of each
area

i

(the logarithm of the inverse of its share). This measure, therefore, takes into

consideration two elements of CSS: (i) the number of stakeholder and/or social issue
areas in which a firm participates, and (ii) the relative importance of each area in terms of
total number of strengths. The entropy measure can therefore range from 0 to 2 where the
closer the score to 0, the narrower the breadth of CSS (with 0 indicating perfect
concentration in one area, or no dispersion). While novel to the area of CSR, the entropy
measure has been extensively used and validated in the corporate diversification literature
in a manner conceptually similar to the one used herein (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson &
Moesel, 1993; Palepu, 1985).
Depth of CSS (DCSS). To assess a firm’s depth of CSS, the concept of a
‘specialization ratio’ was also borrowed from the diversification literature, where the ratio
is the score for the industry sector with the greatest amount of sales divided by a firm’s
total sales (Hoskisson et al., 1993). Here, the specialization ratio for DCSS is calculated
as the area with the greatest amount of strengths divided by the total possible number of
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strengths in that area. Shallow CSS and Deep CSS are then defined on a continuum
ranging from 0 to 1 where the closer the score to ‘1’ the greater the depth of CSS. 6
The following table illustrates how this decomposition will be used to map the
overall aggregate level of CSS (ACSS), the breadth of CSS (BCSS) and the depth of CSS
(DCSS).

Table 5.2: Hypothetical Measurement of Corporate Social Strategy

1

6

0

0

0

0

0

6.00

36

16.7%

0.00

1.00

2

1

5

0

0

0

0

6.00

36

16.7%

0.45

0.83

3

0

3

3

0

0

0

6.00

36

16.7%

0.69

0.50

4

0

0

2

2

2

0

6.00

36

16.7%

1.10

0.33

5

1

1

1

2

1

0

6.00

36

16.7%

1.56

0.33

6

1

1

1

1

1

1

6.00

36

16.7%

1.79

0.17

Human
Rights
Special
Products

Environment

DCSS
(Specialization
Ratio)

Community
Relations

BCSS
(Entropy
Measure)

Diversity

ACSS (Total
Strengths/Total
Possible
Strengths)

Employee
Relations

Total
Number
of
Possible
Strengths

Firm

Total
Number
of
Strengths

As can be seen, each of the hypothetical firms in this “study” has earned a total of
six ‘strengths’. Under traditional methods of assessing CSP that rely solely on a count of
the total number of strengths (e.g. Strike et al., 2006), the CSP of each of these firms
would be equal. This is conceptually similar to the method used to measure ACSS,
however, ACSS has been adjusted by the total number of possible strengths which varies
by year. By adding BCSS and DCSS, this study highlights the nuances in breadth and

6

Note: I did not use the formula: strengths in the CSS area with the greatest amount of strengths divided by
a firm’s total strengths as this was not deemed to accurately capture the depth construct. If a firm only has
one strength in one area, this formula would grant the firm a specialization score of 100%. Dividing the
greatest amount of strengths by the total number of possible strengths in an area was therefore considered a
more representative measure of depth of CSS.
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depth within the different corporate social strategies. Firm 1, for example, has focused all
of its attention in one category - employee relations issues, while Firm 6 has taken a
broader approach and invested in all six areas. Similarly, one can see that Firm 1 has also
engaged in a deeper CSS having earned six strengths in employee relations while Firm 6
has only earned one, thus engaging in a shallow CSS with regards to this particular area.
With regards to the typology presented in Chapter 2, therefore, Firm 1 is likely to fall into
the quadrant of dedicated CSS, while Firm 6 would fall under the quadrant of diffuse
CSS. Although not formally hypothesized, the overall nature of the CSS of each firm can
therefore be assigned to a particular quadrant every year, a topic that will be revisited in
the discussion section.

5.5 Independent Predictor and Moderator Variables
Data for all of the demographic variables were sourced first from COMPUSTAT’s
Execucomp database (name, age, tenure), with functional, educational and international
experience coded primarily from biographies published in the Who’s Who in America
database available through Lexis/Nexis Academic Online people search. This search also
yielded information from Dun and Bradstreet’s Reference Book of Corporate
Management as well as Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors and
Executives. When biographies were not available in any of these databases, the
demographic coding was supplemented with searches on Thompson One Banker and
Mergent Online’s directory of corporate executives, as well as biographies available in
the public domain including BusinessWeek, Fortune, Forbes and the obituaries of various
online trade publications and newspapers. In this manner, each of the CEO demographic
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variables was cross-checked in numerous datasets thus increasing the reliability of the
data.
5.5.1 Independent Predictor Variables
CEO liberal worldview. I construct a new proxy for CEO worldview based on the
extensive research in both political science and psychology discussed in Section 3.3.1 that
has confirmed the existence of a liberal vs. conservative continuum (Tetlock, 2000;
Thorisdottir et al., 2007). Although Tetlock (2000) used a battery of items in a scenario
based survey of middle managers to measure ideological worldview, I will use a
simplified measure specifically related to his findings about the shareholder/stakeholder
divide that attempts to capture these “abstract political sympathies” by evaluating the
political orientation of individual CEOs.
In one of the only studies of which I am aware, Burris (2001) found that individual
CEO political contributions are different from their own firm PAC contributions and
follow a different logic; corporate PACs are concerned with non-market strategies while
individual donations are concerned with supporting particular candidates that follow the
true political preferences of the executive. Further, firm PACs are almost entirely
motivated by economic issues, while individual capitalists are unable to disregard a
candidate’s position with regards to social issues such as abortion, school prayer or civil
liberties (p.378).

Ansolabehere, de Figuieiredo and Snyder (2003) also argue that

“individuals give because they are ideologically motivated, because they are excited by
the politics of particular elections, because they are asked by their friends or colleagues
and because they have the resources necessary to engage in this particular form of
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participation” not because “they receive direct private benefits” from political giving
(p.188). Burris (2001) concludes:
“Like other citizens, capitalists tend to develop not just political
preferences but political identities as either Democrats or Republicans.
This is reflected in the fact that three-fourths of individual capitalists
contributed 90 percent or more of their campaign contributions to a single
party, compared with less than one-seventh of corporations. Party
identifications of this type tend to be formed early in life, often through
transmission from parent to children, they are relatively stable over the life
course, and they are not reducible to a simple matter of agreement or
disagreement with specific policy positions of the parties in a given
elections.” (p.378, emphasis in original)

Although the individual contributions of CEOs are not usually large in terms of
absolute numbers (under $5,000 in Burris’ sample) due to legislated maximums under the
Federal Election Campaign Act (Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo & Snyder Jr, 2003), they
nonetheless reflect a personal commitment to an established political ideology that is
pertinent to the measurement of executive orientation and a possible relationship to CSS.
As such, I sourced individual CEO political contributions from the non-partisan research
institute, Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org), which consolidates the
information from the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The FEC provides complete
data on the campaign contributions of all American citizens, including CEOs. The
contribution record for each CEO was first identified by using their given name, then
cross-checked with the CEO’s middle name, address and employer information to ensure
that the record clearly belonged to the CEO under investigation.
In order to construct the worldview variables, I first recorded the total amount of
donations made by each CEO to every senatorial, congressional, or presidential candidate
or party for every year each CEO was in the database. These numbers were then
translated into the relative percentage of contributions going to either Democratic or
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Republican candidates (contributions to independents and corporate/industry PACS were
also captured, but not used in this analysis unless explicitly affiliated with Democratic or
Republican candidates). Because of the longitudinal nature of the dataset, it was possible
to assess the stability of a CEO’s contributions over time as the data was being gathered.
Contrary to Burris (2001), I found that many CEOs gave inconsistently to both parties,
suggesting that not all donations may be purely ideologically driven. For example, CEO
Fred Smith of FedEx donated heavily to the Democratic Party while they were in power,
but then switched the majority of his contributions to the Republicans when they took
office. A worldview variable based on majority contributions alone was therefore deemed
to be not entirely reliable.
As such, to measure CEO liberal vs. conservative worldview, I created a 7 point
scale based on research in psychology on individual political identity (Graham, Haidt &
Nosek, 2009). Here, political identity is often measured across a continuum anchored on
each end by strongly conservative and strongly liberal with moderate at the midpoint. In
coding the CEO political contributions, I employed a -3 to +3 scale as follows:

(-3) strongly conservative
(-2) moderately conservative
(-1) slightly conservative
(0) neutral

(+1) slightly liberal
(+2) moderately liberal
(+3) strongly liberal

CEO donated more than $10K to the Republican Party
or self-identified as Republican
CEO donated consistently to Republican Party over the
years in the dataset
CEO donated minimal amounts intermittently to the
Republican Party over the years in the dataset
CEO either donated to the Republican and Democratic
parties equally, donated only to company or industry
PACs or did not donate to any political party ever
CEO donated minimal amounts intermittently to the
Democratic Party over the years in the dataset
CEO donated consistently to Democratic Party over the
years in the dataset
CEO donated more than $10K to the Democratic Party
or self-identified as a Democrat
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CEO functional background. Following previous research, I capture both the
primary functional areas in which a CEO has served as well as the breadth of this
functional experience (Beyer et al., 1997; Chattopadhyay et al., 1999; Geletkanycz &
Black, 2001). As is common practice (Herrmann & Datta, 2002; Michel & Hambrick,
1992; Thomas & Simerly, 1994), I code CEOs with backgrounds in marketing/sales,
research and product development or entrepreneurship as having served in output
functions and CEOs with backgrounds in accounting/finance, law, administration/HR,
production/operations, engineering or data processing/information systems as having
served primarily in throughput functions.

With regards to breadth of functional

experience, I follow previous research (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Geletkanycz & Black,
2001) and measure the number of functional positions held by the CEO across his/her
entire career. This is a continuous variable where the higher the score, the greater the
breadth of functional experience; at the lowest end, 1 thus represents an entire career
spent in just one functional area. 7
CEO international experience. Following previous research in this area, CEO
international experience was captured by a dichotomous variable as either ‘0’ or ‘1’, for
either the absence or presence of international experience, where ‘1’ represents
experience in an international function or in a function with international responsibilities
(Roth, 1995; Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009) and/or that the CEO was born outside the
United States (Matta & Beamish, 2008).

7

Although some studies of CEO characteristics that have employed a survey design (e.g., Musteen, Barker
& Baeten, 2006) have used Blau’s index of heterogeneity to measure CEO functional diversity, the data
sources used for this project did not allow for coding of the length of time spent in each functional position.
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CEO educational background. As is common in the upper echelon literature, when
measuring CEO educational background, I looked at both the overall level of education
obtained as well as the CEO’s area of specialization. Similar to Wiersema and Bantel
(1992), Carpenter and Fredrickson (2001) and Herrmann and Datta (2002), I first coded
the highest educational degree obtained by the CEO using a seven point Likert-type scale
(0-some high school, 1-high school, 2-attended college, 3-undergraduate degree, 4attended graduate school, 5-master's degree, 6-attended doctoral program, 7-doctorate).
However, given that my hypotheses revolve around the “MBA mindset” and “Law
mindset” in particular, I then coded educational background for CEOs who hold an MBA
degree with a ‘1’ on this attribute (Geletkanycz & Black, 2001; Slater & Dixon-Fowler,
2010) and CEOs who hold a JD or LLB degree as ‘1’ on this attribute (else ‘0’).
Reliability of Measures. Appendix C contains a table with a representative sample
of studies that have used the above measures to capture the independent variables of
interest, thus speaking to the reliability of these measures. Further, because multiple
sources were used in the gathering of the demographic information, reliability was
iteratively cross-referenced during data collection. Lastly, Roth (1995) compared his
survey results for functional and international experience with archival data available
from the Reference Book of Corporate Management and Who’s Who volumes and found
that the data was consistent with the self-reported information. As such, these archival
measures are deemed reliable to assess executive orientation.
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5.5.2 Moderating Variables
Industry norms. To capture the affect of industry norms on CSS, I used the means
of the CSS measures for each industry (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). Specifically, I
measured the average aggregate CSS, average breadth of CSS and average depth of CSS
for each industry in my database, aggregated at the 2 digit SIC code level.
Managerial discretion. In line with institutional arguments that the characteristics
of a firm’s operating environment will affect the level of executive discretion, Hambrick
and Finkelstein (1987) introduced the construct of managerial discretion to account for
the affect of environmental factors such as product differentiability, market growth,
industry structure, demand instability, quasi-legal constraints and powerful outside forces
on a CEO’s latitude of action. Although often measured as a firm level construct (e.g.,
Shropshire & Hillman, 2007), the appropriate level of analysis here is the industry level
(Boyd & Gove, 2006; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; McClelland et al., 2010).
Although there is a lack of consensus regarding the appropriate operationalization
of managerial discretion at the industry level (Keegan & Kabanoff, 2008), common
measures include some combination of industry level capital intensity, sales growth,
R&D intensity, advertising intensity or other similar measures such as industry
munificence and dynamism (see Boyd & Gove, 2006, for a review). Several studies have
relied directly on Hambrick and Abrahamson’s (1995) ratings of managerial discretion
(e.g., Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Adams, Almeida & Ferreira, 2005) which were
based on an expert panel and correlated with many of the above observable industry
characteristics. Others have used these ratings more indirectly to sample industries in high
or low discretion environments. For example, McClelland et al. (2010) chose firms in the
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textile, furniture and primary metals industries to exemplify low-discretion environments,
while computer equipment and electrical components were selected as examples for high
discretion industries.
To classify firms into low vs. high discretion industries, I followed the process
outlined in Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) who take Finkelstein et al.’s (2009)
expanded list of the managerial discretion ratings of seventy different industries and
average these measures by two digit SIC code. Those industries that fell at the top 50% of
the distribution were rated as a high discretion industry (coded ‘1’) and those at the
bottom 50% as low discretion industries (coded ‘0’). 8 For those industries where
managerial discretion ratings were not available, the high/low categorization was based
on the industry average capital intensity score, with lower scores indicating greater levels
of managerial discretion. 9

5.6 Control Variables: Firm and CEO Level Determinants of CSS
5.6.1 Firm Level Control Variables
Data for all firm-level control variables was sourced from the COMPUSTAT
database for each firm in the sample for the years 1990-2009 (An additional year of data
was necessary for the past performance measure).
8

Note that Adams et al. (2005) used the top and bottom 40%, excluding industries in the middle 20% as
these were deemed more difficult to classify as either high or low discretion industries. Although this may
be a legitimate concern, not wanting to lose data for entire industries, I split the sample above and below the
median discretion score of the averaged ratings, which was 5.05.
9
To assess if this was an appropriate process, I compared the means of the capital intensity scores for the
high vs. low discretion industries already established. The mean capital intensity for high discretion
industries was 67.2, while the mean capital intensity for low discretion industries was 276.6, which was
statistically significant in a t-test comparison of means (p<0.000). After categorizing the remaining
industries as either high/low, these numbers remained virtually unchanged (63.2 and 278.2).
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Firm size. Prior research has shown that firm size will affect a firm’s CSR ratings
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). Specifically, studies have shown that larger firms are more
likely to engage in the ‘people’ dimension of CSR, which includes community donations,
the hiring of women and minorities and the treatment of employees, but are less likely to
perform well in the ‘product’ dimension of CSR which includes product/service quality
and a firm’s stance toward the natural environment (Johnson & Greening, 1999). Strike et
al. (2006) also found that larger firms will show higher levels of both CSR and CSiR
(Corporate Social Irresponsibility) and Shropshire and Hillman (2007) found explicitly
that larger firms are more likely to experience significant shifts in stakeholder
management programs than smaller firms. I therefore control for firm size, measured as
the natural log of total assets. Note that although Waddock and Graves (1997) also
include both total sales and total number of employees as proxies for firm size in their
model of CSP-CFP, these variables were found to have extremely high variance inflation
factors (VIF >29) which indicate high degrees of multicollinearity. As such, only the log
of total assets was retained as a proxy for firm size in this analysis.
Past performance. Waddock and Graves (1997) also found that a firm’s previous
financial performance positively affects the firm’s subsequent social performance and this
finding has been substantiated in a recent meta-analysis (Orlitzky et al., 2003). As such,
following previous studies, I control for past performance by accounting for the return on
assets (ROA) lagged by one year. ROA is considered an appropriate measure of firm
performance here given that it captures the profitability of the firm based on the strategic
use of the resources, or assets, under its control (Hull & Rothenberg, 2008).
Firm risk. Because investing in CSR issues may be associated with either
potential savings (e.g., waste reduction) or possible incremental costs (e.g., pollution
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control equipment), a firm’s risk profile may influence the adoption of CSS. In line with
previous studies (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Waddock & Graves, 1997) therefore, I
control for firm risk by including the ratio of long term debt to total assets.
R&D intensity. McWilliams and Siegel (2000) argue that R&D intensity should
be included as a control variable in all future CSR studies. Although this argument rests
on R&D expenditures as an explanatory variable in firm financial performance (not social
performance), recent studies have nonetheless demonstrated a strong relationship between
R&D intensity and CSP (Hull & Rothenberg, 2008; Padgett & Galán, 2010). Consistent
with these findings, I therefore include R&D intensity as a control variable.
Because this variable is notoriously plagued with missing data issues 10, I follow
previous research by creating three separate measures to capture R&D Intensity: (1) total
R&D expenditures divided by total sales, (2) total R&D expenditures divided by total
sales where all missing values for R&D expenditures are treated as zero and (3) an R&D
missing dummy variable where missing values are coded 1, otherwise 0 (Henderson et al.,
2006). Because measure (1) greatly reduces the number of observations, models using
measures (2) and (3) in combination, allow the total number of observations to be
preserved, yet remove any bias that may be associated with the assigning of zero values to
missing data (Henderson et al., 2006).

10

If a company spends an insignificant amount on R&D (e.g. financial companies), they are not required to
report this amount in financial statements captured by COMPUSTAT and are thus recorded as missing.
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5.6.2 CEO Level Control Variables
Data for all CEO-level control variables was sourced from the COMPUSTAT
Execucomp database for each firm in the sample for the years 1991-2009. In those cases
were data was missing, the information was sourced as detailed in Section 5.5.
CEO tenure. Research has shown that CEOs who have served within a firm or an
industry for an extended period of time are more likely to conform to the norms of the
industry and less likely to deviate from industry conventions (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1990; Hambrick, Geletkanycz & Fredrickson, 1993). For example, several studies have
shown that longer tenured CEOs are more likely to engage in defender strategies
characterized by stability and efficiency than shorter tenured CEOs who were more likely
to undertake prospector strategies related to increased levels of innovation (Finkelstein et
al., 2009). Similarly, tenure has also been found to be negatively related to organizational
change, with shorter-tenured CEOs willing to take more strategic risks, yet longer tenured
CEOs demonstrating a greater commitment to the status quo (Miller, 1991). Geletkanycz
and Black (2001) found that the longer an executive has spent in a particular functional
track, the greater his/her commitment to the status quo, suggesting that CEO perspectives
and views become increasingly narrow and fixed rendering the ability to conceive of new
alternatives or solutions difficult.
However, despite the fact that the impact of CEO tenure on different aspects of
firm performance has been extensively studied (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994), few
studies have looked at the relationship between CEO tenure and any measure of CSR.
Only Thomas et al. (1994) found that CEOs who have a longer tenure in the role and
CEOs who have spent more years in the organization prior to the attainment of their
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current position were more likely to score higher on measures of corporate social
performance (CSP) than CEOs with shorter organizational tenures (Thomas & Simerly,
1994).
Taking these diverse perspectives into account, CEO tenure may have a complex
relationship to CSS. On the one hand, longer organizational tenures should be associated
with higher measures of social performance (Thomas et al., 1994). On the other, CEOs
with long tenures are less equipped to adjust to ambiguous and complex changes in the
operating environment, thus rendering them “stale in the saddle” (Miller, 1991) or
“obsolete” (Henderson et al., 2006). The relationship between CEO tenure and CSS thus
appears to be contingent on organizational experience such that CEO tenure in the firm
may be negatively related to CSS in that the longer a CEO has served in his/her position
the more committed they are to the status quo, yet tenure in the role may be related to
organizational change such that the shorter the time as CEO, the more likely they are to
instigate change. As such, I control for CEO tenure both as tenure in the role (Henderson
et al., 2006; Herrmann & Datta, 2002) as well as tenure in the organization (Thomas &
Simerly, 1994).
CEO age. Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that a CEO’s age can influence
his/her attitude toward risk, with older managers being more risk-averse than younger
ones. Similarly, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) found that executives from earlier birth
cohorts were, on average, more conservative, than executives from later birth cohorts. If
the adoption of CSS policies is considered risky or requires a more liberal worldview
(i.e., especially programs in contested areas such as the adoption of formal policies to
promote gay/lesbian employees), age could affect CSS. Thus, I controlled for CEO age
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(measured in years) as is the norm in upper-echelon research (Musteen, Barker III &
Baeten, 2010),
CEO gender. Lastly, there is some limited research that suggests that gender may
play a role in determining a firm’s propensity to engage in CSS. Williams (2003), for
example, found that women on corporate boards are strongly linked to both the total
amount of firm philanthropic contributions, as well as the type of charity supported
(community services and the arts). Barnett and Karson (1989) found that women are
significantly more likely than men to chose the ethical over the economic option in a
presentation of various work-related ethical dilemma scenarios. More recently, SimgaMugan et al. (2005) also found support that women are more ethical than men in
scenarios in which respondents had responsibility towards agents such as employees (e.g.
demotion after maternity leave) concluding that the difference may be in the cognitive
rules (knowledge structures) accessed by the different genders: “Females are argued to
typically utilize ethics of care, which emphasizes social virtues and caring for others. On
the other hand, males are found to utilize ethics of justice, emphasizing equal treatment
and playing by the rules” (p. 150). Building on the large body of work that suggests
women are more ethically sensitive than men, I control for CEO gender by coding female
CEO’s as 1 and males as 0.
5.7 Other Data Considerations: Data Lag Structure
An important consideration for the analysis of longitudinal information regards
assumptions about the underlying lag structure of the data (Ployhart & Vandenberg,
2010). While the common assumption in upper echelon models is that it takes time for the
CEO effect to be reflected in firm performance measures (Hambrick & Mason, 1984),
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there is no theoretical reason to believe that this is the case for social performance
measures. For example, it is logical to argue that any changes that a CEO makes to
typical strategy investments (capital intensity, R&D, …) in year t, will likely only show
material effects on firm performance (e.g., ROA) in year t+1.

However, the CSS

measures employed here do not automatically imply that a lag structure is required.
Rather, the CSS of each firm in a given year is scored by KLD analysts at the end of
every year, reflecting the social performance choices of that year (e.g., generous giving,
pollution prevention programs, progressive policies towards gay and lesbian employees).
There is no theoretical rationale for assuming that the CEO effect on CSS is not
contemporaneous.
Yet, treatment of data lags in this area has varied widely. For example, Agle et al.
(1999) treat CEO values and CSP contemporaneously as do Manner (2010) and Slater
and Dixon-Fowler (2010). However, still others have implemented a one year lag
between CEO characteristics and CSR measures (e.g., Fong, 2010). Deckop et al. (2006),
for example, found that CEO compensation (short vs. long term) in year t is related to
CSP in year t+1 and Waldman et al. (2006) found that CEO intellectual stimulation in
year t can positively predict the propensity of firms to engage in CSR activities (product
quality and environmental measures) in a subsequent time period. Similarly, Shropshire
and Hillman (2007) found that owner manager controlled firms in year t are less likely to
engage in broad shifts in stakeholder management programs in year t +1.
The difficulty in estimating the appropriate lag structure is further complicated in
that all of the aforementioned studies employ variations of cross-sectional designs. In
longitudinal data analysis, however, the building of growth curve models already
incorporates the role of time into the models themselves and as such, issues of
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endogeneity and causation are not pertinent (Schonfeld & Rindskopf, 2007). Furthermore,
a recent meta-analysis demonstrated that the relationship between CSR and CFP is just as
likely to be concurrent as it is to be lagging or leading (Orlitzky et al., 2003) and
simultaneous estimation methods have therefore been used in several subsequent studies
(Mattingly & Berman, 2006). I therefore build the latent growth curve models without a
lag structure and remit a further discussion about lagged explanatory variables to the posthoc robustness analysis reported in section 6.5.
In addition to decisions regarding the data lag structure for independent variables,
there is also some debate with regards to including a lagged dependent variable (LDV) in
longitudinal models of change. LDVs are often incorporated in cross-sectional designs in
order to ensure the effect of time is adequately captured as well as to reduce questions of
endogeneity. Furthermore, LDVs are often used as a control when autocorrelation is
suspected in the dependent variable (Strike et al., 2006). However, the random coefficient
modeling technique employed herein explicitly accounts for the variance components
among time periods, shedding light on how individual units change over time (Holcomb
et al., 2010). Because data pertaining to the dependent variable in growth curve modeling
is already explicitly modeled every year, adding a LDV thus risks over-parameterizing
the models. Achen (2000) also cautions that while including an LDV may help improve
overall model fit, it can also collapse the coefficients of theoretical interest to
“implausibly small and insignificant values”.
The practice of including a LDV in CSR research is relatively scarce. Only
Waldman et al. (2006) included such a measure (albeit a lagged 5 year average DV) and
their regression tables suggest that indeed there is a high correlation between past social
performance and current social performance (Pearson correlations between 0.68 and 0.76
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and highly significant). Yet, none of the relationships of interest (e.g., CEO charisma and
CSR) in the Waldman et al. study were found to be significant; it is possible then, that
including LDV measures may have actually suppressed the importance of these and other
predictors as suggested by Achen (2000).
Given that the primary purpose of this research is to tease out the CEO effect on
CSS, and the RCM analytic method used explicitly models the role of time (Schonfeld &
Rindskopf, 2007), the use of lagged ACSS, BCSS or DCSS as autoregressive control
variables is deemed inappropriate. While I return to the discussion of LDVs in the
robustness analysis (Section 6.5), there is no a priori rationale for including these in the
hypotheses testing.
Having introduced the choice of research methodology, the research design, the
data and sample creation as well as defined the operationalization of all variables of
interest, I now turn to an assessment of the findings. The presentation of results proceeds
in two parts. First, I provide a general overview of the data through a descriptive analysis
of the relationships of interest. I then move on to the RCM analysis introduced in this
chapter.
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS

The findings are presented as follows: I begin with general descriptive statistics
(Section 6.1) as well as some preliminary testing of the patterns of change (Section 6.2)
as recommended by Singer and Willett (2003). This is then followed by formal tests of
the hypotheses using a random coefficient model (RCM) building technique (Sections
6.3), post-hoc tests (Section 6.4) and robustness tests of the data (Section 6.5). I conclude
with a summary of the results of the hypotheses tests (Section 6.6) before engaging in a
discussion of the findings in Chapter 7.
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
A summary of the variables used in this study, including the operationalization,
means, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis as well as any transformations
necessary to ensure normality can be found in Table 6.1. Of note, the mean score for the
overall level of corporate social strategy (ACSS) across all years, all firms and all
industries is 8.9%, suggesting that out of all of the possible strengths firms could earn, the
mean ACSS of corporations is still relatively low. However, the standard deviation is
high (8.5), indicating a wide variability in the adoption of corporate social strategies over
time, across firms and industries. Although some firms continue to “do nothing” (13 firms
maintained an ACSS score of 0 throughout the 19 years measured), the maximum ACSS
in the sample belongs to IBM, that had adopted 61.8% of all possible corporate social
strengths in 2009.
The average breadth of corporate social strategy (BCSS) across all years, all firms
and all industries is also a modest 0.49 (st. dev 0.50), with a minimum of 0 and a
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maximum of 1.63. As BCSS is an entropy measure of breadth, this suggests that most
firms in this study are engaging in approximately one CSS category (community,
diversity, environment, employee relations, product quality or human rights); only
Motorola, scoring the maximum BCSS score of 1.63, has adopted CSS practices across
all six categories. In comparison, the average depth of corporate social strategy (DCSS) is
0.25 (st. dev 0.18), with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1, suggesting that for the
category in which a firm is most deeply engaged, firms adopt on average 25% of all of the
CSS policies/programs in this category. For example, while the high score of 1 (100%)
can be attributed to several firms that scored 1/1 in the human rights category in 1996, the
depth of commitment to particular areas can still be seen in many firms such as HewlettPackard, that adopted 88% of all CSS in the diversity category in 2004 under CEO Carly
Fiorina or Honeywell that adopted 83% of all CSS in the employee category in 2005
under CEO David Cote.
The descriptive statistics in Table 6.1 also provide some preliminary information
about the 1,008 CEO’s in the dataset. The CEOs in this sample are on average 57 years
old (minimum 30, maximum 90), male (98%), moderately conservative (-0.77) and have
spent an average of 8 years as CEO, largely in throughput functions (64%) across
approximately 2.7 functional areas. Of these CEOs, 39% hold an MBA degree, 11% hold
a legal degree and 25% have international experience. These figures are similar to
descriptive statistics of age, tenure, functional and educational background as well as
international experience reported in previous studies suggesting the sample is both
representative and generalizable.
The average firm size as measured by total assets was $26,798.80 (st. dev.
$96,722.53), with the smallest firm being Time Warner in 1991 (total assets of only $8.0)
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and the largest firm, Bank of America, holding total assets of $2,223,299.0 in 2009.11
This firm size measure was skewed and highly kurtotic and thus transformed using its
natural log. The average past financial performance measured by ROA was 0.06 (st. dev
0.08). Although kurtotic, skewness was acceptable. As such, the ROA measure is left
untransformed as recommended by Tabachnic and Fidell (2007). 12 The average for firm
risk was 0.19 (st. dev 0.14) which was normally distributed. The R&D Intensity measure
(with zeros) indicated an average R&D expenditure/sales ratio of 0.03 (st. dev. 0.05)
which was transformed using its square root.

11

Note: Total assets are reported in millions of USD. The 1991 Time Warner total asset figure seemed
small, so the Compustat figure was cross-referenced with the financial statements available on Mergent
Online and was found to be accurate.
12
A robustness test using a Windsorized past performance variable is discussed in Section 6.5.
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Operationalization

N

Missing
Data

Min

Max

Mean

St.Dev Skewness Kurtosis

Dependent Variables:
Aggregate CSS
Breadth of CSS
Depth of CSS

Total KLD strengths/Total possible KLD
strengths (x100)
Entropy measure of breadth
Specialization ratio (Highest total
proportional score in one area)

6334

0.0%

0

61.76

8.89

8.48

1.39

2.47

6334

0.0%

0

1.63

0.49

0.50

0.39

-1.28

6334

0.0%

0

1

0.25

0.18

0.65

0.48

6334

0.0%

-3

3

-0.77

1.70

0.40

-0.53

6334

0.0%

0

1

0.36

0.48

6334

0.0%

0

6

2.70

0.90

0.25

0.47

5982
5982

5.6%
5.6%

0
0

1
1

0.39
0.11

0.49
0.31

6334

0.0%

0

1

0.25

0.43

349
349
349
349

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%

0.89
0.00
0.00
0.00

20.50
1.12
0.46
1.00

8.89
0.49
0.25
0.50

2.44
0.18
0.06
0.50

0.28
-1.30
-0.15

2.86
0.94
2.24

33
90
57.16
6.84
0
1
0.02
0.14
0.3
48.0
8.06
7.95
0.3
60.6
21.65
12.78
8 2223299 26798.80 96722.53
(.90)
(6.35)
(3.75)
(.722)
-1.09
0.95
0.0579
0.08
0
1.07
0.19
0.14
0 0.7439
0.05
0.06
(-3.25) (-0.13)
(-1.53)
(0.49)
0 0.7439
0.03
0.05
(0.0)
(0.86) (0.099)
(0.13)

0.31

1.44

1.96
0.08
9.70
(.253)
-0.91
0.92
2.96
(-0.25)
3.69
(1.27)

4.08
-0.97
128.96
(.138)
27.09
1.87
16.61
(-0.11)
23.96
(1.21)

Independent Variables:

CEO liberal worldview

CEO functional
background

CEO educational
background
CEO international
experience
Moderating Variables
Industry norms

Managerial discretion
Control Variables
CEO age
CEO gender
CEO tenure
Firm size
Past Performance
Firm risk
R&D Intensity

3 strongly liberal
2 moderately liberal
1 slightly liberal
0 neutral
-1 slightly conservative
-2 moderately conservative
-3 strongly conservative
Output (1): sales, marketing, product
R&D, entrepreneurship; Throughput
(0): production, operations,
accounting, finance, law, process R&D
Count of the number of different
functional areas
CEO holds an MBA degree
CEO holds a law degree
Experience in an international function
or in a function with international
responsibilities, studied abroad, born
abroad
Average ACSS/Industry
Average BCSS/Industry
Average DCSS/Industry
Industry ratings: Low/High(0/1)
Age in years
Male (0)/Female (1)
Years as CEO
Years employed at firm
Total Assets
(Log Transformed)
ROA 1 year lag
Ratio of long term debt/total assets
R&D Expenditures/Sales
(Log Transformed)
R&D Expenditures/Sales (all n/a=0)
(SQRT Transformed)

6334
6334
6334
6334
6315
(6315)
6321
6298
3600
(3136)
6334
(6334)

0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.3%
(0.3%)
0.2%
0.6%
43.2%
(50.2%)
0.0%
(0.0%)
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Table 6.2 presents the correlations between the variables included in the study
based on pooled observations. Of note, Table 6.2 provides some preliminary evidence in
support of several hypotheses. First, with regards to the aggregate level of CSS, the
correlation matrix suggests that CEO’s with a liberal worldview (Hypothesis 4), with a
dominant functional background in output functions (Hypothesis 6), with a greater
breadth of functional experience (Hypothesis 8) and with international experience
(Hypothesis 10) are significantly and positively related to ACSS. Interestingly, the
correlations between the educational background variables are also significant, yet while
the legal mindset hypothesis (Hypothesis 14) is in the predicted direction (r=-.049,
p<0.000), the hypothesis around the MBA mindset (Hypothesis 12) is significant, but in
the direction opposite of that predicted (r=.039, p<0.01).
Several control variables are also significantly correlated to a firm’s ACSS. At the
individual level, CEO age (r=-0.058, p<0.000) and tenure as CEO (r=-0.095, p<0.000) are
negatively related to ACSS while CEO gender (r=0.086, p<0.000) and CEO tenure at the
firm (r=0.049, p<0.000) are positively and significantly related to ACSS. At the firm
level, size (r=0.461, p<0.000) and R&D Intensity (r=0.225, p<0.000) are both positively
and significantly related to ACSS, while firm risk, and past financial performance do not
appear to be related to ACSS.
The correlation patterns are much the same for BCSS and DCSS with the
following notable exceptions. A CEO’s liberal worldview appears to be positively related
to depth of commitment, yet not to the breadth of corporate social strategies pursued. In
contrast, CEOs with an MBA are positively related to breadth of corporate social
strategies, yet not with depth. The positive, significant correlations for CEOs with output
functions, greater functional breadth and international experience hold for BCSS and
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DCSS, as does the negative association with a legal mindset. The control variables also
show similar patterns, although past financial performance becomes significantly related
to depth of CSS and firm risk is positively associated with the breadth of CSS suggesting
some interesting nuances in the data.
Given that no inter-factor correlations are above the recommended level of .70
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), multicollinearity is not likely to bias the data. However, I
nonetheless formally tested for multicollinearity by running a pooled OLS regression with
ACSS as the dependent variable and found no variance inflation factor (VIF) higher than
1.6, well below the accepted maximum of 10 (Paetzold, 1992). 13 Hence, multicollinearity
is not considered an issue in this study.

13

The pooled OLS regression also revealed some interesting positive relationships between the predictor
variables and the dependent variables, with the CEO executive orientation factors adding approximately 4%
to the ACSS baseline control variable model with an R2 of 31.1% (n=5,942). Further, many of the
hypothesized relationships between CEO executive orientation and CSS were supported. For ACSS, CEOs
with a liberal worldview (β=0.203, p<0.000), functional background in output roles (β=1.617, p<0.000),
with a breadth of functional experience (β=0.238, p<0.05) and international experience (β =1.149, p<0.000)
were positively and significantly related to ACSS as predicted. This omnibus test, however, failed to
provide support for the hypothesized negative relationship between a CEO’s MBA mindset and ACSS,
although a legal mindset is negatively and significantly related to ACSS (β =-0.953, p<0.000). The pooled
OLS regressions were also run for BCSS and DCSS as dependent variables; while the hypothesized
relationships held for DCSS, there were in general, less significant relationships between the executive
orientation variables and the breadth of CSS than there were for depth, suggesting there may be variations
in the determinants of these two dimensions of CSS.

Table 6.2: Correlations
Correlations

1 ACSS
2 BCSS
3 DCSS
4 Political
5 Output Function
6 Functional
7 MBA
8 JD/ LLB
9 Int. Experience
10 Tenure as CEO
11 Tenure at firm
12 Age
13 Gender
14 Size
15 Past Performance
16 Risk
17 R&DIntensity

1
1.000

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

.820**

1.000

.866**
.029*

.629**
0.009

.046**

1.000

.098**

.061**

.100**

-.025*

1.000

.127**

.105**

-.039**

-0.020

1.000

.039**

.038**

.126**
0.022

-.093**

-0.006

-.034**

1.000

-.049**

-.037**

-.040**

-.182**

.103**

-.195**

1.000

.190**

.127**

.177**

.094**
0.020

.111**

.110**

.101**

-.079**

1.000

**

**

**

-0.015

**

**

**

*

-.138**

1.000

*

**

**

**

.462**

1.000

**

**

.425**

1.000

*

**

-.049**
-0.003

-.095

**

.049

**

-.058

**

.086

**

-.077

**

.056

**

-.041
0.010
**

.461
0.023

.360
0.018

0.022

**

.032

13

14

15

16

17

1.000

-.087

.031

**

-.063

**

.100

**

.374

*

.030
0.014

.160**
.230**
.225**
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

-.054

**

-.037

**

.099

**

-.053

**

-.040

**

.088
-0.022

.106

**

.062
0.000
**

.090

**

-.118

**

.083

-.151

**

-.073

**

-.084

*

.028

**

.181

**

-.044

-.102

**

-.075

**

-.111

**

-.067

*

.032
0.019

.026
-.038

**

.107
-0.020
**

.036

**

-.093

**

.044

**

.112

*

.025

.517

-.028

**

-.138

**

.091

-.097

*

.031

**

0.007

**

.074

1.000
-.079**

1.000

*

-.159**

1.000

.147**

-.264**

1.000

-.027*

.147**

-.184**

-.028

**

.085

0.006

.059

.050

-.097

-.056

-0.013

.029
-0.024

.132**

.037**

.077**

-.050**

.222**

-.083**

-.099**

-.094**

0.004

*

-.038

-.068

**

**

**

1.000

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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6.2 Preliminary Testing: Patterns of Change
As suggested by Singer and Willett (2003), before beginning the formal model
testing, I first explored the patterns of change present in the longitudinal dataset visually.
Figure 6.1 depicts the mean ACSS of all companies in the dataset over time, without
regard for the nesting of the firms within industries. One can see from figure 6.1 that the
mean aggregate CSS rate appears to start at around 5% in 1991 and grow to just over 12%
by 2009, more than doubling over the 19 year time span. Further, there appears to be a
slight deceleration in the rate of growth in the early 2000’s, followed by a steeper
trajectory post 2004.

Figure 6.1: Mean ACSS from 1991-2009
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The patterns of change for BCSS and DCSS also appear linear and increasing over
time, with a similar acceleration in the rate of change after 2004 more apparent for BCSS
than DCSS as shown in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2: Mean BCSS and DCSS from 1991-2009

In order to visualize if the increases in mean ACSS vary by industry, the mean
ACSS was plotted against year by industry grouping. There appears to be some variance
in the initial status and growth slopes by industry as illustrated by Figure 6.3. For
example, it appears that the Refining/Rubber/Plastic industry has consistently
outperformed other industries, while the chemical/pharmaceutical industry has shown the
steepest adoption curve. While some industries have much flatter growth curves (e.g.
wholesale/retail), consistent with Figure 6.1 above, on the whole it appears as though
aggregate CSS has been growing over time.
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Figure 6.3: Mean ACSS from 1991-2009 by Industry

Depth and breadth appear to follow a similar pattern, although there seems to be a
greater degree of heterogeneity in the pattern of mean BCSS by industry over time as
illustrated in Figures 6.4 below.

Figure 6.4: Mean BCSS and DCSS from 1991-2009 by Industry
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These visual tests, however, still do not tell us if the overall patterns of change
over time are linear or significant as predicted in Hypothesis 1. To explore the overall role
of time very generally, I first ran a series of simple models where corporate social
strategy was regressed on time as recommended by Bliese and Ployhart (2002). As can
be seen in Table 6.3, the results show that time has a small, yet positive and significant
relationship with the aggregate level, breadth and depth of CSS. When looking at the
aggregate level of CSS, the mean ACSS score at the initial point of data collection
(time=0) was 5.62%, growing approximately 0.37%/year; the initial breadth was .368,
growing approximately .013 units/year and the initial depth was 0.179 increasing at only
0.008/year.

Table 6.3: Ordinary Least Squares Model Regressing CSS on Time
DV
ACSS
BCSS
DCSS

Intercept (S.E.)
5.622*** (0.200)
0.368*** (0.012)
0.179*** (0.004)

Beta
(S.E.)
0.366*** (0.019)
0.013*** (0.001)
0.008*** (0.000)

R2
.054***
.020***
.052***

These very simple, illustrative models however, do not provide any information
with regards to the variance in growth trajectories between industries or between firms,
nor do they tell us anything about within-firm changes in initial status or growth of CSS
over time. The most significant limitation with these regression models, therefore, are that
they assume that all firms start at the same initial level of CSS and grow at the same rate
(that is, they are fixed-effects models).
To illustrate, Figure 6.5 depicts the relationship between time and the total
aggregate level of firm CSS, paneled by industry for ease of visualization. As can be seen,
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the intercepts (the initial level of CSS) as well as the growth trajectories (the slope of
CSS) appear to vary by industry. For example, the mean ACSS at the initial point of data
collection (time=0) for the mining/construction industry is close to 2.5%, while the initial
status for the refining/rubber/plastic industry appears to be closer to 10% – both of which
differ significantly from the total sample mean which was 5.6%, as established above.
Similarly, the rate of change in ACSS also appears to vary by industry with the adoption
of ACSS occurring most rapidly in the chemical/pharmaceutical industry (steeper OLS
curve), in contrast to very little change in transportation or wholesale retail industries
(flatter OLS curves).
Figure 6.5: Relationship Between Time and ACSS by Industry

It appears, therefore, that the industry level CSS intercepts and growth trajectories
follow a similar overall linear pattern, yet the differences would justify a random
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industry-specific time slope as well as a random industry-specific intercept (West et
al., 2007). I found these trends to be similar for both the breadth of CSS and the
depth of CSS measures over time as well as seen in Figures 6.6 and 6.7, although
BCSS growth curves on the whole appear to be flatter than DCSS, and even negative
in one case - the wholesale/retail industry. Although preliminary, these growth charts
demonstrate that BCSS and DCSS could explain differences in strategic approaches to
CSS, with some industries focusing on growing through breadth and others through
depth, a nuance not discernable through a focus on ACSS only.
Figure 6.6: Relationship Between Time and BCSS by Industry
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Figure 6.7: Relationship Between Time and DCSS by Industry

These illustrations, however, also do not shed any light with regards to the
variances in growth rates between firms within each industry. Taking the
chemical/pharmaceutical industry as an example, Figure 6.8 below illustrates that
although the ACSS growth trajectory appears to be increasing over time (as indicated
by the thick black line), there are nonetheless significant variances in both the initial
level of ACSS as well as the growth of ACSS for each firm within this industry over
time, with some firms starting high, yet adding very few ACSS initiatives over time,
while other firms have started with a lower level of ACSS, but made greater progress
in adopting ACSS practices over time.
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Figure 6.8: Relationship Between Time and ACSS for firms in the
Chemical/Pharmaceutical Industry

Interesting patterns also emerge for BCSS and DCSS. The BCSS of the
chemical/pharmaceutical industry as illustrated in Figure 6.9, for example, while still
showing an overall positive, linear growth trajectory over time, demonstrates significant
variance in the intercept and slope of individual firm growth trajectories over time, with
some notable and significant negative trajectories such as for Company ID 127 (H.B.
Fuller, that went from an entropy measure of 1.1 to 0.0 between 1991 and 2009) and
Company ID 67 (Calgon Carbon Corporation, that went from 0.69 to 0.00 over the 19
years). The ACSS, BCSS and DCSS growth trajectories by industry are included in
Appendix A.
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Figure 6.9: Relationship Between Time and BCSS for firms in the
Chemical/Pharmaceutical Industry

Figure 6.10: Relationship Between Time and DCSS for firms in the
Chemical/Pharmaceutical Industry
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These preliminary tests of relationships and growth patterns suggest that there is
some initial support to Hypothesis 1-3 that predicted that there will be an overall linear
growth rate of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social
strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy over time and that firms will differ
significantly in both their initial levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time. These
tests, however, do not formally test the significance of these relationships. As such, I
now turn to formal model building and hypotheses testing using a random coefficient
modeling (RCM) approach as introduced in Section 5.8 and detailed in the following
sections.
6.3 Hypotheses Testing
In order to test the hypotheses, a longitudinal, multi-level growth model was built
using the sequential “step-up” or “model comparison” strategy as recommended for RCM
- Random Coefficient Modeling (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Hox, 2010; Ployhart, Holtz &
Bliese, 2002; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Singer & Willett, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell,
2007). With this method, one begins with a simple regression framework that partitions
the variance in the dependent variable between hierarchical levels and then builds
progressively towards more complex models, testing for increased model fit using
deviance statistics or likelihood ratios. The five main steps in this sequential procedure
are outlined in Table 6.4 below. 14

14

Note that existing applications of the model comparison approach in RCM vary somewhat with regards to
the steps, sequence and emphasis placed on each component of this procedure. For example, Thoresen et al.
(2004) bypass Step 1b, while Holcomb et al. (2010) and Mysangi et al. (2006) emphasize this step, yet
omit Step 2. Table 6.4 thus presents a composite of existing procedures that is aimed at completeness.
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Table 6.4: Sequence of Steps in Building Longitudinal, Multi-Level Growth Models
Model Building Steps
Interpretation
1. Define the Null Models:
a) Estimate an unconditional means Estimate ICC - how much variability in
(random intercept) model
CSS can be attributed to within vs.
between firms and between industries;
Decide whether a multi-level model is
warranted
b) Estimate an unconditional linear Estimate how much variability in CSS can
growth model with fixed effects
be attributed to year effects specifically
c) Estimate an unconditional linear Significance test of parameters to
growth model with random effects
determine if variances in intercept, slope
and intercept/slope covariance are
statistically significant over time
Differences in likelihood ratio for overall
fit compared to unconditional means
models
2. Determine the function of time:
Estimate the shape of CSS over time (is Significance test of parameters
it linear, quadratic, cubic or another Differences in likelihood ratio for overall
higher order polynomial model)
fit compared to unconditional linear
growth models.
3. Estimate
the
error
structure Differences in likelihood ratios
(homogeneous, auto-correlated etc.)
4. Add time-variant predictors of Significance test of parameters &
variability in initial-status and growth of Differences in likelihood ratios
CSS to the final Level 1 model
5. Add time in-variant predictors of Significance test of parameters &
variability to the Level 2 model and/or Differences in likelihood ratios
Level 3 models
Adapted from: Bliese & Ployhart (2002), Singer & Willet (2003) and Holcomb et al. (2010)

6.3.1 Step 1: Defining the Null Models
The first step in the model comparison approach is to build a series of null models
beginning with a basic unconditional means model and basic unconditional growth
models to partition the outcome variance first across firms without regard to time (the
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unconditional means model) and second, across both firms and time (the unconditional
growth models)(Singer & Willett, 2003). These simple models are also commonly
referred to as null models (Peugh & Enders, 2005), empty longitudinal models (Hoffman
& Stawski, 2009), random intercept and random slope models (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002)
or variance components models (West et al., 2007), and serve not only as baselines
against which subsequent models can be compared, but also to establish if there is
sufficient systemic variation in the outcome measures (ACSS, BCSS, DCSS) to warrant
further multi-level analysis.
I follow the notation for three-level longitudinal model-building using RCM from
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), Peugh and Enders (2005), Bliese and Ployhart (2002) and
Luke (2004), which are most similar to the notations commonly used in three-level
studies of organizational change such as Chen (2005), Holcomb et al. (2010) and
Mysangi et al. (2006). 15 The subscripts t, i, and j denote time, firm and industry
respectively where there are:
t= 1, 2, ….. Tij time periods within firm i in industry j;
i = 1, 2, …….Ij firms within industry j; and
j = 1,2,……..J industries.

6.3.1.1 The Unconditional Means Model
The unconditional means model for a three-level analysis partitions the variation in
the dependent variable (ACSS, BCSS, DCSS) among three levels: (1) within-firms across
15

Note: Notations used by various researchers/disciplines differ only in the symbols used to represent the
variances and error terms at each level and are substantively equivalent. For example, Singer & Willet
(2003) use ζ to denote the Level 2 random effect rather than r.
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time, (2) between-firms (nested within industries) and (3) between-industries, such that
the equations read as follows:

Level 1 (within-firms):
Level 2 (between-firm):

Ytij = π0ij + etij
π0ij = β00j + r0ij

Level 3 (between-industries):

β00j = γ000 + u00j

(1)
(2)
(3)

At Level 1 (within-firms across time), the null model predicts CSS at each time
period as a function of an intercept (firm mean CSS) plus a random error. Ytij is the
dependent variable (ACSS, BCSS, DCSS) for time period t of firm i in industry j; π0ij is
the mean of Y for firm i in industry j (across time) and etij is a random “time effect”, that
is the deviation of Y for time period t of firm i in industry j. It is assumed that etij is
normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of σ2 (Holcomb et al., 2010;
Misangyi et al., 2006).
At level 2 (between firms nested within industries), the mean CSS of each firm over
time (π0ij) is assumed to vary randomly around each industry’s mean CSS. β00j is the
mean of Y for industry j in time period t and r0ij is the random “firm effect” or the
deviation of Y for firm i in industry j over time. It is assumed that r0ij is normally
distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of τπ.
At level 3 (between-industries), the intercept β00j is modeled as a dependent variable
that varies randomly around the grand mean of CSS (γ000) and u00j is the random “industry
effect”, or the deviation of Y for industry j over time. Here, it is assumed that u00j is
normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of τβ.
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The unconditional means model is therefore able to partition the variance in CSS
into three components: σ2, within firms (across time periods), τπ, between firms within
industries and and τβ, between industries. Based on the estimates of these variance
components it is therefore possible to calculate the proportion of variance that resides at
each level – also known as the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC)(Singer & Willett,
2003). If this measure is significant, the ICC demonstrates that the dependent variable
differs within firms across time, between firms within industries and between industries
and thus confirms that a multi-level model is warranted. High values of the ICC also
suggest that there is a nontrivial degree of non-independence of observations, thus
justifies the use of RCM or another multi-level analytic method that does not rest on the
i.i.d. assumption necessary in traditional OLS regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
The three level ICC is calculated as follows:

Level 1 (proportion of variance within firms across time):

σ2/ (σ2 + τπ + τβ)

Level 2 (proportion of variance between firms within industries): τπ / (σ2 + τπ + τβ)
Level 3 (proportion of variance between industries):

τβ / (σ2 + τπ + τβ)

The results for Step 1, the unconditional means (or random intercept) models for
ACSS, BCSS and DCSS are shown in Table 6.5. 16 As can be seen, the unconditional
means model for ACSS (Model 1a) indicates that 68.2 % of the variance in ACSS is
between firms within industries, while 30.1 % of the variance in ACSS is within firms
(both significant at the p<0.000 level). In contrast, only 1.7% of the variance in ACSS is
16

In all cases and throughout this thesis, robust standard errors are reported as these automatically correct
for any departures from the assumptions of the variance-covariance matrix (Raudenbush et al., 2004).
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between industries. As can be seen in Models 1b and 1c, these patterns were also similar
for the unconditional means models for BCSS and DCSS (with the industry level variance
insignificant in the DCSS model).
Because the between industry variation is very small in all models, and the
reliability estimates for the Level 2 random coefficients, β00j, are also very low across all
three models (ACSS: 0.384, BCSS: 0.558, DCSS: 0.201), a two-level model may be
advisable. 17 The reliability estimates capture the systemic portion of variance available to
be explained by industry level factors in a 3 level model and hence are an early indication
that accurately estimating the predictors for the majority of the variance between
industries will be difficult (Russell, 2001). At this stage, however, the model building
continues at three levels for exploratory purposes.

17

Note: In order to ensure that the small industry variance was not due to the chosen method of coding for
industry, Models 1a-c were also run with firms nested in their original 4 digit SIC codes as well as their 2
digit SIC codes. Although the 4 digit SIC is often used in organizational research (e.g. Misangy et al.,
2006), this operationalization likely violates power requirements for multi-level modeling as some 4 digit
SIC’s may only contain one firm (as is the case in my sample). As such, this model failed to run. Nesting
the firms within their 2 digit SIC, rather than the 1 digit SIC, yielded near identical results with regards to
the variance components estimated in Step 1. Furthermore, the industry variance in this specification was
insignificant across all dependent variables. As such, the original operationalization for industry was
retained at this point for theoretical and methodological comparisons to Waddock & Grave’s (1997)
seminal work in the field.

Table 6.5: Results for Unconditional Means Models for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS
Unconditional Means Models

Parameter

Model 1a: ACSS

Fixed Effect
Grand Mean (Intercept)
Random Effects
Level 1
Temporal variation
(within-firm variation of CSS over time)
Level 2
Between firm variation in intercept
(variation in initial CSS between firms within
industries)
Level 3
Between industry variation in intercept
(variation in mean CSS between industries)
Variance Decomposition by Level
Level 1 (within-firm over time)
Level 2 (between-firms within industries)
Level 3 (between industries)
Goodness of Fit
Deviance
Reliabilities
Reliability Estimate of Random Level 1 Coefficient
Reliability Estimate of Random Level 2 Coefficient

γ000

etij

Model 1b: BCSS

Model 1c: DCSS

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

8.753***

(0.503)

0.476***

(0.034)

0.247***

(0.009)

Variance

(SD)

Variance

(SD)

Variance

(SD)

21.285***

(4.614)

0.098***

(0.312)

0.014***

(0.117)

48.280***

(4.948)

0.144***

(0.379)

0.020***

(0.142)

1.175*

(1.084)

0.008*

(0.098)

0.000

(0.014)

rij

uj

% by Level
30.1%
68.2%
1.7%
pm
38655
4
π0ij
β00j

0.976
0.384

% by Level
39.4%
57.8%
2.8%
pm
4399
4
0.964
0.558

% by Level
41.2%
58.8%
0.0%
pm
-8049
4
0.963
0.201

n= 6,334 observations, nested within 349 firms, nested within 12 industries
*** p< .001
** p< .01
* p< .05
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Note that the unconditional models report a deviance statistic based on -2 Log
Likelihood (-2LL) which are estimated using Full Maximum Likelihood (FML) rather
than Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML). FML and REML will usually produce the
same results for the level-1 residuals in large sample data sets, however, FML is the
appropriate method for overall model fit testing as it accounts for different sets of fixedeffect parameters (West et al., 2007). The deviance statistics of the null models reported
in Table 6.5 have no meaning on their own, yet the deviance statistics of subsequent
models can be directly compared to these reference models by subtracting the -2LL of the
nested model from the reference model and using an overall chi-square test to gauge
improvements in model fit. Under REML estimation, on the other hand, only the
differences in the random part of the models can be compared using the chi-square tests
(Hox, 2010) rendering REML estimation inappropriate in the context of testing
hypotheses about fixed effect parameters (West et al., 2007). 18

6.3.1.2 The Unconditional Linear Growth Models
The second null model to be estimated is the unconditional linear growth model
which is also a direct test of Hypotheses 1-3 in that the unconditional growth model can
test if CSS follows a linear increasing trajectory, on average, over time (H1a-c) and
whether there are significant differences in firms’ initial levels (H2a-c) and rates of
adoption of CSS over time (H3a-c). Holcomb et al. (2010) suggest that one fit two types

18

FML is also a methodological constraint imposed by the HLM6 software for 3 level models
(Raudenbush, S., Bryk, A., Cheong, Y. F., Congdon, R., & Du Toit, M. 2004. HLM 6: Hierarchical Linear
and Nonlinear Modeling. Lincolnwood, IL: Scientific Software International, Inc.).
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of unconditional linear growth models – one with fixed effects at all levels, followed by
an unconditional linear growth model with random effects at all levels.
The benefit of first estimating the unconditional growth model with the fixed
effects at all levels, is that it allows you to isolate the effect of the year variable on
reducing the total variance explained (Misangyi et al., 2006). As such, in contrast to the
unconditional means model, rather than examining the amount of variance attributable to
each level, the unconditional growth model estimates the variance explained by year
effects specifically to determine if the patterns of change vary significantly between firms
over time (Holcomb et al., 2010). 19 This is done by extending the unconditional means
model to include a YEARtij covariate and its slope coefficient π1ij to the Level 1 equation
in order to model the change in CSS for firm i in industry j for each period. In a three
level format, this model is as follows:
Level 1: Ytij = π0ij + π1ij(YEARtij) + etij

(4)

Level 2: π0ij = β00j + r0ij

(5a)

π1ij = β10j
Level 3: β00j = γ000 + u00j
β10j = γ100

(5b)
(6a)
(6b)

The Level 1 unconditional linear growth model in Equation (4) describes the
linear growth trajectory for CSS (aggregate, breadth or depth) at time t for firm i in
industry j. Specifically, firm i in industry j’s CSS score at time t is modeled as a function
of the intercept (the initial status of firm ij, π0ij), the slope or the growth rate of CSS for
19

Note: This is conceptually very different than modeling year effects with dummy variables, which control
for environmental jolts that are assumed to affect all firms similarly. Including a time vector in RCM
models allows for the examination of the individual firm growth trajectories of CSS over time – first as
fixed and then as varying between firms and industries over time (See Short et al., 2006 for a discussion).
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firm ij during the study (π1ij), and a time-specific residual term (etij) that captures the
deviation between a firm’s observed score and its estimated linear trajectory (Peugh &
Enders, 2005). Because the dependent variable is measured every year and is equally
spaced, the time variable (YEARtij), which is a Level 1 covariate, uses integer values
between 0 (at the initial observation in 1991) and 18 (for the final year in the database,
2009). Centering time in this way “allows the intercept to be interpreted as the estimated
initial status (i.e., the expected value of the outcome variable when time=0)” (Peugh &
Enders, 2005: 731) and is a commonly used centering method for time in organizational
studies (e.g., Holcomb et al., 2010).
The Level 2 models describe the individual firm intercepts and slopes as a
function of their mean intercepts and slopes. Equation (5a), for example, defines the mean
initial status of CSS for firm i in industry j (intercept) as a function of the mean initial
status within industry j (β00j), plus a firm deviation (r0ij) from this mean initial status.
Equation (5b), on the other hand, defines firm ij’s growth rate in CSS as a function of the
mean growth rate within the industry (β10j), which here is assumed to be fixed.
At Level 3, the mean initial status of CSS within industry j, β00j, is modeled as
function of the overall initial mean status of CSS of all firms (γ000) and a random variance
(u00j). β10j is the mean growth within industry j, while γ100, is the overall mean growth rate
of CSS, which again, at this step, is assumed to be fixed.
The results for the unconditional linear change model with fixed effects are
presented in Table 6.6. As can be seen in Model 2a, the grand mean of ACSS is now
5.6% vs. 8.7% in the unconditional means model. In the unconditional means model, the
grand mean of 8.7% represented the grand mean in the sample regardless of time. In the
unconditional linear change model with a fixed time effect, the overall initial mean status
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of CSS of all firms (γ000) is 5.6% (p <0.000), and can now be interpreted as the average
initial status of ACSS for all firms at time zero (1991). 20 Further, the average rate of
change for ACSS (γ100) across all firms over the 18 years is 0.353 which is also highly
significant (p <0.000) supporting a linear growth trajectory as predicted in Hypothesis 1a.
Models 2b and 2c show similar patterns for both BCSS and DCSS. The average breadth
of CSS for all firms in 1991 was 0.367 and the average depth of CSS was 0.181, both
significant (p<0.000); slope coefficients for BCSS and DCSS were also positive and
significant, supporting a linear growth trend over time as predicted in Hypothesis 1b and
Hypothesis 1c.
The unconditional growth models with fixed effects can also be used to assess the
reduction in the variance component in the temporal variation (etij) at Level 1 to estimate
the total variance explained specifically by year effects (Singer & Willett, 2003). Here,
the Level 1 variance component for ACSS was reduced from 21.285 in the unconditional
means model (Model 1a) to 17.512 (Model 2a). The total variance explained by year
effects then is 3.773/ (total variance in the unconditional means model) =
3.773/70.74=0.0536 or 5.3%. Similarly, BCSS and DCSS also saw a reduction in the
temporal variation estimate such that the total variance in BCSS explained by the year
effect is thus 2.0% (0.098-0.093)=0.005/0.249=0.02) and the total variance in DCSS
explained by the year effect is 5.9% (0.014-0.012=0.002/0.034=0.0588). 21 Industry
effects continue to be marginally significant in the DCSS model (Model 2c).

20
21

Note: This is similar to the OLS estimate for time obtained in preliminary tests summarized in Table 6.3.
Note: This is similar to the R2 estimates for the role of time also summarized in Table 6.3.

Table 6.6: Results for Unconditional Linear Means Models with Fixed Effects
Unconditional Linear Growth Models
Fixed Effects
Average initial status (intercept)
Average linear rate of change (slope)
Random Effects
Level 1
Temporal variation
(within-firm variation of CSS over time)
Level 2
Between firm variation in initial status
(intercept)
Level 3
Between industry variation in initial status
(intercept)
Goodness of Fit
Deviance
Reliabilities
Reliability of Random Level 1 Coefficient
Reliability of Random Level 2 Coefficient

ParaMeter

Model 2a: ACSS

Model 2b: BCSS

Model 2c: DCSS

Coeff.
5.609***
0.353***
VC

(SE)
(0.414)
(0.041)
(SD)

Coeff.
0.367***
0.012***
VC

(SE)
(0.029)
(0.002)
(SD)

Coeff.
0.180***
0.008***
VC

SE
(0.009)
(0.000)
(SD)

17.512***

(4.185)

0.093***

(0.305)

0.012***

(0.109)

r0ij

48.118***

(6.937)

0.143***

(0.379)

0.020***

(0.141)

u00j

1.167*

(1.080)

0.008**

(0.087)

0.000†

(0.014)

37484

pm
5

4110

pm
5

-8853

pm
5

γ000
γ100

etij

π0ij
β00j

0.980
0.385

0.965
0.560

0.968
0.198

n= 6,334 observations, nested within 349 firms, nested within 12 industries
*** p< .001
** p<.01
* p<.05
†
p<0.10
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At this point, the deviance statistics from the reference model and the deviance
statistics from the linear fixed models are compared using a chi-square test of significance
to assess whether or not the unconditional linear change models with fixed effects are a
better fit to the data than the unconditional means models. In all cases, the unconditional
linear change models with fixed effects present a significant improvement in model fit
over the unconditional means models. For example, the change in deviance statistics
between the unconditional means model of ACSS (Model 1a) and the unconditional linear
change model with fixed effects (Model 2a) using a χ2 statistic (38655 at 4 parameters vs.
37484 at 5 parameters; 1 df) is clearly significant at the p <0.000 level. Both of the
unconditional linear means models with fixed year effects for BCSS and DCSS also have
significantly better model fits than their corresponding unconditional means models
(BCSS: deviance reduction from 4399 – 4110, 1 df; DCSS: deviance reduction from 8049 to -8853, 1 df – p<0.000).
Although the unconditional linear change models with fixed effects are
informative, in reality, as could be seen in the exploratory descriptive statistics presented
in section 6.2, it is unlikely that the linear growth slopes for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS are
actually fixed (or parallel) over time. As such, in order to test if the variance in slopes
between firms is significant, I next fit an unconditional linear growth model with random
effects. The equations are similar to those presented in 4-6, however, the YEAR effect is
now allowed to vary randomly at Level 2 and Level 3 by adding a residual, r1ij, to
equation 5b so that the linear trend for the slope coefficient can vary randomly between
firms within industries. Similarly, I add a residual, u10j, to equation 6b to allow the slope
coefficient to also vary between industries, so that:
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Level 1: Ytij = π0ij + π1ij(YEARtij) + etij

(7)

Level 2: π0ij = β00j + r0ij

(8a)

π1ij = β10j + r1ij

(8b)

Level 3: β00j = γ000 + u00j

(9a)

β10j = γ100 + u10j

(9b)

The results of the unconditional linear change models with random intercepts and
random slopes are presented in Table 6.7. Similar to the unconditional linear growth
model with fixed effects, the average initial status across all firms in ACSS at time zero
(1991) was 5.7%. In other words, out of all of the possible strengths a firm could have
earned for ACSS, the average firm in 1991 was only engaging in approximately 5.7% of
these activities. Over the study period, the average rate of change or growth in ACSS was
0.33%, which was also significant (p<0.000). The results in both Table 6.8 and Table 6.9
thus confirm a significant linear growth trend for ACSS, supporting Hypothesis 1a which
predicted that the ACSS pursued by firms, on average, will increase linearly over time.
Furthermore, Model 3a also confirms that there is a significant variation (p<0.000)
in the average initial status of ACSS between firms, r0ij, and a significant variation
(p<0.000) in the linear change rates of ACSS between firms, r1ij, thus also supporting
Hypotheses 1b and 1c which predicted that firms would differ significantly in their initial
levels and rates of adoption of ACSS over time. Interestingly, although not part of the
models, the correlation between a firm’s initial level of ACSS and their rate of adoption
of ACSS over time is negative (-0.183) suggesting that firms with a higher average initial
status of ACSS grow at a slower rate of change than firms with a lower initial status of
ACSS.

Table 6.7: Results of Unconditional Linear Growth Models with Random Effects
Unconditional Linear Growth Models
Fixed Effects
Average initial status (intercept)
Average linear rate of change (slope)
Random Effects
Level 1
Temporal variation
(within-firm variation of CSS over time)
Level 2
Between firm variation in initial status
(intercept)
Between firm linear change rate (slope)
Level 3
Between industry variation in initial status
(intercept)
Between industry linear change rate (slope)
Goodness of Fit
Deviance
Reliabilities
Reliability of Random Level 1 Coefficients
Reliability of Random Level 2 Coefficient

ParaMeter

Model 3a: ACSS

Model 3b: BCSS

Model 3c: DCSS

Coeff.
5.725***
0.333***
Variance

(SE)
(0.400)
(0.036)
(SD)

Coeff.
0.373***
0.011***
Variance

(SE)
(0.027)
(0.002)
(SD)

Coeff.
0.181***
0.007***
Variance

(SE)
(0.010)
(0.001)
(SD)

9.306***

(3.051)

0.063***

(0.251)

0.009***

(0.093)

r0ij

38.025***

(6.166)

0.213***

(0.462)

0.021***

(0.146)

r1ij

0.264***

(0.514)

0.001***

(0.032)

0.000***

(0.010)

u00j

0.499†

(0.707)

0.002

(0.044)

0.001**

(0.021)

u10j

0.005

(0.068)
Parameters
9

0.000

(0.004)
Parameters
9

0.000

(0.000)
Parameters
9

γ000
γ100

etij

34570
π0ij
π1ij
β00j
β10j

0.950
0.934
0.254
0.302

2538

0.941
0.888
0.192
0.305

-10069

0.919
0.860
0.329
0.046

n= 6,334 observations, within 349 firms, within 12 industries
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;

†

p<0.10
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As in previous models, the industry components continue to be very small and in
these models, largely insignificant with very low reliabilities; specifically, the between
industry variance in initial status, u00j, for ACSS is only marginally significant (p<0.100)
and the reliability of estimating the random coefficient at this level, β00j, is only 0.254.
Similarly, the between industry variance in the linear rate of change, u10j, was not
significant and the reliability of the β10j estimate was also very low (0.302). As such,
despite the descriptive exploratory graphs that appeared to suggest that industries do
differ in their initial status and their rates of change in ACSS over time, these variances
are not, on the whole, statistically significant.
This suggests that the observed patterns in firm ACSS growth trajectories are not
all clustered around an industry mean in a manner that demonstrates that significant
patterns in the growth trajectories are due to industry effects. Rather, we can find high
initial status and high growth parameters in all industries just as we can find low initial
status and low growth across all industries (it is not that these effects are industry
specific). This is not to say that industry characteristics may not moderate the relationship
between firm characteristics and CSS, but rather that there is little systematic variation
attributable to nesting firms within industry effects specifically and that it will be difficult
to model this variation with between-industry measures (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). 22
Table 6.7 also shows the results for the unconditional linear growth models with
random effects for the breadth (Model 3b) and depth (Model 3c) of corporate social
strategy over time. Again, we can see that the average linear change in growth of BCSS
22

For example, the variance estimate for the between industry linear change rate is 0.005 with a standard
deviation of 0.068 (non-significant). This indicates that firms within industries that have growth rates that
are one standard deviation above average are expected to increase their ACSS at the rate of 0.333+0.068 or
0.401. Clearly, there is not sufficient variability in the between industry slopes to reliably estimate their
effects on firm-level adoption of ACSS.
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was positive and significant (γ100 = 0.011, p<0.000), as was the average linear change in
growth of DCSS (γ100 = 0.007, p<0.000), thus supporting Hypotheses 1b and 1c as well.
Similarly, Models 3b & 3c also show that there is significant variation in both the
intercepts and slopes between firms for both BCSS and DCSS, thus supporting
Hypotheses 2b and 2c as well as Hypotheses 3b and 3c. The same negative correlation
between intercepts and slopes was also observed, as was the insignificance and low
reliabilities of the industry effects. A summary of all of the Hypotheses tests results are
also presented in Table 6.20 at the end of this chapter.
Once again, the model fit statistics of the unconditional linear change models with
random effects are compared to the unconditional linear change models with fixed effects
to ensure that model fit is improving. Across all outcome measures, ACSS, BCSS and
DCSS, the deviance chi-square tests are significant (p<0.000), suggesting that the models
with random slopes are indeed more representative of the data than the model with fixed
slopes across time. Hypotheses 1-3 are thus fully supported.

6.3.2 Step 2: Determine the Function of Time
The next step in the model comparison approach is to determine if the significant
linear trend found in Steps 1 is indeed the correct estimate for the function of time on
CSS, as compared to a quadratic, cubic or other higher order polynomial curve. At this
stage, given that a) the overall variance attributable to industry effects was found to be
very small, b) the reliabilities of the random estimates for industry effects are also very
small and c) that the variance components attributable to industry effects in the
unconditional linear growth models with random effects were either marginally
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significant or not significant, the three level model is reduced to two levels, with years
nested in firms, but not firms nested in industries (the subscript j has been removed from
the models). Because the linear trend was found to vary significantly between firms, the
models retain parameters that allow the slopes to vary. The models to be estimated then
become:
Level 1: Yti = π0i + π1i(YEARti) + π2i(YEARti)2 + π3i(YEARti)3 + eti

(10)

Level 2: π0i = β00 + r0i

(11a)

π1i = β10 + r1i

(11b)

π2i = β20 + r2i

(11c)

π3i = β30 + r3i

(11b)

These equations were tested hierarchically, adding the quadratic and the cubic
trends in a step-wise fashion and assessing improvements in model fit as well as tradeoffs regarding model parsimony vs. complexity. 23 Here, π0i is once again the initial level
of CSS of firm i at time t, however, π1i now captures the instantaneous growth rate for
firm i at time t, while π2i captures the curvature or acceleration/deceleration in each
growth trajectory. In the cubic model, π3i captures the change in the rate of change and
helps distinguish if, in the case that a quadratic model is significant, the
acceleration/deceleration in the growth trajectories persists or if there may in fact be a
another inflection point where the trend reverses (Singer & Willett, 2003).
Table 6.8 presents the results of the step-wise tests of higher order polynomial
growth curves for ACSS. Note that Model 4a is slightly different from the final linear
growth model with random effects from Step1 given the change to a two level model (the
23

Note that the statistical program used to create the .mdm files was now HLM2 (vs. HLM3 for the 3-level
models); FML is retained given hypothesis testing around the model fixed-effects components.
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1.7% variance attributable to industry effects is now partitioned within and between
firms). In addition, while Model 4a and 4b include the random effects of linear and
quadratic terms, a model with random cubic effect, r3i, failed to run. Hence, a fixed cubic
effect model is presented.

Table 6.8: Comparison of Fitting Alternative Polynomial Change Trajectories to ACSS over Time
Higher Order Change Trajectories:
ACSS
Fixed Effects
Average initial status (intercept)
Average rate of change (linear)
Average rate of change (quadratic)
Average rate of change (cubic)
Random Effects
Level 1
Temporal variation (within firm over
time)
Level 2
Between firm variation in initial status
(intercept)
Between firm linear change rate (linear
slope)
Between firm (quadratic rate of change)
Between firm (cubic rate of change)
Goodness of Fit
Deviance
Reliabilities
Reliability of intercept coefficient
Reliability of slope coefficient
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient

Parameter

Model 4a:
Linear Growth

Model 4b:
Quadratic Growth

Model 4c:
Cubic Growth (Fixed)

Coefficient

(SE)

Coefficient

(SE)

Coefficient

(SE)

5.719***
0.340***

(0.341)
(0.029)

5.590***
0.383***
-0.003

(0.318)
(0.059)
(0.003)

Variance

(SD)

Variance

(SD)

4.941***
0.854***
-0.069***
0.003***
Variance

(0.325)
(0.109)
(0.013)
(0.000)
(SD)

eti

9.305***

(3.050)

7.036***

(2.653)

6.927***

(2.632)

r0i

38.482***

(6.203)

32.053***

(5.662)

32.186***

(5.673)

r1i

0.269***

(0.519)

0.985***

(0.992)

0.996***

(0.998)

0.003***

(0.055)

0.003***
-

33551

Parameters
10

(0.055)
Parameters
11

β00
β10
β20
β30

r2i
r3i
34573
π0i
π1i
π2i

Parameters
6
0.951
0.935

0.912
0.824
0.827

33467

0.914
0.827
0.829

n= 6,334 observations, within 349 firms
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<0.10

140

141
As can be seen in Table 6.8, the linear rate of change in ACSS over time remains
significant in all models. Model 4a is simply the baseline model established in Step 1 (the
unconditional linear growth model with random slopes yet without the industry level
nesting). Model 4b introduces both fixed and random quadratic growth parameters. The
fixed effect is not significant (β20= -0.003, p >0.05), suggesting that the average value of
the quadratic growth rates between firms is indistinguishable from zero. However, the
variance components associated with the quadratic growth curve model were significant
(r2i=0.003, p<.000) suggesting that there are statistically significant variations in the
quadratic rates of change across firms in the sample (Singer & Willett, 2003).
Furthermore, the difference in deviance statistics from Model 4a to Model 4b suggest a
significant improvement in fit (1,022 at 4 df, p<0.000). As such, further models may
retain the quadratic fixed effect as it may be possible to predict some of this variation
with the addition of explanatory covariates (Singer & Willett, 2003).
Model 4c estimates a cubic growth model which adds one more fixed effect (as
noted above, the model with random effects failed to run). In this model, all the fixed
effects are significant. Coupled with a significant reduction in the goodness of fit test (84
at 1 df), this suggests that firm change in ACSS over time should be treated as though it
follows a cubic trajectory – first increasing linearly (β10=0.825, p<0.000), then continuing
to increase, albeit at a decelerated rate (β20= -0.069, p<0.000) and finally the change in the
rate of change accelerating again (β30 =0.002, p<0.000). This mirrors the preliminary
descriptive plot found in Figures 6 and implies that there was indeed a greater rate of
adoption of social and environmental initiatives earlier on in the panel, tempering off in
the middle and then accelerating again in the last few years.
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Tables 6.9 and 6.10 demonstrate similar results for BCSS and DCSS. The models
with cubic growth functions with random effects here did not run as well. As such, the
cubic fixed models are presented. In both cases, the cubic growth models with fixed
effects for the cubic function had the best model fits, although the absolute value of the
parameter estimates for the quadratic and cubic functions were very small.

Table 6.9: Comparison of Fitting Alternative Polynomial Change Trajectories to BCSS
Higher Order Change Trajectories:
BCSS
Fixed Effects
Average initial status (intercept)
Average rate of change (linear)
Average rate of change (quadratic)
Average rate of change (cubic)
Random Effects
Level 1
Temporal variation (within firm over
time)
Level 2
Between firm variation in initial status
(intercept)
Between firm linear change rate (linear
slope)
Between firm (quadratic rate of change)
Between firm (cubic rate of change)
Goodness of Fit
Deviance
Reliabilities
Reliability of intercept coefficient
Reliability of slope coefficient
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient

Parameter

Model 5a:
Linear Growth
Coeff.
(SE)
0.376***
(0.256)
0.012***
(0.002)

Model 5b:
Quadratic Growth
Coeff.
(SE)
0.370***
(0.025)
0.014**
(0.005)
-0.000
(0.000)

Variance

(SD)

Variance

(SD)

eti

0.063***

(0.251)

0.049***

(0.221)

0.043***

(0.219)

r0i

0.215***

(0.464)

0.197***

(0.444)

0.197***

(0.444)

r1i

0.001***

(0.032)

0.006***

(0.078)

0.006***

(0.079)

0.000***

(0.004)

0.000***
-

1681

Pm
10

(0.004)
pm
11

β00
β10
β20
β30

r2i
r3i
pm
6

2548
π0i
π1i
π2i

0.941
0.890

0.902
0.807
0.815

Model 5c:
Cubic Growth (Fixed)
Coeff.
(SE)
0.312***
(0.026)
0.056***
(0.009)
-0.006***
(0.001)
0.000***
(0.000)
Variance
(SD)

1586
0.904
0.812
0.817

n= 6,334 observations, within 349 firms
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<0.10
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Table 6.10: Comparison of Fitting Alternative Polynomial Change Trajectories to DCSS
Higher Order Change Trajectories: DCSS
Fixed Effects
Average initial status (intercept)
Average rate of change (linear)
Average rate of change (quadratic)
Average rate of change (cubic)
Random Effects
Level 1
Temporal variation (within firm over time)
Level 2
Between firm variation in initial status
(intercept)
Between firm linear change rate (linear
slope)
Between firm (quadratic rate of change)
Between firm (cubic rate of change)
Goodness of Fit
Deviance
Reliabilities
Reliability of intercept coefficient
Reliability of slope coefficient
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient
n= 6,334 observations, within 349 firms
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<0.10

Parameter

Model 6a:
Linear Growth
Coeff.
(SE)
0.181***
(0.008)
0.007***
(0.001)

Model 6b:
Quadratic Growth
Coeff.
(SE)
0.174***
(0.008)
0.009**
(0.002)
-0.000
(0.000)

Variance

(SD)

Variance

(SD)

eti

0.009***

(0.093)

0.007***

(0.084)

0.007***

(0.084)

r0i

0.022***

(0.147)

0.019***

(0.140)

0.022***

(0.140)

r1i

0.000***

(0.010)

0.001***

(0.026)

0.001***

(0.027)

0.000***

(0.001)

0.000***

(0.001)

-10730

Pm
10

-10758

pm
11

β00
β10
β20
β30

r2i
r3i
pm
6

-10068
π0i
π1i
π2i

0.920
0.861

0.863
0.768
0.769

Model 6c:
Cubic Growth (Fixed)
Coeff.
(SE)
0.162***
(0.008)
0.018***
(0.003)
-0.001**
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
Variance
(SD)

0.864
0.770
0.771
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6.3.3 Step 3: Estimating the Error Structure
Up until this point, the equations estimated have assumed that the Level 1
residuals (eti) are independent, have a mean of zero and a constant variance for all
occasions (Heck, Thomas & Tabata, 2010). However, in longitudinal datasets this type of
simple error structure is unlikely given repeated measures within each firm that are likely
highly correlated to each other (Hox, 2010; Singer & Willett, 2003). Although
“incorrectly adopting the default error structure does not appear to bias fixed effects
estimates in many cases” (Peugh & Enders, 2005: p. 736), it may impact the significance
of random effects, especially in longitudinal research.

As such, it is strongly

recommended to test different Level 1 covariate structures which may theoretically better
fit the data (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Singer & Willett, 2003).
Singer and Willett (2003) recommend testing a total of six different error
covariance structures: unstructured, compound symmetric, heterogeneous compound
symmetric, first order autoregressive (AR1), heterogeneous autoregressive and Toeplitz.
These models are then compared to those established in Step 2, with smaller deviance
statistics indicating a better fit and thus included in the final model to be retained prior to
adding explanatory covariates in Steps 4 and 5.
However, each error structure imposes a distinct set of assumptions on the
residual covariance matrices which may or may not be of theoretical interest. In this case,
the first order autoregressive error structure (AR1) is theoretically the most likely error
structure to occur in longitudinal studies (e.g., Hausknecht et al., 2008). The AR1 error
structure allows residuals within firms to be correlated from occasion to occasion (ρ), but
with diminishing correlations over time (ρ at time 1, ρ2 at time 2, ρ3 at time 3 etc.).
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Theoretically and statistically, this type of error structure for the Level 1 residuals is most
likely representative of the data used in this study, as the Level 1 variance is assumed to
be independent across firms, σ2, but correlated within firms (Heck et al., 2010). Using
just the first five occasions for ease of presentation, a first order autocorrelation matrix is
estimated as follows:

σ2

1
ρ
ρ2
ρ3
ρ4

ρ
1
ρ
ρ2
ρ3

ρ2
ρ
1
ρ
ρ2

ρ3
ρ2
ρ
1
ρ

ρ4
ρ3
ρ2
ρ
1

In order to test if an AR1 error structure improved the fit of the final cubic growth
models established in Step 2, the models were rerun using a hierarchical multivariate
level model (HMLM) vs. the HLM2 procedure used in Step 3, as HMLM allows for the
hypothesis tests for different level 1 variances (HLM2 does not). 24 The primary
disadvantage with HMLM (vs. HLM2), however, is that this method does not provide
covariance estimates required for hypotheses testing in Steps 4 and 5. As such, the error
structure is assessed at this time for exploratory purposes only and the implications
revisited after the effects of the covariates have been tested in HLM2.
The cubic growth models with AR1 error structures for ACSS (7a), BCSS (7b)
and DCSS (7c) are presented in Table 6.11.

As can be seen from this table, the

magnitudes of the fixed effects are relatively similar to the unconditional cubic growth
24

HLM2 imposes a homogeneous error structure on all models, and allows for comparison tests using a
heterogeneous sigma squared model for the level-1 variances only. In this case, the heterogeneous error
structures for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS were not statistically superior to the more parsimonious
homogeneous variances used in the reference models (p>0.05). The remaining error structures suggested by
Singer & Willett (2003) were instead tested by repeating steps 1 & 2 (Models 1-6c) in SPSS 18 Linear
Mixed program which allows for the specification of different error structures. Of the six error structures,
only the linear change models with the AR1 error structures for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS converged and in
all cases, the model fits using an AR1 error structure were significantly better than the linear change models
with homogenous error structures.
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models with random effects for the linear and quadratic parameters and fixed effects for
the cubic parameter established in Step 2, however, the standard errors are generally
smaller in the ARI models. Importantly, there is a significant improvement in the overall
model fit (for ACSS, the deviance reduction is from 33467 in the homogenous sigma
squared model to 31612 in the AR1 model at 1df, p<0.000), suggesting that the AR1
structure is, in fact, the better model for this longitudinal data set.
As noted above, HMLM does not provide variance components comparable to
those assessed in Models 6a-c. However, it does partition the within firm variance
component into a constant variance component, σ2, and the correlation between any two
adjacent occasions, ρ which is informative. The ρ estimate which ranges from 0.62 for the
DCSS model (7c) and 0.73 in the ACSS model (7a) indicates a very high degree of
covariance between measurement occasions (the second lag correlation for ACSS would
be 0.732 or 0.53, the third lag correlation would be 0.733 or 0.39 etc.) suggesting that the
methods that do not account for this violation of the i.i.d. assumption are in danger of
making Type I errors (failure to account for autocorrelation can lead to underestimated
standard errors and thus inflated t-values)(Bliese & Ployhart, 2002).
Given the magnitude of the covariation in measurement occasions, the AR1 error
structure is preferred over the baseline models to test for overall model fit. However, no
substantive differences in the intercept and growth parameters were detected (e.g. growth
parameters that were no longer significant in the AR1 models). As such, I can proceed to
modeling the predictor variables using the homogenous error structure assumed by HLM2
(Short et al., 2006) so that differences in variance components can be directly compared
and pseudo R2 statistics computed. Similar to Misangyi et al. (2006), the issue of AR1
error structures will be revisited as the last step in the model building process.

Table 6.11: Unconditional Cubic Growth Models with AR1 Level 1 Error Structure
Final Unconditional Cubic Growth
Models
Fixed Effects

Parameter

Model 7a: ACSS

Model 7b: BCSS

Model 7c: DCSS

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

Average initial status (intercept)

β00

5.033***

(0.308)

0.318***

(0.025)

0.164***

(0.008)

Average rate of change (linear)

β10

0.764***

(0.095)

0.050***

(0.007)

0.017***

(0.003)

Average rate of change (quadratic)

β20

-0.054***

(0.012)

-0.005***

(0.001)

-0.001**

(0.000)

Average rate of change (cubic)

β30

0.002***

(0.000)

0.000***

(0.000)

0.000**

(0.000)

VC

(SE)

VC

(SE)

VC

(SE)

σ2

14.547

(1.200)

0.088

(0.006)

0.011

(0.019)

ρ

0.729

(0.021)

0.672

(0.020)

0.616

(0.019)

12

Parameters
12

Random Effects
Level 1
Temporal variation (within firm over
time), eti :
AR1
diagonal
AR1 rho
Goodness of Fit
Deviance

Parameters
31612
12

-12150

Parameters
12

n= 6,334 observations, within 349 firms
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<0.10
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6.3.4 Step 4 and Step 5: Adding Time-Variant Variables to the Level 1 Models and
Adding Time-Invariant Variables to the Level 2 Models
Broadly speaking, the steps taken thus far essentially determine the relationship
between CSS and time, concluding that (a) there is a small but significant linear increase
in CSS (all forms) over time, (b) firms differ in terms of their initial level of CSS and (c)
that the linear growth patterns vary significantly between firms but (d) not substantially
between industries. Furthermore, we know that (e) while the quadratic growth function is
non-significant, (f) there may be a possible cubic function to the role of time on CSS
adoption, but that (g) the absolute value of these parameters are very small. Lastly, we
know that (h) when an auto-correlated error structure is included in the Level 1 cubic
growth models, overall model fit improves significantly.
These findings are clearly an advance over traditional cross-sectional designs, yet
the significant variance component parameters suggest that a non-trivial amount of
variance is still to be explained in all models (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). Steps 4 and 5 in
the RCM procedure therefore allow for hypothesis testing regarding why firms vary in
terms of their intercept values (initial levels of CSS) as well as why firms have different
slopes (rates of adoption of CSS over time) by adding predictor variables to the baseline
equations established in Steps 1-3.
To begin, I first add all of the firm level control variables to the models in HLM2.
Although the control variables have been measured at each time point across all 19 years
of the study and are thus technically time-variant (e.g. the measure of firm size is
recorded in every year for every firm), theoretically, it could be argued that the firm size,
past performance, risk and R&D intensity are more likely to explain differences between
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firms, than differences within firms over time and could therefore also be modeled as
time-invariant predictors at Level 2. In order to determine at which level of the equations
to enter the control variables, Misangy et al. (2006) and Holcomb et al., (2010) suggest
running an ICC analysis on each independent variable in order to determine if the amount
of variance in each measure can be attributed primarily to within firm effects (across
time, or transient effects) and thus should be modeled as time-variant at Level 1, or
whether the variance in each measure resides primarily between firms (or a crosssectional/stable effect), and thus modeled through aggregating observations over time and
entering these as time-invariant predictors at Level 2. Simultaneously, HLM2 also
provides the reliability of estimating the random Level 1 coefficient, π0i, (also referred to
as ICC(2)) which is, in effect, an estimate of the reliability of the aggregate measure
(Misangyi et al., 2006). The results of these analyses are presented in Table 6.12 below.

Table 6.12: Results of ICC Analysis of Control Variables

Control
Variable
Size
Past
Performance
Risk
R&D Intensity

Variance
% of
across
Variance
Total
variance
time
between
Variance within
(withinfirms
firms
firms)
0.071***
0.458***
0.529
13.1%

%
variance Reliability
between
ICC(2)
firms
86.9%

0.991

0.004***

0.002***

0.006

68.6%

31.4%

0.892

0.007***
0.001***

0.011***
0.015***

0.019
0.016

38.6%
6.1%

61.4%
93.9%

0.966
0.996

N=6334

As illustrated in Table 6.12, for three out of the four control variables (Size, Risk
and R&D Intensity), the majority of the variance resides between firms, rather than within
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firms over time (from 61%-94%). In contrast, the bulk of the variance in past financial
performance resides within the firm over time (69%). This suggests that past performance
should be entered as a time-variant variable at Level 1 and the remaining control variables
can be entered into the equations as time-invariant variables at Level 2 (they have a stable
effect on ACSS over time). The high reliabilities of π0i also suggest that aggregation of
these control variables is justifiable (Misangyi et al., 2006). As such, firm size, risk and
R&D intensity are aggregated for each firm over the time span of the study and their firm
level averages modeled at Level 2. The control models then become:
Level 1: Yti = π0i + π1i(YEARti) + π2i(YEARti)2+ π3i(YEARti)3 +
π4i (PAST PERFORMANCEti) + eti

(12)

Level 2: π0i = β0i + β01(SIZEti) + β02(RISKti) + β03(RDINTti) + r0i

(13a)

π1i = β10 + β11(SIZEti) + β12(RISKti) + β13(RDINTti) + r1i

(13b)

π2i = β20 + r2i

(13c)

π3i = β30

(13d)

π4i = β40

(13e)

Note that the effects of cubic growth, π3i, and past performance, π4i, on CSS are
set as fixed as no random errors are included in equations (13d and e).

In this manner,

all of the control variables (except past performance) are modeled as predictors of the
initial levels and linear growth rates of CSS between firms and these effects are allowed
to vary between firms. Only past performance is modeled as a predictor of CSS within
firms.
Prior to this analysis, all of the control variables were centered around their grand
mean before being entered in equations 12-13e. The centering of variables in multi-level
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models is a critical step in that it effects the meaning and interpretation of coefficients
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). By grand-mean centering all of the control variables, the
intercept in equation 12, π0i, can be interpreted as the expected outcome for an “average”
firm at the mean of all control variables (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In other words, the
intercept, π0i, represents the mean CSS across time for firm i, adjusted for the effect of
past-performance which is simultaneously modeled as the outcome in equation 13a
adjusted for the stable effects of size, risk, and R&D intensity expected to explain
between-firm variance (Misangyi et al., 2006).
Having theoretically and statistically determined at which level to enter the
control variables, a similar procedure was followed in order to determine the appropriate
level at which to enter the predictor variables around executive orientation. Given that the
unit of analysis is the firm (as discussed in Chapter 4), it is critical to the models whether
the effect of executive orientation on the initial status and rate of change in CSS over time
is predicted to occur primarily within the firm over time, or between firms over time
(Ployhart et al., 2002). Entering the executive orientation variables as time-variant at
Level 1 would examine the within-firm change process as a reflection of CEO
characteristics, while entering the predictor variables as time invariant at Level 2 answers
questions regarding inter-firm differences in CSS change patterns that are attributable to
executive orientation. Given that the latter best reflects the hypotheses set forth in this
thesis, the executive orientation variables are first modeled at Level 2, as predictors of
between-firm differences in initial levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time.
Alternate model specifications are considered in the discussion section as post-hoc
analyses.

153
To confirm if aggregation of the executive orientation variables is statistically
reliable, similar to the analysis of variance decomposition of the control variables, ICC(1)
and ICC(2) analyses were also performed on the CEO characteristics variables. As shown
in Table 6.13 below, although the within-firm and the between-firm variances are
relatively equal, the reliability of aggregating the executive orientation variables are very
high. As such, there is statistical support for the theoretical rationale of modeling
executive orientation as a between firm predictor of level and rates of adoption of CSS.

Table 6.13: Results of ICC Analysis of Predictor Variables

Predictor Variable

Political Liberalism
Output Function
Functional Breadth
International Exp.
MBA
JD/LLB
Age
Gender
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at firm

Variance
across
time
(withinfirms)
1.128
0.097
0.404
0.092
0.114
0.049
28.203
0.009
35.613
87.745

Variance
between
firms
1.768***
0.133***
0.400***
0.097***
0.125***
0.046***
18.579***
0.009***
27.854***
75.905***

% of
%
Total
variance variance
Variance within
between
firms
firms
3.048
0.230
0.804
0.188
0.239
0.095
46.793
0.018
63.467
163.650

42.0%
42.2%
50.3%
48.9%
47.7%
51.6%
60.3%
50.0%
56.1%
53.6%

Reliability

0.966
0.961
0.947
0.950
0.948
0.941
0.922
0.945
0.934
0.940

58.0%
57.8%
49.7%
51.1%
52.3%
48.4%
39.7%
50.0%
43.9%
46.4%

N=6334

The full models for the hypothesis testing then become:
Level 1: Yti = π0i + π1i(YEARti) + π2i(YEARti)2+ π3i(YEARti)3 +
π4i (PAST PERFORMANCEti) + eti

(14)

Level 2: π0i = β0i + β01(SIZEti) + β02(RISKti) + β03(RDINTti) + β04(POLITICAL
LIBERALISMti) + β05(OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) + β06(FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) +
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β07(INTERNATIONALEXPti) + β08(MBAti) + β09(JDLLBti) + β010(AGEti) +
β011(GENDERti) + β012(TENUREINROLEti) + β013(TENUREATFIRMti) + r0i

(15a)

π1i = β10 + β11(SIZEti) + β12(RISKti) + β13(RDINTti) + β14(POLITICAL
LIBERALISMti) + β15(OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) + β16(FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) +
β17(INTERNATIONALEXPti) + β18(MBAti) + β19(JDLLBti) + β110(AGEti) +
β111(GENDERti) + β112(TENUREINROLEti) + β113(TENUREATFIRMti) + r1i

(15b)

π2i = β20 + r2i

(15c)

π3i = β30

(15d)

π4i = β40

(15e)

Again, the effects of quadratic growth are allowed to vary randomly, however, the
cubic growth parameter, π3i, and the past performance estimate, π4i, on CSS are set as
fixed and no random errors are included in equations (15d and e). Similarly, all of the
predictor variables were centered around their grand mean before being entered in
equations. 25 The intercept in equation 14, π0i, can now be interpreted as the expected CSS
outcome for an “average” firm at the mean of all control and predictor variables
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In other words, the intercept, π0i, represents the mean CSS
across time for firm i, adjusted for the effect of past-performance over time which is
simultaneously modeled as the outcome in equation 15a adjusted for the stable effects of
firm and executive orientation expected to explain between-firm variance (Misangyi et
al., 2006). The linear slope is also simultaneously modeled as the outcome in equation
15b as predicted by firm and executive characteristics.
25

Although dichotomous variables are usually not centered, because the executive orientation variables
were aggregated at the level of the firm, these variables were no longer dichotomous, but rather represented
the ‘average’ for a particular CEO attribute over the 19 year period for a particular firm. As such, grand
mean centering is the appropriate method to facilitate interpretation of the results.
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Because the hypotheses testing proceeds in a step wise fashion, including the
predictors to the base line equations and testing for changes in variance components using
pseudo R2 statistics and changes in overall model fit using chi-square tests of the deviance
statistics, rather than continue to report ACSS, BCSS and DCSS together, the effects of
the predictors are modeled against the base line in a separate table for each dependent
variable. Table 6.14, therefore, reports the results for the ACSS models, while Table 6.15
and 6.16 present the results for BCSS and DCSS models respectively.
Note that because HLM2 does not allow for any missing data at Level 2, two sets
of CEO models were estimated in all subsequent analyses. First, “full” models with all of
the 6,334 observations nested in 349 firms were run to test Hypotheses 4-11. These
models omit the education variables (MBA and legal degrees) which had 5.6% missing
data as described in Table 6.1. Rather than lose the data on the principle covariates of
interest in testing executive orientation, a second set of “reduced” models (with 6,232
observations in 343 firms) that include the education variables were run to test
Hypotheses 12-15. 26 The full and reduced models are labeled CEO Model 1 and CEO
Model 2 on the following pages and the effect on sample size noted at the bottom of the
Tables.

26

Note that the variance components and the deviance statistics for the CEO Model 2 are compared to a
reduced baseline cubic growth and control model not reported here for space considerations.

Table 6.14: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of ACSS
Firm Level Models of ACSS
Fixed Effects
For intercept (initial status, π0i):
Average initial status (intercept)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender
For average linear rate of change (π1i)
Average rate of change (linear)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender

Para
meter

Model 8a:
Baseline Cubic Growth
Model
Coeff.
(SE)

β00
β01
β02
β03
β04
β05
β06
β07
β08
β09
β010
β011
β012
β013

4.941***

β10
β11
β12
β13
β14
β15
β16
β17
β18
β19
β110
β111
β112
β113

0.855***

(0.325)

(0.109)

Model 8b:
Control Model

Model 8c:
CEO Model 1

Model 8d:
CEO Model 2

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

4.953***
2.062***
-1.103
2.176

(0.317)
(0.530)
(2.780)
(2.569)

4.957***
2.213***
-2.040
0.450
0.451*
1.747*
0.109
0.850

(0.312)
(0.571)
(2.867)
(2.749)
(0.212)
(0.886)
(0.519)
(1.026)

-0.017
0.073*
-0.141†
3.720

(0.068)
(0.035)
(0.078)
(2.859)

4.922***
2.395***
-1.826
0.584
0.441*
1.784*
0.043
1.053
-0.445
0.842
-0.011
0.072*
-0.145†
3.859

(0.315)
(0.580)
(2.891)
(2.774)
(0.219)
(0.902)
(0.526)
(1.036)
(0.598)
(1.528)
(0.068)
(0.037)
(0.083)
(2.951)

0.848***
0.374***
-0.152
1.356***
-0.010
0.156*
0.067*
0.024

(0.108)
(0.039)
(0.218)
(0.205)
(0.017)
(0.070)
(0.033)
(0.075)

-0.008†
0.007*
0.001
0.734***

(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.169)

0.865***
0.374***
-0.119
1.355***
-0.007
0.139*
0.072*
0.005
0.107†
-0.151
-0.008†
0.006*
0.002
0.733***

(0.110)
(0.039)
(0.218)
(0.205)
(0.017)
(0.071)
(0.033)
(0.075)
(0.058)
(0.105)
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.169)

0.849***
0.380***
-0.129
1.458***

(0.109)
(0.038)
(0.217)
(0.197)
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Table 6.14: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of ACSS (continued)
Firm Level Models of ACSS

Parameter

Model 8a:
Baseline Cubic
Growth Model
Coeff.
(SE)

Model 8b:
Control Model

Fixed Effects (cont’d)
Coeff.
(SE)
For intercept (initial status, π0i):
β20
-0.069*** (0.013) -0.069***
(0.013)
For average quadratic rate of change (π2i)
β30
0.003***
(0.000)
0.002***
(0.000)
For average cubic rate of change (π3i)
Β40
1.719**
(0.665)
For slope of past performance (π4i)
Random Effects
VC
(SD)
VC
(SD)
Level 1
Temporal variation (within firms)
eti
6.928***
(2.630)
6.916***
(2.630)
Level 2
Between firm variation in initial status
r0i
32.186*** (5.673) 30.440***
(5.517)
Between firm linear change rate
r1i
0.996***
(0.998)
0.897***
(0.947)
Between firm quadratic change rate
r2i
0.003***
(0.055)
0.003***
(0.055)
Total Variance
40.113
38.259
Variance Explained (R2)
4.6%
Change in variance explained (∆R2)
Goodness of Fit
pm
pm
Deviance
33467
11
33183
18
Reliabilities
Reliability of intercept coefficient
π0i
0.914
0.909
Reliability of slope coefficient
π1i
0.827
0.812
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient
π2i
0.829
0.830
Models 8a-8c: n= 6,334 observations within 349 firms; Model 8d: n=6,232 observations within 343 firms
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<0.10

Model 8c:
CEO Model 1

Model 8d:
CEO Model 2

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

-0.069***
0.002***
1.672**
VC

(0.013)
(0.000)
(0.666)
(SD)

-0.069***
0.002***
1.646**
VC

(0.013)
(0.000)
(0.672)
(SD)

6.915***

(2.630)

7.000***

(2.645)

28.988***
0.876***
0.003***
36.782
8.3%
3.9%

(5.384)
(0.936)
(0.055)

29.042 ***
0.893***
0.003***
36.938
9.0%
3.8%

(5.389)
(0.945)
(0.055)

33117
0.904
0.808
0.829

pm
34

32647

pm
38

0.905
0.811
0.831
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Table 6.14 presents the results for the hypotheses testing regarding the predictors
of initial levels and growth of ACSS over time. Model 8a, the baseline cubic growth
model, is identical to Model 4c which was established in Step 2 as the reference model.
Model 8b adds the control variables, Model 8c adds the executive orientation variables
(not including education) and Model 8d adds the education variables using the reduced
sample.
The control model (Model 8b) provides a statistically better fit than the
unconditional cubic growth model (χ2= 284 at 7df, p<0.000) and explains approximately
4.6% of the variance in ACSS, largely between firms. The overall average initial status
for ACSS is largely unchanged at 4.953 % (from 4.941% in the baseline model) which
can be interpreted as the initial level of ACSS for firms at the average level of past
performance, size, risk and R&D intensity.
With regards to the initial status of ACSS in 1991, only size and past financial
performance are statistically significant predictors (both p<0.05). Specifically, the initial
status for larger firms was 2.06% higher than the average firm, or 7% in 1991 (vs. 5% on
average). Similarly, firms with above average past financial performance have an
estimated starting ACSS level of about 6.672% (4.953%+1.719%), confirming prior
studies that have shown a modest positive relationship between past CFP and CSP (e.g.,
Waddock & Graves, 1997). However, the effects of risk and R&D intensity on initial
levels of ACSS were not significant. The latter result in particular is contrary to prior
studies that have shown a positive relationship between R&D intensity and CSP
specifically (e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, 2000).
More interesting, perhaps, is the relationship between the control variables and the
rate of change in ACSS over time. Here, the average instantaneous growth in ACSS

159
(which varies randomly across firms) is 0.849% and is statistically significant (p<0.000).
Firm size appears to be a significant predictor in the rate of change in ACSS (β11=0.380,
p<0.000) such that larger firms grew in ACSS at a higher rate of change than firms at the
mean level of firm size (1.2% rather than 0.85 %). As opposed to its effect on initial
status, the effect of R&D intensity on the linear rate of change was significant, such that
the ACSS of firms with R&D intensity above the mean grew at a rate of 2.3 % (vs.
0.85%). This is an important nuance in the debate surrounding the relationship between
R&D intensity and CSP (Padgett & Galán, 2010). While the two do not appear to be
related cross-sectionally at time 0 (1991), it appears as though R&D intensity is a strong
predictor of the rate of adoption of ACSS over time.
Despite the addition of the control variables, the significant variance components
suggest that there is still significant residual variance in the initial intercept and the slope
(both, p<0.000) to be explained and that analysis can proceed to Model 8c and 8d for
direct tests of the hypotheses. Several of the CEO level control variables showed
significant relationships with the initial level of ACSS. In particular, firms with CEOs
that have longer tenures at the firm, showed higher initial levels of ACSS (β011=0.073,
p<0.05), while firms with older CEOs had lower initial levels of ACSS (β012=0.141,
p<0.10). As can be seen in the first CEO model (full sample), firms that are run by CEOs
with a liberal worldview do have a higher initial level of aggregate corporate social
strategy (β04=0.451, p<0.05) thus supporting Hypothesis 4a. Furthermore, firms led by
CEOs with functional backgrounds predominantly in output functions (e.g. marketing,
sales) also have significantly higher initial levels of ACSS (β05=1.747, p<0.05) supporting
Hypothesis 6a. Functional breadth and international experience, however, do not appear
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to affect initial levels of ACSS so that Hypotheses 8a and 10a are not supported in these
models.
The models for the linear slope of ACSS, on the other hand, had different results.
While tenure at the firm continued to be positive and significant (β111=0.007, p<0.05),
tenure in the role of CEO was negatively and marginally significantly related to the rate
of adoption of ACSS at the firm level (β110=-0.008, p<0.10). Here, gender becomes a
highly statistically significant predictor of the rate of adoption such that firms with above
average levels of female CEOs grew at a rate 0.734% higher than the average firm (or at a
linear rate of 1.582% vs. 0.848%). Model 8c, however, fails to provide support for
Hypothesis 5a, that firms run by CEOs with a liberal worldview have a higher rate of
adoption of ACSS over time. Rather, firms led by CEOs from output functions
(β15=0.156, p<0.05) and with greater functional breadth (β16=0.067, p<0.05) appear to
predict steeper adoption of ACSS over time (Hypotheses 7a and 9a are supported). On
the whole, however, the CEO executive orientation model demonstrates a significant
improvement over both the baseline model (χ2= 350 at 23df, p<0.000) and the control
model (χ2= 66 at 16df, p<0.000) explaining an additional 3.9% of the variance for a total
of pseudo R2 of 8.3%.
In order to test the effects of CEO educational background, all executive
orientation variables were entered in CEO Model 2 with the slightly smaller sample size
(Model 8d). All of the main effects established in Model 8c hold. However, the effects of
an MBA education or law education were not significant predictors of a firm’s initial
status of ACSS, although firms run by CEOs with MBA did marginally predict the linear
rate of adoption of ACSS over time (β85=0.107, p<0.10), albeit in the opposite direction
of that hypothesized. As such, I find no support for Hypotheses 12a, 13a, 14a and 15a
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which predicted that CEOs with MBAs and law degrees would have lower initial levels of
ACSS and slower rates of adoption of ACSS over time. Similar to Model 8c, however,
the full CEO executive orientation model demonstrated a significant improvement over
both the baseline model (χ2= 351 at 27df, p<0.000) and the control model (χ2= 70 at 20df,
p<0.000) explaining an additional 3.8% of the variance over the control model 27 for a
total of pseudo R2 of 9.0% over the baseline.
The hypotheses tests for BCSS and DCSS are reported in Tables 6.15 & 6.16
below.

27

Note: This is similar to the 4% OLS pooled estimate of CEO effects reported in Section 6.1.

Table 6.15: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of BCSS
Firm Level Models of BCSS
Fixed Effects
For intercept (initial status, π0i):
Average initial status (intercept)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender
For average linear rate of change (π1i)
Average rate of change (linear)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender

Para
meter

Model 9a:
Baseline Cubic Growth
Model
Coeff.
(SE)

β00
β01
β02
β03
β04
β05
β06
β07
β08
β09
β010
β011
β012
β013

0.312***

β10
β11
β12
β13
β14
β15
β16
β17
β18
β19
β110
β111
β112
β113

0.056***

(0.026)

(0.009)

Model 9b:
Control Model

Model 9c:
CEO Model 1

Model 9d:
CEO Model 2

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

0.326***
0.149***
0.175
0.378†

(0.026)
(0.038)
(0.222)
(0.202)

0.316***
0.164***
0.111
0.233
0.027
0.135*
-0.004
0.074

(0.025)
(0.039)
(0.227)
(0.219)
(0.017)
(0.068)
(0.038)
(0.083)

-0.001
0.004
-0.010
0.271

(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.233)

0.317***
0.170***
0.106
0.225
0.024
0.134†
-0.006
0.086
-0.024
0.115
-0.001
0.004
-0.012†
0.279

(0.026)
(0.040)
(0.228)
(0.221)
(0.018)
(0.069)
(0.034)
(0.084)
(0.064)
(0.121)
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.237)

0.054***
0.011***
-0.007
0.067***
-0.001
0.000
0.005*
-0.004

(0.009)
(0.002)
(0.016)
(0.015)
(0.001)
(0.005)
(0.002)
(0.006)

-0.000
0.000
0.000
0.004

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.021)

0.054***
0.011***
-0.004
0.067***
-0.001
0.000
0.006*
-0.005
0.007
-0.015*
-0.000
0.000
0.001
0.004

(0.009)
(0.003)
(0.016)
(0.015)
(0.001)
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.020)

0.054***
0.012***
-0.007
0.064***

(0.009)
(0.002)
(0.016)
(0.013)
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Table 6.15: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of BCSS (continued)
Firm Level Models of BCSS

Parameter

Model 9a:
Baseline Cubic
Growth Model
Coeff.
(SE)

Model 9b:
Control Model

Fixed Effects (cont’d)
Coeff.
(SE)
For intercept (initial status, π0i):
β20
-0.006*** (0.001) -0.006***
(0.001)
For average quadratic rate of change (π2i)
β30
0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
For average cubic rate of change (π3i)
Β40
0.135*
(0.065)
For slope of past performance (π4i)
Random Effects
VC
(SD)
VC
(SD)
Level 1
Temporal variation (within firms)
eti
0.048***
(0.219)
0.048***
(0.218)
Level 2
Between firm variation in initial status
r0i
0.197***
(0.444)
0.186***
(0.432)
Between firm linear change rate
r1i
0.006***
(0.079)
0.006***
(0.078)
Between firm quadratic change rate
r2i
0.000***
(0.004)
0.000***
(0.004)
Total Variance
0.251
0.241
Variance Explained (R2)
4.4%
Change in variance explained (∆R2)
Goodness of Fit
pm
pm
Deviance
1586
11
1396
18
Reliabilities
Reliability of intercept coefficient
π0i
0.904
0.898
Reliability of slope coefficient
π1i
0.812
0.809
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient
π2i
0.817
0.818
Models 8a-8c: n= 6,334 observations within 349 firms; Model 8d: n=6,232 observations within 343 firms
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<0.10

Model 9c:
CEO Model 1

Model 9d:
CEO Model 2

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

-0.006***
0.000***
0.131*
VC

(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.065)
(SD)

-0.006***
0.000***
0.133*
VC

(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.065)
(SD)

0.048***

(0.218)

0.048***

(0.219)

0.178***
0.006***
0.000***
0.232
7.6%
3.3%

(0.422)
(0.078)
(0.004)

0.179***
0.006***
0.000***
0.234
7.5%
2.9%

(0.424)
(0.078)
(0.004)

1362
0.894
0.807
0.818

pm
34

1372

pm
38

0.895
0.809
0.818
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Table 6.16: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of DCSS
Firm Level Models of DCSS
Fixed Effects
For intercept (initial status, π0i):
Average initial status (intercept)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender
For average linear rate of change (π1i)
Average rate of change (linear)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender

Para
meter

Model 10a:
Baseline Cubic Growth
Model
Coeff.
(SE)

β00
β01
β02
β03
β04
β05
β06
β07
β08
β09
β010
β011
β012
β013

0.162***

β10
β11
β12
β13
β14
β15
β16
β17
β18
β19
β110
β111
β112
β113

0.018***

(0.008)

(0.003)

Model 10b:
Control Model

Model 10c:
CEO Model 1

Model 10d:
CEO Model 2

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

0.162***
0.048***
-0.092
0.032

(0.008)
(0.012)
(0.072)
(0.060)

0.162***
0.046**
-0.127†
0.006
0.014*
0.031
0.013
0.023

(0.008)
(0.013)
(0.073)
(0.065)
(0.005)
(0.022)
(0.013)
(0.024)

-0.001
0.003**
-0.004*
0.055

(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.061)

0.160***
0.053**
-0.116
0.001
0.015*
0.035
0.011
0.030
-0.014
0.025
-0.001
0.003*
-0.004*
0.059

(0.008)
(0.013)
(0.074)
(0.066)
(0.006)
(0.022)
(0.013)
(0.024)
(0.021)
(0.034)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.063)

0.018***
0.006***
0.002
0.019***
-0.000
0.003†
0.001
-0.000

(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)

-0.000
0.000
0.000
0.018**

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.006)

0.018***
0.006***
0.002
0.019***
-0.000
0.002
0.001
-0.001
0.002
-0.003
-0.000
0.000
0.000
0.018**

(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.005)
(0.005)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.006)

0.018***
0.005***
0.001
0.020***

(0.003)
(0.000)
(0.005)
(0.004)

164

Table 6.16: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of DCSS (continued)
Firm Level Models of DCSS

Parameter

Model 10a:
Baseline Cubic
Growth Model
Coeff.
(SE)

Model 10b:
Control Model

Fixed Effects (cont’d)
Coeff.
(SE)
For intercept (initial status, π0i):
β20
-0.001**
(0.000)
-0.001**
(0.000)
For average quadratic rate of change (π2i)
β30
0.000**
(0.000)
0.000**
(0.000)
For average cubic rate of change (π3i)
Β40
0.055*
(0.021)
For slope of past performance (π4i)
Random Effects
VC
(SD)
VC
(SD)
Level 1
Temporal variation (within firms)
eti
0.007***
(0.084)
0.007***
(0.084)
Level 2
Between firm variation in initial status
r0i
0.019***
(0.140)
0.019***
(0.135)
Between firm linear change rate
r1i
0.002***
(0.027)
0.001***
(0.026)
Between firm quadratic change rate
r2i
0.000***
(0.001)
0.000***
(0.001)
Total Variance
0.027
0.026
Variance Explained (R2)
4.5%
Change in variance explained (∆R2)
Goodness of Fit
pm
pm
Deviance
-10759
11
-10886
18
Reliabilities
Reliability of intercept coefficient
π0i
0.864
0.855
Reliability of slope coefficient
π1i
0.770
0.766
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient
π2i
0.771
0.771
Models 8a-8c: n= 6,334 observations within 349 firms; Model 8d: n=6,232 observations within 343 firms
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<0.10

Model 10c:
CEO Model 1

Model 10d:
CEO Model 2

Coeff.

(SE)

Coeff.

(SE)

-0.001**
0.000**
0.053*
VC

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.021)
(SD)

-0.001**
0.000**
0.053*
VC

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.022)
(SD)

0.007***

(0.084)

0.007***

(0.084)

0.017***
0.001***
0.000***
0.025
8.9%
4.6%

(0.131)
(0.026)
(0.001)

0.017***
0.001***
0.000***
0.025
8.9%
3.6%

(0.130)
(0.026)
(0.001)

-10948
0.847
0.765
0.771

pm
34

-10733

pm
38

0.845
0.764
0.771
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Lastly, to test for the moderating effects of industry norms and managerial
discretion predicted in Hypotheses 16-18, I created 36 interaction terms as predictors
moderating both the initial levels and the rates of adoption of CSS over time as well as
moderating the effects of the executive orientation variables on the initial rates and
adoption of CSS over time. However, given the small and largely insignificant industry
effects found in Step 1, at this stage it is unlikely that significant moderating effects will
be detected. Regardless, I proceed with the formal testing of Hypotheses 16-18 by
modeling the following equations (using high discretion environments (HD) as an
example):
Level 1: Yti = π0i + π1i(YEARti) + π2i(YEARti)2+ π3i(YEARti)3 +
π4i (PAST PERFORMANCEti) + eti

(16)

Level 2: π0i = β0i + β01(SIZEti) + β02(RISKti) + β03(RDINTti) + β04(POLITICAL
LIBERALISMti) + β05(OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) + β06(FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) +
β07(INTERNATIONALEXPti) + β08(MBAti) + β09(JDLLBti) + β010(TENUREINROLEti) +
β011(TENUREATFIRMti) + β012(AGEti) + β013(GENDERti) + β014(HIGH DISCRETIONti)
+ β015(HDti X POLITICAL LIBERALISMti) + β016(HDti X OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) +
β017(HDti X FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) + β018(HDti X INTERNATIONALEXPti) +
β019(HDti X MBAti) + β020(HDti X JDLLBti) +r0i

(17a)

π1i = β10 + β11(SIZEti) + β12(RISKti) + β13(RDINTti) + β14(POLITICAL
LIBERALISMti) + β15(OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) + β16(FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) +
β17(INTERNATIONALEXPti) + β18(MBAti) + β19(JDLLBti) + β110(AGEti) +
β111(GENDERti) + β112(TENUREINROLEti) + β113(TENUREATFIRMti) + β114(HIGH
DISCRETIONti) + β115(HDti X POLITICAL LIBERALISMti) + β116(HDti X
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OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) + β117(HDti X FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) + β118(HDti X
INTERNATIONALEXPti) + β119(HDti X MBAti) + β120(HDti X JDLLBti) + r1i

(17b)

π2i = β20 + r2i

(17c)

π3i = β30

(17d)

π4i = β40

(17e)

All variables where standardized prior to being entered into Equations 16 -17e.
Table 6.17 presents the results of the moderation tests for ACSS. Model 11a is a
replication of Model 8d (albeit, with standardized coefficients) and serves as the baseline
model. Model 11b adds the direct effect of high discretion industry as well as the six
interaction effects for each executive orientation variable under study, while Model 11c
presents the results for the moderation effects of industry mean ACSS on the relationship
between executive orientation and ACSS. 28
As predicted, the results for the moderation tests were either small or insignificant
given the minimal variance found attributable to industry effects in Step 1. However,
although the impact on initial levels and the rate of adoption of ACSS does not appear to
be greater in high discretion industries (χ2= 13 at 14 df, p>0.05), there is a small, but
significant improvement in the model that accounts for the moderating role of industry
norms (χ2= 29 at 14 df, p<0.05).

Given the insignificant results for the effect of

managerial discretion (Model 11b), Hypotheses 16a and 17a are not supported and I focus
instead on the results of Model 11c for industry norms. 29

28

For ease of presentation only the full model with all executive orientation variables is presented (n=6232
observations nested in 343 firms)
29
Note: I also tested for the moderating effect using an alternate 3-level model specification in HLM3,
which re-introduces separate equations at Level 3 (rather than standardizing and creating interaction
variables). The non-significance of the results hold.

Table 6.17: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of ACSS with Moderating Effects
Firm Level Models of ACSS
Fixed Effects
For intercept (initial status, π0i):
Average initial status (intercept)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender
High Discretion (HD)
HD x Political liberalism
HD x Output function
HD x Functional breadth
HD x International experience
HD x MBA
HD x JD/LLB
Industry Mean ACSS (IMACSS)
IMACSS x Political liberalism
IMACSS x Output function
IMACSS x Functional breadth
IMACSS x International experience
IMACSS x MBA
IMACSS x JD/LLB

Parameter

β00
β01
β02
β03
β04
β05
β06
β07
β08
β09
β010
β011
β012
β013
β014
β015
β016
β017
β018
β019
β020
β014
β015
β016
β017
β018
β019
β020

Model 11a:
CEO Model
Coeff.
(SE)
4.922***
1.627***
-0.199
0.072
0.597*
0.664*
0.028
0.356
-0.162
0.187
-0.060
0.646*
-0.652†
0.375

(0.315)
(0.394)
(0.315)
(0.341)
(0.296)
(0.336)
(0.342)
(0.331)
(0.307)
(0.339)
(0.388)
(0.330)
(0.375)
(0.287)

Model 11b:
Managerial Discretion
Coeff.
(SE)
4.632***
1.792***
-0.265
-0.081
0.430
0.815†
0.491
0.199
-0.746†
0.369
-0.081
0.724*
-0.693†
0.403
0.569
0.355
-0.437
-0.942
0.287
1.162†
-0.375

(0.425)
(0.429)
(0.315)
(0.337)
(0.462)
(0.475)
(0.509)
(0.464)
(0.307)
(0.532)
(0.376)
(0.333)
(0.363)
(0.277)
(0.646)
(0.619)
(0.671)
(0.647)
(0.608)
(0.618)
(0.636)

Model 11c:
Industry Mean ACSS
Coeff.
(SE)
4.921***
1.189***
-0.102
-0.289
0.475†
0.547†
-0.045
0.336
-0.253
0.147
-0.151
0.660*
-0.721†
0.319

(0.308)
(0.405)
(0.329)
(0.348)
(0.292)
(0.313)
(0.332)
(0.315)
(0.295)
(0.322)
(0.363)
(0.330)
(0.372)
(0.276)

1.551***
-0.059
0.569*
0.059
0.014
-0.472†
0.265

(0.289)
(0.265)
(0.287)
(0.274)
(0.244)
(0.261)
(0.281)
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Table 6.17: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of ACSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d)
Firm Level Models of ACSS
Fixed Effects (cont’d)
For average linear rate of change (π1i)
Average rate of change (linear)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender
High Discretion (HD)
HD x Political liberalism
HD x Output function
HD x Functional breadth
HD x International experience
HD x MBA
HD x JD/LLB
Industry Mean ACSS (IMACSS)
IMACSS x Political liberalism
IMACSS x Output function
IMACSS x Functional breadth
IMACSS x International experience
IMACSS x MBA
IMACSS x JD/LLB
For average quadratic rate of change (π2i)
For average cubic rate of change (π3i)
For slope of past performance (π4i)

Parameter

β10
β11
β12
β13
β14
β15
β16
β17
β18
β19
β110
β111
β112
β113
β114
β115
β116
β117
β118
β119
β120
β114
β115
β116
β117
β118
β119
β120
β20
β30
Β40

Model 11a:
CEO Model
Coeff.
(SE)
0.865***
0.254***
-0.013
0.166***
-0.010
0.051*
0.046*
0.002
0.039†
-0.033
-0.044†
0.057*
0.010
0.071***

-0.069***
0.003***
0.126*

(0.110)
(0.027)
(0.024)
(0.025)
(0.024)
(0.027)
(0.022)
(0.024)
(0.021)
(0.023)
(0.027)
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.016)

(0.013)
(0.000)
(0.052)

Model 11b:
Managerial Discretion
Coeff.
(SE)
0.877***
0.253***
-0.011
0.167***
0.015
0.064
0.049
0.037
0.045
-0.051
-0.043
0.059*
0.007
0.078***
-0.024
-0.046
-0.021
-0.003
-0.061
-0.010
0.037

-0.069***
0.003***
0.125*

(0.113)
(0.028)
(0.024)
(0.025)
(0.036)
(0.043)
(0.034)
(0.036)
(0.035)
(0.032)
(0.027)
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.017)
(0.046)
(0.046)
(0.056)
(0.043)
(0.046)
(0.045)
(0.043)

(0.013)
(0.000)
(0.051)

Model 11c:
Industry Mean ACSS
Coeff.
(SE)
0.865***
0.263***
-0.018
0.172***
-0.011
0.054*
0.052*
0.001
0.043*
-0.031
-0.041
0.057*
0.014
0.073***

(0.110)
(0.028)
(0.025)
(0.026)
(0.024)
(0.026)
(0.022)
(0.024)
(0.021)
(0.023)
(0.027)
(0.024)
(0.024)
(0.017)

-0.021
-0.030
-0.014
0.032†
0.008
0.009
0.014
-0.069***
0.002***
0.127*

(0.023)
(0.022)
(0.026)
(0.019)
(0.023)
(0.021)
(0.023)
(0.013)
(0.000)
(0.051)
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Table 6.17: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of ACSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d)
Firm Level Models of ACSS
Random Effects
Level 1
Temporal variation (within firms)
Level 2
Between firm variation in initial status
Between firm linear change rate
Between firm quadratic change rate
Total Variance
Variance Explained (R2)
Change in variance explained (∆R2)
Goodness of Fit
Deviance
Reliabilities
Reliability of intercept coefficient
Reliability of slope coefficient
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient
n=6,232 observations within 343 firms
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<0.10

Para-meter

Model 11a:
CEO Model
VC
(SD)

Model 11b:
Managerial Discretion
VC
(SD)

Model 11c:
Industry Mean ACSS

eti

7.000***

(2.645)

7.000***

(2.645)

7.000***

(2.645)

r0i
r1i
r2i

29.042***
0.893***
0.003***
36.938
9.0%

(5.673)
(0.945)
(0.055)

28.235***
0.898***
0.003***
36.136
10.4%
n/s

(5.314)
(0.947)
(0.055)

27.287***
0.883***
0.003***
35.173
12.3%
4.8%

(5.223)
(0.939)
(0.055)

32647
π0i
π1i
π2i

0.905
0.811
0.831

pm
38

32634
0.902
0.811
0.831

pm
52

32618

pm
52

0.899
0.809
0.831
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As can be seen in Model 11c, the higher the mean ACSS of the industry, the
higher the initial firm level status of ACSS (β014=1.551, p<0.000). Furthermore, the tests
for the interaction effects of executive orientation and industry norms indicate that the
mean industry ACSS does moderate the relationship between two out of the six executive
orientation variables and the initial level of ACSS: the relationship between CEOs from
output functions and the initial status of ACSS is stronger when industry mean ACSS was
high (p<0.05). Furthermore, while there was no direct effect of an MBA education on the
initial level of ACSS, industry norms do seem to moderate this relationship such that the
relationship is stronger and marginally significant when the mean ACSS in the industry is
high (p<0.10). In other words, when industry ACSS is high, the predicted negative
relationship between firms with CEOs that have an MBA degree and the initial levels of
ACSS is stronger. However, given that an interaction effect was found for only two of the
variables, Hypothesis 18a is only partially supported.
With regards to the linear rate of adoption of ACSS over time, industry norms do
not appear to play a direct role (β114=-0.021, p>0.05). In fact, the negative sign suggests
that it is possible that the higher the industry mean ACSS the slower the rate of adoption
of ACSS over time (although insignificant). Furthermore, of the interaction effects,
industry norms appear to only marginally effect the relationship between CEOs with
greater functional breadth and the rate of adoption of ACSS (p<0.10) although this
relationship is smaller than the direct effect. Given the lack of significant interactions in
the predicted direction, Hypothesis 19a is not supported.
Tables 6.18 and 6.19 replicate the tests for BCSS and DCSS as dependent
variables.

Table 6.18: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of BCSS with Moderating Effects
Firm Level Models of ACSS
Fixed Effects
For intercept (initial status, π0i):
Average initial status (intercept)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender
High Discretion (HD)
HD x Political liberalism
HD x Output function
HD x Functional breadth
HD x International experience
HD x MBA
HD x JD/LLB
Industry Mean BCSS (IMBCSS)
IMBCSS x Political liberalism
IMBCSS x Output function
IMBCSS x Functional breadth
IMBCSS x International experience
IMBCSS x MBA
IMBCSS x JD/LLB

Parameter

β00
β01
β02
β03
β04
β05
β06
β07
β08
β09
β010
β011
β012
β013
β014
β015
β016
β017
β018
β019
β020
β014
β015
β016
β017
β018
β019
β020

Model 12a:
CEO Model
Coeff.
(SE)
0.317***
0.115***
0.011
0.028
0.032
0.049*
-0.004
0.027
-0.009
0.025
-0.005
0.039
-0.053†
0.027

(0.026)
(0.027)
(0.025)
(0.027)
(0.024)
(0.026)
(0.026)
(0.027)
(0.023)
(0.027)
(0.031)
(0.026)
(0.029)
(0.023)

Model 12b:
Managerial Discretion
Coeff.
(SE)
0.310***
0.127***
0.007
0.021
0.035
0.090*
0.014
0.025
-0.029
0.058
-0.004
0.041
-0.053†
0.033
0.013
-0.015
-0.085†
-0.039
0.011
0.043
-0.075

(0.035)
(0.029)
(0.025)
(0.027)
(0.036)
(0.036)
(0.036)
(0.039)
(0.035)
(0.038)
(0.030)
(0.027)
(0.028)
(0.023)
(0.051)
(0.051)
(0.050)
(0.049)
(0.049)
(0.047)
(0.049)

Model 12c:
Industry Mean BCSS
Coeff.
(SE)
0.317***
0.086**
0.009
-0.007
0.021
0.051*
-0.012
0.028
-0.019
0.019
-0.006
0.039
-0.060*
0.028

(0.026)
(0.028)
(0.025)
(0.028)
(0.024)
(0.025)
(0.025)
(0.025)
(0.022)
(0.024)
(0.027)
(0.025)
(0.029)
(0.025)

0.126***
-0.012
0.024
0.005
0.004
-0.027
0.041

(0.022)
(0.024)
(0.018)
(0.021)
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.019)
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Table 6.18: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of BCSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d)
Firm Level Models of ACSS

β10
β11
β12
β13
β14
β15
β16
β17
β18
β19
β110
β111
β112
β113
β114
β115
β116
β117
β118
β119
β120
β114
β115
β116
β117
β118
β119
β120
β20
β30
Β40

Model 12a:
CEO Model
Coeff.
(SE)
0.054***
0.007***
-0.000
0.008***
-0.001
-0.000
0.004*
-0.002
0.002
-0.003*
-0.002
0.001
0.003
0.000

-0.006***
0.000***
0.010*

(0.009)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)

(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.005)

Model 12b:
Managerial Discretion
Coeff.
(SE)
0.057***
0.006***
-0.000
0.009***
-0.001
-0.004
0.004
-0.000
0.002
-0.005*
-0.002
0.001
0.003
0.000
-0.005
0.001
0.008*
-0.000
-0.003
0.001
0.004

-0.006***
0.000***
0.010*

(0.009)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.003)

(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.005)

Model 12c:
Industry Mean BCSS
Coeff.
(SE)
0.055***
0.007***
-0.000
0.008***
-0.001
-0.000
0.004*
-0.002
0.002
-0.003†
-0.001
0.001
0.003†
0.000

(0.009)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)

-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
0.000
0.000
0.001
-0.002
-0.006***
0.000***
0.010*

(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.005)
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Fixed Effects (cont’d)
For average linear rate of change (π1i)
Average rate of change (linear)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender
High Discretion (HD)
HD x Political liberalism
HD x Output function
HD x Functional breadth
HD x International experience
HD x MBA
HD x JD/LLB
Industry Mean BCSS (IMBCSS)
IMBCSS x Political liberalism
IMBCSS x Output function
IMBCSS x Functional breadth
IMBCSS x International experience
IMBCSS x MBA
IMBCSS x JD/LLB
For average quadratic rate of change (π2i)
For average cubic rate of change (π3i)
For slope of past performance (π4i)

Parameter

Table 6.18: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of BCSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d)
Firm Level Models of ACSS
Random Effects
Level 1
Temporal variation (within firms)
Level 2
Between firm variation in initial status
Between firm linear change rate
Between firm quadratic change rate
Total Variance
Variance Explained (R2)
Change in variance explained (∆R2)
Goodness of Fit
Deviance
Reliabilities
Reliability of intercept coefficient
Reliability of slope coefficient
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient
n=6,232 observations within 343 firms
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<0.10

Para-meter

Model 12a:
CEO Model
VC
(SD)

Model 12b:
Managerial Discretion
VC
(SD)

Model 12c:
Industry Mean BCSS

eti

0.048***

(0.219)

0.048***

(0.219)

0.048***

(0.219)

r0i
r1i
r2i

0.180***
0.006***
0.000***
0.234
7.5%

(0.424)
(0.078)
(0.004)

0.176***
0.006***
0.000***
0.230
9.1%
1.6%

(0.419)
(0.078)
(0.004)

0.167***
0.006***
0.000***
0.221
12.6%
5.6%

(0.408)
(0.078)
(0.004)

1373

38

1358

52

1329

52

π0i
π1i
π2i

0.895
0.809
0.818

0.893
0.808
0.819

0.888
0.808
0.818
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Table 6.19: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of DCSS with Moderating Effects
Firm Level Models of ACSS
Fixed Effects
For intercept (initial status, π0i):
Average initial status (intercept)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender
High Discretion (HD)
HD x Political liberalism
HD x Output function
HD x Functional breadth
HD x International experience
HD x MBA
HD x JD/LLB
Industry Mean DCSS (IMDCSS)
IMDCSS x Political liberalism
IMDCSS x Output function
IMDCSS x Functional breadth
IMDCSS x International experience
IMDCSS x MBA
IMDCSS x JD/LLB

Parameter

β00
β01
β02
β03
β04
β05
β06
β07
β08
β09
β010
β011
β012
β013
β014
β015
β016
β017
β018
β019
β020
β014
β015
β016
β017
β018
β019
β020

Model 13a:
CEO Model
Coeff.
(SE)
0.159***
0.036***
-0.013
0.000
0.019*
0.013
0.007
0.010
-0.005
0.005
-0.005
0.024*
-0.017*
0.006

(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.006)

Model 13b:
Managerial Discretion
Coeff.
(SE)
0.157***
0.037***
-0.014
-0.003
0.017
0.019
0.018
0.000
-0.021†
0.000
-0.005
0.026*
-0.018*
0.005
0.006
0.009
0.005
-0.023
0.018
0.030†
0.011

(0.011)
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.012)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0016)
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.013)
(0.016)
(0.014)

Model 13c:
Industry Mean DCSS
Coeff.
(SE)
0.159***
0.023**
-0.010
*0.004
0.017*
0.006
0.004
0.010
-0.006
0.004
-0.007
0.024**
-0.019*
0.003

(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.005)

0.046***
0.001
0.018**
0.005
-0.001
-0.012†
-0.003

(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.008)
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Table 6.19: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of DCSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d)
Firm Level Models of ACSS

β10
β11
β12
β13
β14
β15
β16
β17
β18
β19
β110
β111
β112
β113
β114
β115
β116
β117
β118
β119
β120
β114
β115
β116
β117
β118
β119
β120
β20
β30
Β40

Model 13a:
CEO Model
Coeff.
(SE)
0.019***
0.004***
0.000
0.002***
-0.001
0.001
0.000
-0.000
0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.000
0.001
0.002**

-0.001**
0.000**
0.004*

(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)

Model 13b:
Managerial Discretion
Coeff.
(SE)
0.018***
0.004***
0.000
0.002***
-0.000
0.001
0.000
-0.000
0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.000
0.001
0.002**
0.000
-0.000
-0.002
0.001
-0.002
-0.000
-0.001

-0.001**
0.000**
0.004*

(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)

Model 13c:
Industry Mean DCSS
Coeff.
(SE)
0.018***
0.004***
0.000
0.002***
-0.000
0.001*
0.000
-0.000
0.001
-0.001
-0.001
-0.000
0.001
0.002**

(0.003)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.000)

-0.001**
-0.000
-0.000
-0.001
-0.000
0.000
0.001
-0.001**
0.000**
0.004*

(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)
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Fixed Effects (cont’d)
For average linear rate of change (π1i)
Average rate of change (linear)
Size
Risk
R&D Intensity
Political liberalism
Output function
Functional breadth
International experience
MBA
JD/LLB
Tenure as CEO
Tenure at the firm
Age
Gender
High Discretion (HD)
HD x Political liberalism
HD x Output function
HD x Functional breadth
HD x International experience
HD x MBA
HD x JD/LLB
Industry Mean DCSS (IMDCSS)
IMDCSS x Political liberalism
IMDCSS x Output function
IMDCSS x Functional breadth
IMDCSS x International experience
IMDCSS x MBA
IMDCSS x JD/LLB
For average quadratic rate of change (π2i)
For average cubic rate of change (π3i)
For slope of past performance (π4i)

Parameter

Table 6.19: Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of DCSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d)
Firm Level Models of ACSS
Random Effects
Level 1
Temporal variation (within firms)
Level 2
Between firm variation in initial status
Between firm linear change rate
Between firm quadratic change rate
Total Variance
Variance Explained (R2)
Change in variance explained (∆R2)
Goodness of Fit
Deviance
Reliabilities
Reliability of intercept coefficient
Reliability of slope coefficient
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient
n=6,232 observations within 343 firms
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; † p<0.10

Para-meter

Model 13a:
CEO Model
VC
(SD)

Model 13b:
Managerial Discretion
VC
(SD)

Model 13c:
Industry Mean DCSS

eti

0.007

(0.084)

0.007

(0.084)

0.007

(0.084)

r0i
r1i
r2i

0.017
0.001
0.000
0.025
8.4%

(0.130)
(0.026)
(0.001)

0.016
0.001
0.000
0.024
12.1%
4.0%

(0.128)
(0.026)
(0.001)

0.015
0.001
0.000
0.023
15.8%
8.0%

(0.126)
(0.026)
(0.001)

-10733

38

-10746

52

-10772

52

π0i
π1i
π2i

0.845
0.764
0.771

0.841
0.765
0.771

0.836
0.769
0.771
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6.4 Post Hoc Tests
Given the nature of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, alternate formulations
of the longitudinal multi-level models are conceivable. Although the models built in
section 6.3 best reflect the theory, I nonetheless conducted several post hoc tests given the
limited support for the main hypotheses of interest found using RCM. The results of
these post hoc tests, using ACSS as a dependent variable for illustrative purposes, are
described below.
Modeling the variance in CEO variables: In the ICC tests conducted in Step 4 &
5 of the RCM methodology, the variance in the executive orientation variables
attributable to transient time factors vs. stable between-firm factors was approximately
equally split, despite high reliability scores for aggregation (Table 6.13). As such, I tested
several alternate models, where the CEO variables were entered either as time-variant at
Level 1 (rather than stable between firm variances at Level 2) in a two-level model and as
time-invariant in a three-level format where years were nested in CEOs and CEOs were
nested in firms.
Conceptually, these formulations test slightly different research questions than
those hypothesized. In the models where CEO variables are entered as time-variant at
Level 1 in a two-level model, the equations test if changes in CEO executive orientation
within-firms can predict mean levels of CSS. In the models where CEO variables are
entered as time-invariant in a three-level model, technically the equations create
independent growth curves for each CEO (rather than each firm) and therefore test if
differences between CEOs within firms (rather than between firms) influence the initial
status or rate of adoption of CSS for each CEO.
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In the two-level model, where all CEO variables were entered as time-variant, no
significant results were found between the executive orientation variables and ACSS.
The stable firm-level effects were similar to those found in the original analysis (that is
firm size predicts both initial status and rate of adoption of ACSS, while R&D intensity
predicts only the rate of adoption; past performance is also a significant within-firm
predictor of ACSS). However, the models did not detect that changes in a firm’s CEO’s
executive orientation affects ACSS. Given the relative homogeneity of the characteristics
of CEOs within firms, this finding is not all together surprising.
Similarly, in the three-level model, where years were nested in CEOs and CEOs
nested in firms, the relationship between executive orientation and ACSS was also largely
insignificant. While the firm level controls remained the same, only a shift within a firm
to a CEO with a law degree was marginally negatively related to the rate of adoption of
ACSS (p<0.10). However, the reliability estimate in the 3 level model for the CEO slopes
was also very low (0.170), suggesting that there is little overall variance in the rate of
adoption of ACSS between CEOs in the same firm over time. Furthermore, this model
construction violates some published guidelines regarding the minimum number of Level
2 units to be nested in Level 3 units as some firms had only one CEO for the duration of
the study (the sample for these models was 5,276 observations, nested in 833 CEOs
within 303 firms).
Modeling one CEO per firm: Given this specificity/aggregation trade-off, I also
created an alternate sample that consisted of only one CEO per firm, thereby eliminating
the need to model the executive orientation variables as time-variant, yet also eliminating
the problems associated with low reliabilities and measurement issues of the three level
models. I first narrowed the time frame of study to 2001-2008 so that I may select just
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one CEO per firm; I then selected the CEO that was in place for the longest tenure during
this time frame for each firm. This yielded a sample of 1,787 observations nested in 330
CEO/Firms.
Overall, the full CEO model was a significant improvement over both the null and
the control models (p<0.05), yielding a pseudo R2 of 48.1%. The relationships between
the executive orientation variables and the initial status of ACSS (here, the initial status is
2001 vs. 1991) were, for the most part, as predicted. CEO political liberalism, output
function background, international experience, tenure at the firm and gender were all
positively and significantly related to the intercept, as were the firm control variables of
size, R&D intensity and past performance. On the other hand, the only marginally
significant predictor of the rate of adoption of ACSS was the negative impact of a law
mindset (-0.39, p<0.10). However, the lack of significant findings in the growth curves is
not surprising given the much shorter nature of this reduced sample (average of 5 years
vs. 18 years). The most interesting finding, perhaps, is that in these models, adding the
CEO executive orientation variables to the control model resulted in a reduction in the
variance components of 13.8%, suggesting that CEO executive orientation, when
modeled as one CEO per firm, has a significant effect on ACSS.
Alternate moderation modeling. Despite finding little variation at the industry
level in Step 1, Hypotheses 16-19 were also modeled returning to HLM3. Here, rather
than use standardized variables and interaction terms as done for Models 11-13, the
moderation was tested by including industry norms and managerial discretion as Level 3
cross-level moderators of the initial status and rate of adoption of ACSS. The results of
these tests were similar to those found in Models 11-13; the hypotheses around
managerial discretion received no support and the effects of industry norms on the
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relationships between executive orientation and ACSS were only partially supported. At
this stage, an alternate measure for managerial discretion was also tested. Using the
aggregated standard deviation for the industry ACSS rather than the high/low distinction
based on the Finkelstein et al. (2009) ratings yielded identical insignificant results.
Alternate error structure. As discussed in section 6.3.3, an important, yet often
neglected step in RCM is the testing of alternate error structures. HLM assumes a
homogeneous sigma squared error structure. Using HMLM2, this can be compared to a
first-order autoregressive error structure using a chi-square test of significance. Here,
Model 10a was rerun using the AR1 specification in HMLM2. Although the methodology
requires different specification (e.g., only the linear or polynomial effects of time can be
entered at Level 1), the model with the AR1 error structure is nonetheless a better fit to
the data (chi-square=1815, p<0.000). In this specification, most of the relationships hold,
however, the effect of output function on the initial status of ACSS is no longer
statistically significant, neither is tenure at the firm nor age. All of the relationships found
for the rate of adoption of ACSS, on the other hand, remain as predicted in Model 10a.

6.5 Robustness Checks
In addition to the post-hoc analyses, I conducted several robustness checks on the
final models presented in Section 6.3.
Industry. Despite finding little variance in the three level models for industry, I
nonetheless tested the final model for ACSS (Model 8d) including a full set of industry
dummies as a robustness check. Using the computer/aero/auto industry as a control, with
the exception of the refining/rubber/plastic industry (3.493, p<0.05), none of the industry
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coefficients were significant predictors of either the initial status or rate of adoption of
ACSS. Furthermore, the main findings remained largely intact, with some minor
variances in significance estimates. Given the effect of including the industry dummies on
the number of estimated parameters required (from 38 to 60), the more parsimonious
model is retained.
R&D intensity. As described in the methods section, a full 43% of the firm years
were missing R&D expenditure information. As is common practice, the missing data
was coded as zero given that this is likely accurate for many firms (e.g. financial
companies), however, a missing data dummy was also created (Henderson et al., 2006).
As a robustness check, Model 8d was rerun including the R&D dummy variable. The
coefficient for the R&D dummy variable was insignificant and the significance of the
R&D intensity variable on the rate of adoption of ACSS unaffected. The coding for R&D
in the analysis is thus deemed robust to this specification.
Slack resources. It has been argued that a firm’s level of slack resources may also
determine the degree to which a firm can decide to engage in social issue programs
(Bansal, 2005) and it has been found to be positively related to CSR in past research
(Hillman & Keim, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Waddock & Graves, 1997). The data for
this variable, however, was not found to be missing at random, but was, again, highly
correlated to industry membership. As such, rather than lose the information on the
primary variables of interest, I reran the final models on a reduced sample that included a
control for slack resources, measured as the ratio of current assets over current liabilities
(Strike et al., 2006). This model had 5,515 observations nested in 303 firms and slack
resources was not found to be a significant predictor of either the initial status or rate of
adoption of ACSS. However, in these models the effect of political liberalism and age on
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the initial status of ACSS became insignificant; the remaining relationships held. Given
that Model 8d contained more data on the primary variables of interest, the results are not
modified.
Past performance. As noted in the descriptive statistics, while skewness was not
an issue, the past performance variable was nonetheless highly kurtotic. To ensure that
the kurtosis was not affecting the findings presented herein, Models 8d, 9d and 10d were
rerun replacing the untransformed past performance measure with a windsorized past
performance variable. There was no impact of this transformation on the value and
significance of the main variables of interest. However, given the larger standard errors
associated with the windsorized past performance measure, the significance of past
performance on ACSS became insignificant (p=0.11), while the effect of past
performance on BCSS and DCSS went from significant (p<0.05) to marginally
significant (p<0.10). The impact on the coefficient for past performance in all three cases,
however, was minimal. The discussion of firm level antecedents to CSS in Section 7.2
includes this finding.
Lagged explanatory variables. Despite arguing for contemporaneous effects of
CEO characteristics on CSS, I nonetheless also tested models with lagged explanatory
variables. All relationships found in Model 8d hold when lagged by one year.
Lagged dependent variables. As noted in the methodology section, I also did not
include any LDVs in my analysis as the method used herein addresses issues of
autocorrelation explicitly. However, like Strike et al. (2006), I nonetheless ran the
analyses using lagged measures of ACSS as a robustness check. I first did this by adding
lagged ACSS to the pooled OLS regressions conducted for the VIFs in Section 6.1. Not
surprisingly, as predicted, the inclusion of LDVs helped improve overall model fit, yet
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suppressed the effect of most coefficients of interest (Achen, 2000). When adding a
lagged measure of ACSS to the time-variant equations in HLM, the reliability of all
estimates plummeted to near-zero, indicating that the inclusion of an LDV does, in fact,
remove most, if not all of, the ability to reliably model predictor variables of interest.
6.6 Summary of Hypotheses Tests
Table 6.20 summarizes the results of the hypotheses tests conducted in this
chapter using the RCM methodology. Overall, of the 57 separate hypotheses, 18 were
fully supported, 3 were partially supported and the remaining hypotheses were not
supported. Most notably, a clear linear pattern was detected in the adoption of ACSS,
BCSS and DCSS over the last 20 years, albeit the overall growth remains relatively small
(from 5% of total possible strengths in 1991 to just over 12% of total possible strengths in
2009, on average). As such, despite finding statistically significant variation between
firms (and surprisingly, not between industries), predicting variation in the initial levels
and the rates of adoption of firm CSS proved challenging.
Table 6.20: Summary of Hypotheses Tests using RCM
Hypothesis
1a
1b
1c
2a
2b
2c
3a
3b
3c
4a
4b
4c

Predicted Relationship
ACSS follows a linear trajectory over time
BCSS follows a linear trajectory over time
DCSS follows a linear trajectory over time
Significant difference in initial level of ACSS
Significant difference in initial level of BCSS
Significant difference in initial level of DCSS
Significant difference in adoption of ACSS
Significant difference in adoption of BCSS
Significant difference in adoption of DCSS
Liberal worldview and initial level of ACSS
Liberal worldview and initial level of BCSS
Liberal worldview and initial level of DCSS

Result

Model(s)

Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Supported

2a & 3a
2b & 3b
2c & 3c
3a
3b
3c
3a
3b
3c
8c & 8d
9c & 9d
10c &10d
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5a
5b
5c
6a
6b
6c
7a
7b
7c
8a
8b
8c
9a
9b
9c
10a
10b
10c
11a
11b
11c
12a
12b
12c
13a
13b
13c
14a
14b
14c
15a
15b
15c
16a
16b
16c
17a
17b
17c
18a
18b
18c
19a
19b
19c

Liberal worldview and adoption of ACSS
Liberal worldview and adoption of BCSS
Liberal worldview and adoption of DCSS
Output function and initial level of ACSS
Output function and initial level of BCSS
Output function and initial level of DCSS
Output function and adoption of ACSS
Output function and adoption of BCSS
Output function and adoption of DCSS
Functional breadth and initial level of ACSS
Functional breadth and initial level of BCSS
Functional breadth and initial level of DCSS
Functional breadth and adoption of ACSS
Functional breadth and adoption of BCSS
Functional breadth and adoption of DCSS
International experience and level of ACSS
International experience and level of BCSS
International experience and level of DCSS
International experience and adoption of ACSS
International experience and adoption of BCSS
International experience and adoption of DCSS
MBA and initial level of ACSS
MBA and initial level of BCSS
MBA and initial level of DCSS
MBA and adoption of ACSS
MBA and adoption of BCSS
MBA and adoption of DCSS
JD/LLB and initial level of ACSS
JD/LLB and initial level of BCSS
JD/LLB and initial level of DCSS
JD/LLB and adoption of ACSS
JD/LLB and adoption of BCSS
JD/LLB and adoption of DCSS
Managerial Discretion moderating EO&ACSS
Managerial Discretion moderating EO&BCSS
Managerial Discretion moderating EO&CCSS
MD moderating EO & adoption of ACSS
MD moderating EO & adoption of BCSS
MD moderating EO & adoption of DCSS
Mean ACSS moderating EO & ACSS
Mean BCSS moderating EO & BCSS
Mean DCSS moderating EO & DCSS
MACSS moderating EO & adoption of ACSS
MBCSS moderating EO & adoption of BCSS
MDCSS moderating EO & adoption of DCSS

Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Partially Supp.
Partially Supp.
Partially Supp.
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported

8c & 8d
9c & 9d
10c &10d
8c & 8d
9c & 9d
10c &10d
8c & 8d
9c & 9d
10c
8c & 8d
9c & 9d
10c &10d
8c & 8d
9c & 9d
10c &10d
8c & 8d
9c & 9d
10c &10d
8c & 8d
9c & 9d
10c &10d
8d
9d
10d
8d
9d
10d
8d
9d
10d
8d
9d
10d
11b
12b
13b
11b
12b
13b
11c
12c
13c
11c
12c
13c
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In summary, models for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS showed similar patterns. On the
whole, the CEO effect ranged from approximately 3% in the final RCM models (Model
8d, 9d, 10d) to a robust 14% in the post hoc analysis that isolated the effect of just one
CEO per firm on ACSS. Firms run by CEO’s with a liberal worldview were consistently
related to the initial levels of CSS, while firms run by CEOs from output functions appear
to be related to both initial levels and growth of CSS over time. The remaining results for
executive orientation were mixed, with international experience showing no relationship
to CSS in any RCM model despite a positive and significant relationship in the post hoc
analysis. Similarly, firms run by CEOs with an MBA mindset did not affect the rate of
adoption of CSS, while the negative effect of a law mindset found some support in the
RCM and post-hoc tests. These results are discussed in detail in the next chapter as they
relate to the literature covered in Chapter 2 and the theory developed in Chapters 3 and 4.
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION

Organizational researchers have long been interested in how managerial cognition
affects strategic decision making at the firm level (Walsh, 1995). Herein, I built a model
of how managerial cognition at the strategic leadership level influences the corporate
social strategies pursued by the firm. Rooted in both the upper echelon perspective and
institutional theory, I argued that an open executive orientation in particular, as reflected
in a CEO’s political worldview, and variables such as functional background, education
and international experience affect the selective perception, interpretation and therefore
choice of the breadth and depth of a firm’s commitment to corporate social strategy.
Furthermore, I argued that the level of managerial discretion at the industry level as well
as general industry norms will attenuate the relationship between executive orientation
and the initial status and rate of adoption of CSS over time, building a longitudinal, multilevel model of the relationship between executive orientation and corporate social
strategy.
The findings of the RCM tests of these relationships, however, were mixed. In this
chapter I discuss the significance of these results broadly at three levels – individual
(CEO), firm and industry - moving from more micro to more macro implications. First, I
review the results of the ‘CEO Effect’ on CSS. Although varied, the findings nonetheless
offer some interesting nuances into the relationship between an open executive
orientation and the corporate social strategy pursued by the firm over time (Section 7.1).
Second, I consider the various important relationships in firm level adoption of ACSS,
BCSS and DCSS over time that warrant further exploration (Section 7.2). Lastly, perhaps
the most surprising finding of this research regards the lack of significant variance found
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in the CSS of firms between industries (Section 7.3). The implications of these findings
are discussed in the following sections.
7.1 Individual Level: The CEO Effect
Strategy scholars have long debated the degree to which an organization’s CEO
has the capacity to influence important strategic decisions and firm performance
outcomes (Child, 1972; Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Lieberson
& O'Connor, 1972; Mackey, 2008; Thomas, 1988). Several streams of research have
emerged under the ‘does leadership matter’ umbrella: (1) descriptive studies that seek to
explain how much CEO’s matter (Mackey, 2008), (2) contingency models that look to
explain when or where CEO’s matter (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Rowe, Cannella,
Rankin & Gorman, 2005), and (3) upper echelon explorations into how CEO’s matter, or
stated differently, what particular aspects of executive orientation matter to strategic
choices made at the firm level (Finkelstein et al., 2009).
With regards to the first stream of research on how much CEO’s matter, consensus
with regards to the magnitude of the CEO effect on firm performance has been elusive.
By “CEO effect”, I mean the “proportion of variance in a firm-level outcome variable that
is statistically associated with, or can be attributed to, the presence of individual CEOs in
the sample” (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007p. 769-770). This terminology is often found in
variance components analysis (VCA) studies of year, industry and firm effects in strategy
research (e.g., Hough, 2006; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Misangyi et al., 2006; Rumelt,
1991; Schmalensee, 1985) and can easily be applied to research in CSR as well.
However, given different theoretical and methodological approaches that underpin
historical studies on the influence of CEOs (Mackey, 2008), estimates of the CEO effect
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on firm performance (e.g., ROA) have ranged widely from approximately 5% to 30%,
depending on time frame, sample and methodology used as summarized in Table 7.1.
Other studies that have not directly employed VCA, have also examined the CEO effect
on more specific strategy decisions finding that CEOs influence 3% of the variance in
acquisitions, 2% in advertising, 1% in R&D and a full 37% of changes in SG&A (selling,
general & administrative) expenses (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003).
In this dissertation, the CEO effect on CSS was also captured in several models
and similarly ranges from 3% to 14% depending on the underlying sampling strategy. In
the RCM models, including the full set of CEO executive orientation variables reduced
the unexplained variance in ACSS by approximately 4% (Model 8d). Similarly, the CEO
effect on BCSS was found to be 2.9% (Model 9d) and for DCSS 3.6% (Model 10d).
These lower numbers are more in line with Bertrand and Schoar’s (2003) findings
regarding the CEO effect on particular strategy levers such as advertising and acquisitions
than with overall firm financial performance figures as described in Figure 7.1.
Furthermore, these results are also in line with several studies that have included CEO
predictor variables in models of CSP. For example, Manner (2010) found that CEO
education and functional background can explain approximately 5% of the variance in
positive CSP measures, yet had no effect on the negative side of CSP. Similarly, CEO
international experience and output functional background also add 1.8% to models of
CSP strengths with no effect on CSP weaknesses (Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009).
In addition, the post-hoc tests revealed that, where the effect of just one CEO per
firm was modeled on a reduced sample, adding the executive orientation predictors
reduced the variance components by almost 14% (Section 6.4). This suggests that the
CEO effect is much more discernable in models where only one CEO per firm is
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observed, rather than models where CEO effects are aggregated, as is often done in crosssectional studies. On the whole, despite a relatively small variance explained, the finding
of a significant CEO effect in this dissertation (all chi-square tests between models were
significant), nonetheless provides evidence that CEO’s do matter in determining a firm’s
initial level and rates of adoption of CSS over time.

Table 7.1: Prior Empirical Studies on the CEO Effect (DV: ROA)
Study

Sample:
CEOs
Firms
Industries
Observations
Time Frame
Method

Year Effect
Industry Effect
Corporate Effect
CEO Effect
Error
Total

Lieberson &
O’Connor
(1972)

Weiner
(1978)

Thomas
(1988) *

Wasserman,
Nohria &
Anand (2001)

Crossland & Hambrick
(2007) **

Mackey (2008)

n/a
167
13
3,340
1946-1965
VCA

n/a
193
1
3,667
1956-1974
VCA

n/a
12
1
n/a
1965-1984
VCA

1384
531
42
10,089
1979-1997
VCA

1.8%
28.5%
22.6%
14.5%
32.6%
100%

2.4%
20.5%
45.8%
8.7%
22.6%
100%

5.6%
n/a
83.2%
5.7%
5.4%
100%

2.6%
6.3%
25.5%
14.7%
50.9%
100%

222
100
n/a
1,464
1988-2002
Sequential
SimulANOVA
taneous
ANOVA
4.0%
3.6%
7.7%
11.8%
6.5%
19.1%
30.4%
13.4%
51.4%
52.1%
100%
100%

92
51
98
801
1992-2002
Sequential
SimulANOVA
taneous
ANOVA
1.0%
0.7%
18.0%
6.2%
29.5%
7.9%
12.9%
29.2%
38.5%
21.8%
100%
100%

Table adapted and expanded from: Mackey, A. 2008. The effect of CEOs on firm performance, Strategic Management Journal, 29(12), p. 1362.
* The Thomas (1988) study is the only one that is UK not US based
**The Crossland & Hambrick (2007) study compares the CEO effect for US, Japanese and German firms; The US data is repeated here for consistency with
other studies.
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With regards to the second stream of research examining when or where CEOs
matter, I modeled the CEO effect on CSS in light of two different situational variables:
managerial discretion and industry norms. The results for managerial discretion were
unequivocal: The CEO effect is not stronger in environments characterized by greater
degrees of latitude of action (chi-square tests for model fit improvements for 11b, 12b and
13b were all non-significant).

This finding is surprising given the vast amount of

research that supports stronger associations between CEO variables and firm level
outcomes in high versus low discretion contexts (Boyd & Gove, 2006; Crossland &
Hambrick, 2011).

However, given that the overall industry effect was minimal as

detected in the unconditional means models (Table 6.5), it appears as though there was a
great deal of variance between firms within industries in general, suggesting overall
higher degrees of managerial discretion than anticipated. I return to this point in Section
7.3.
The results with regards to industry norms were similar. Although some of the
predicted associations between executive orientation and initial levels of CSS were
stronger when industry norms were also higher, these findings were not consistent. Again,
with little industry level distinctions between initial levels and rates of adoption of CSS, it
was difficult to tease out when the CEO effect may be greater in higher vs. lower mean
CSS industries. On the whole, however, the non-significant effects of situational factors
suggests that that the CEO effect is not contingent on the degree of latitude of action in
their operating environment, nor contingent on the level of ‘peer pressure’ imposed by
industry norms. This is an important finding in that it supports the strategic choice
perspective of managerial decision making rather than situational constraint perspectives
(Child, 1972; Oliver, 1991) .
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At the core of this dissertation, of course, is the third stream of research into the
CEO effect, which takes an upper echelon perspective on how CEOs matter to firm level
outcomes. Having theoretically argued for the importance of an open executive
orientation on levels and rates of adoption of CSS, the final results were mixed and only
some of the hypothesized relationships were significant. Figure 7.1 visually depicts the
final significant RCM results for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS using the coefficients from
Models 8d, 9d and 10d. The dashed lines represent relationships that found partial support
in other models.
in Figure
other models.
7.1: Empirical Model of Executive Orientation and CSS

Open
Executive
Orientation

ACSS

Initial Level

Liberal Worldview
Output Functional Background
Functional Breadth

0.44*

0.14*

1.78*

0.11*

Rate of Change
BCSS

0.07*
0.14†

Initial Level

0.01*

Rate of Change

-0.02*

DCSS

International Experience
MBA Specialization

0.02*

Initial Level
JD/LLB Specialization

Rate of Change
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The findings of the hypotheses tests of executive orientation on CSS demonstrate
that not all demographic proxies of an open executive orientation have the same influence
on a firm’s CSS over time. The strongest and most consistent results were for firms led by
CEO’s with output (e.g., marketing, sales) functional backgrounds, who were related to
both the initial levels of ACSS and BCSS, as well as the rate of adoption of ACSS and
DCSS (partially). This is a similar result to one of the earliest cross-sectional studies in
this area which found that firms with high CSP scores (amalgamated) were more likely to
be led by CEOs with backgrounds in output functions (Thomas & Simerly, 1994).
Furthermore, it is also in line with studies that have used the throughput/output function
distinction as a proxy for CEO openness to change specifically (Musteen et al., 2006,
2010).
Figure 7.2 visually depicts the effect of firms run by CEO’s with output functional
backgrounds on ACSS over time using the results from Model 8c with standardized
coefficients to graph the relationships. As can be seen, the initial level of ACSS in 1991
for firms run by CEOs with output functional backgrounds is higher than the sample
mean and the trajectory for the rate of change over time increases as well (there is a slight
fanning in the tail).
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Figure 7.2: Relationship Between CEO Output Functional Background and Firm
ACSS Over Time

Firms run by CEOs with a liberal worldview were also hypothesized to affect the
initial levels and the rate of adoption of CSS. However, in this longitudinal study, a
liberal worldview only affected the initial levels of ACSS and DCSS, with no influence
on the adoption of broader or deeper social strategies over time. This initial impact,
however, was significant and, as can be seen in Figure 7.3, makes a substantial difference
to the growth trajectory of ACSS over time for firms run by CEOs with more liberal
worldviews. As such, within this sample, firms run by CEOs with liberal worldviews did
have higher ACSS and DCSS levels between 1991-2009 than firms run by CEOs with
conservative worldviews. This supports the argument that an open executive orientation
with regards to social, environmental and other stakeholder issues does in fact make a
difference to the levels of CSS adopted by the firm over time.
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Figure 7.3: Relationship Between CEO Political Liberalism And Firm ACSS Over
Time

Functional breadth, on the other hand, only affects the rates of change of ACSS
and BCSS, with no direct effect on initial levels of CSS. This is somewhat contrary to
Manner’s (2010) recent cross-sectional study that found firms run by CEO’s with greater
functional breadth had higher levels of CSP. However, the OLS beta estimate for the
cross-sectional effect of functional breadth on KLD strengths reported in Manner’s study
(0.09, p<0.05) is not that different from the estimated coefficient for the effect of
functional breadth reported here (0.07, p<0.05). Because the RCM methodology allows
for the modeling of the impact of both the intercept and the slope on the overall levels of
CSS, it could be that cross-sectional studies miss this nuance.

This finding does,

however, suggest that being exposed to a broader variety of functional areas allows for a
broader ‘selective’ perception, interpretation and hence choice of social and
environmental programs over time. Although, as can be seen in Figure 7.4, the overall
impact of this effect over time is not substantive.
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Figure 7.4: Relationship Between CEO Functional Breadth and Firm ACSS Over
Time

With regards to international experience, none of the RCM models supported the
hypothesis that international experience is positively related to ACSS, BCSS or DCSS
initially or over time. This is somewhat surprising given recent research that has shown
that firms run by CEOs that have had some international assignment experience are
positively related to CSP strengths in particular, at least cross-sectionally (Slater &
Dixon-Fowler, 2009). Again, this may be an artefact of the longitudinal vs. crosssectional study methodology. For example, in the post hoc analyses reported in Section
6.4, international experience was positively and significantly associated with ACSS in the
models were only one CEO per firm was measured. Here, the effect of international
experience on the initial levels of ACSS was both significant and substantial (β=2.73,
p<0.001) (although no effect on the rate of adoption was detected given the shorter time
frame of the sample). This coefficient is larger than the effect of CEOs with output
functional backgrounds (β=2.01, p<0.05) or liberal worldviews (β=0.36, p<0.10) on
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initial levels of ACSS (in this case, in 2001), supporting the earlier conclusion that
empirical models that isolate the performance of a single CEO will detect greater ‘CEO
effects’ as is the case in the Slater and Dixon-Fowler (2009) study.
Lastly, the influence of educational specialization had mixed effects on CSS.
Contrary to expected patterns, firms run by CEOs with MBA degrees were marginally
more, not less, likely to adopt ACSS over time. Yet, as predicted, firms run by CEOs with
legal degrees were less likely to adopt broader CSS. Despite arguments that an MBA
education narrows the scope of training to favour shareholder over stakeholder theories of
the firm (Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005), it appears as though, on average, this does not
affect the adoption of social, environmental and other stakeholder programs over time.
The RCM analyses and the above discussion of the CEO effect thus answer the
first research question posed in this dissertation:
1. What is the relationship between executive orientation and the
corporate social strategy pursued by the firm over time?
I now turn to a discussion of the second research question:
2. How do firm and industry characteristics affect the relationship
between executive orientation and the corporate social strategies
pursued by the firm over time?

7.2 Firm Level: Typologies and Trends
7.2.1 CSS: Business as Usual?
As the first study to have explicitly modeled the individual growth trajectories of
firm level CSS over time, the relatively small overall improvement in CSS over the last
19 years is a somewhat surprising finding of this dissertation. In the aggregate, ACSS has
grown from approximately 5% to 12% of total possible social, environmental and other
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stakeholder strengths in the past two decades. The breadth of CSS has also doubled from
about 0.31 to 0.63 and the depth of CSS from .16 to .32. Although this could be
considered progress, in absolute terms, the average KLD score for firms has only grown
from 2 strengths in 1991 to 4 strengths, on average, in 2009. An entropy measure of 0.31
corresponds to a presence in just over one CSR category (e.g., community relations) and
increasing this to 0.63 represents a dispersion from one to two categories (e.g.,
community relations and diversity). Further, within the CSS area that a firm is engaging
at the deepest level of commitment, in 2009 firms are still only participating, on average,
in 32% of the total possible initiatives in that area. As such, despite claims that the dawn
of a new corporate social responsibility era is upon us (Googins et al., 2007; Waddock,
2008), in empirical fact, this rise has been neither fast, nor great. Rather, it seems as
though it has been largely business as usual.
Linking these average scores back to the typology of CSS built in Section 2.3, if
the depth axis ranges from 0 to 1 and the breadth axis from 0 to 1.63, than the average
CSS pursued by firms in 1991 is not substantially different than that pursued by firms in
2009; as can be seen in Figure 7.5, with a DCSS of 0.32 and a BCSS of 0.63, the average
firm in 2009 is still following a Derivative CSS, as was the case in 1991.
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Figure 7.5: Typology of Corporate Social Strategy: 1991-2009
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However, the variance in both the initial levels of CSS and the rates of adoption of
CSS by firms over time has been significant (Tables 6.6 - 6.10). Further, as outlined in
Table 6.1, the range of firm level CSS is vast, with BCSS from zero to 1.63 (or to a
presence in every CSR area) and DCSS from zero to one such that some firms are 100%
committed to a particular social or environmental category. If we replace the scale of the
depth and breadth axes with the sample mean (rather than the scale mid point), it becomes
easier to identify specific firms that fall into more proactive quadrants, following Diffuse,
Dedicated and Devoted CSS. For example, in 2009, the distribution of the 303 firms in
the sample would fall within each quadrant as represented in Figure 7.6.
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Figure 7.6: Distribution of Firms by CSS Quadrant (Mean Split) – 2009
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While the largest group of firms is still following a Derivative CSS, and 9% of
firms remained completely Disengaged in 2009, the variety of approaches to CSS is
nonetheless apparent. To illustrate, using the Steel/Heavy Manufacturing industry as an
example (SIC 3200-3599, n=39), the following figure demonstrates how the typology can
be used to assess the variance in the depth and breath of firm level CSS at a given point in
time (here 2009). As can be seen below, familiar companies that are generally well
known for their CSR efforts such as Xerox and Hewlett-Packard, can be found in the
Devoted CSS quadrant, scoring above the mean on both depth and breadth dimensions. In
contrast, other firms such as Deere & Company, follow a Diffuse strategy, with limited
engagement across a broad spectrum of social and environmental areas, while ParkerHannifin scores high in only one category illustrating a Dedicated CSS. While numerous
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firms also fall into the Derivative quadrant, only Crane & Co. is completely Disengaged
in this industry in 2009 registering no strengths in any CSR areas.

Figure 7.7: Typology of Corporate Social Strategy – Steel/Heavy Manufacturing
2009

What then are the firm level determinants of BCSS and DCSS? On top of the
open executive orientation predictors outlined in the previous section, several firm-level
control variables were also found to be significant determinants of the breadth and depth
of CSS over time. Specifically, as in previous studies (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000;
Shropshire & Hillman, 2007; Strike et al., 2006), this dissertation confirms that firm size
is an important determinant of both the initial levels and rates of adoption of CSS in the
last two decades (consistent significant, positive relationship with both initial levels and
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rates of change across all models). Furthermore, although previous research has stressed
the importance of R&D on CSP (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Padgett & Galán, 2010), it
appears as though R&D intensity is an important predictor of the rate of adoption of CSS
over time, but is not necessarily related to the initial status of CSS.
Although there is a lengthy debate with regards to the direction of the causal
relationship between firm financial and firm social performance (Margolis et al., 2007;
Waddock & Graves, 1997), in this thesis financial performance was modeled as a firmlevel control variable predicting initial levels and rates of adoption of ACSS, BCSS and
DCSS over time. In all models in this dissertation, this relationship was found to be
positive, substantial and significant. However, as noted in the robustness checks, the
positive CFP-CSP link uncovered in this thesis should be used with some caution, as the
significance levels vary under alternate specifications of the independent variable.
Furthermore, past performance was modeled as a direct within-firm time-variant
determinant of CSS, rather than as a predictor of intercepts or slopes at Level 2 which
could also affect interpretation.
Left unanswered in this dissertation is how different types of CSS (Disengaged,
Derivative, Dedicated, Diffuse or Devoted) may in turn affect firm financial performance.
This is a question of some importance that has recently surfaced as part of the CSP-CFP
debate, which has moved beyond answering questions regarding whether CSR matters, to
calls for a better understanding of how CSR makes a difference to firm level outcomes
(Barnett, 2007; Brammer & Millington, 2008; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Mazutis, 2010;
Orlitzky et al., 2003). Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, this discussion
nonetheless points to some interesting future research where the full causal link
(executive orientation → CSS → firm performance), can be tested empirically.
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7.2.2 CSS: Linear and Non-Linear Trends over Time
In addition to findings at the firm level pertaining to the typology, there were also
interesting nuances with regards to the patterns of change observed in firm level adoption
of CSS over time. The hypotheses and models developed herein were based on the
assumption that the relationship between firm level CSS and time would be linear and
positive. In fact, results revealed that, while the overall linear growth pattern holds over
time, a small, yet statistically significant cubic trend could be detected (Figures 6.1-6.4;
Tables 6.8-6.10). Although no hypotheses were generated to predict this pattern, several
possible explanations are feasible given that the final models still contained a significant
amount of unexplained variance.
First, it is possible that the growth in the scope and scale of stakeholder, social and
environmental issues facing organizations has not been merely cumulative (Waddock,
2008; Waddock et al., 2002), but rather that this growth has been cyclical; as a result, the
adoption of CSS initiatives at the firm level that tackle these issues has also been cyclical.
In-line with the issue life-cycle approach (Rivoli & Waddock, 2011) outlined in Section
3.1, it is possible that as the importance of some issues have faded, others emerged, which
could explain the slight deceleration in the rate of adoption of ACSS, BCSS and DCSS
that occurred around the year 2000 and then the quickening of the rate of adoption around
the year 2004.
Alternately, the cubic trend could be the result of other macro-environmental
factors that affected all firms in the sample equally. For example, it is possible that firmlevel corporate social strategy somewhat mirrors the national policies of the political
party in office, in four or eight year trends. Similarly, macro environmental jolts such as
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the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in late 2002, which was accompanied by a
rush of ethics programs and transparency initiatives, could also explain the rise in CSS
seen beginning in 2004. This discussion, however, is speculative and these questions are
left for future research.
7.3 Industry Level: Isomorphism - What Isomorphism?
The last level of analysis yielding interesting results in this dissertation pertains to
the role of the institutional field, often operationalized at the industry level (Hambrick et
al., 2004). Research in CSR has long contended that industry matters in shaping firm
level social, environmental and other stakeholder relationships (Waddock & Graves,
1997). Similarly, institutional theorists stress the importance of field level processes such
as mimetic, coercive and normative isomorphism that affect the rate of adoption of new
practices such as CSR within industries (Campbell, 2007; Hoffman, 1999; Matten &
Moon, 2008). Yet, in this thesis, the level of variance attributable to between industry
factors ranged from 0% (DCSS) to 2.8% (BCSS) with the overall variance in ACSS
determined by industry at only 1.7% (as reported in the unconditional means models in
Table 6.5). This suggests that, contrary to the popular assumption that industry
membership determines the degree to which firms will engage in CSR activities (Chen,
Patten & Roberts, 2008), firms within industries actually have a great deal of latitude in
terms of how they choose to respond to social, environmental and other stakeholder
issues.
As can be seen in the individual firm growth curves modeled by industry and
presented in Appendix D, rather than reflecting isomorphism over time (where less
variance is observed as time progresses), the patterns in the growth curves remain wildly
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variant around the mean throughout the 1991-2009 time frame of this study for every
industry. This effect can also been seen in Table 7.2 which details both the mean levels of
ACSS and the standard deviations in ACSS from 1991-2009 grouped by industry. While
the mean ACSS for all industries has increased during this time span, so too has the
standard deviation. This effect is also visually depicted in Figure 7.8.

Table 7.2: Growth in Mean Levels and Standard Deviations of ACSS over Time by Industry
Industry/Year
Mining/Construction

Food/Textiles/Apparel

Forrest/Paper/Publishing

Chemicals/Pharma

Refining/Rubber/Plastic

Steel/Heavy Manufacturing

Computers/Auto/Aero

Transportation

Telephone/Utilities

Wholesale/Retail

Financial

Hotel/Entertainment/Services

Yearly Averages

Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Avg.
2.38
3.21
3.97
3.87
3.43
4.09
4.31
4.53
5.17
4.67
5.42
4.84
4.88
4.10
4.55
5.25
6.93
8.82
9.05 4.87
3.12
3.09
3.40
2.50
2.49
3.38
2.67
3.50
4.18
3.52
5.15
4.25
3.95
3.37
4.29
4.92
4.98
6.32
6.52 4.27
14
15
14
15
16
16
16
16
16
15
16
16
16
16
16
14
14
14
13
5.31
5.71
7.41
8.47
9.54
8.76
8.33
7.47
7.47
8.06
8.61
8.60
8.85
8.85
9.72
11.25
11.64
12.06
12.69 8.81
5.45
5.35
6.55
7.04
7.76
7.68
7.18
5.72
5.81
6.59
7.48
7.41
7.41
7.80
8.33
9.16
9.24
10.71
10.61 7.68
23
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
23
23
20
19
4.80
5.31
5.68
5.10
6.05
6.90
7.87
8.19
8.84
8.54
8.28
8.28
7.52
7.81
9.19
10.59
12.09
11.66
11.55 8.08
5.79
6.86
6.72
6.05
6.12
6.44
7.07
7.62
7.53
7.76
7.14
6.81
6.91
7.27
7.98
9.13
8.91
10.08
10.06 7.72
27
30
30
31
32
32
32
32
32
32
31
30
32
32
32
30
27
28
28
5.79
6.89
7.11
8.32
9.17
9.53
10.16
10.34
10.89
11.32
11.98
12.63
12.01
12.34
13.88
14.39
15.46
16.44
16.36 11.28
6.58
6.63
6.95
7.33
8.40
8.15
8.56
8.22
8.31
8.72
9.38
9.80
9.68
10.27
11.44
11.22
11.10
10.79
11.03 9.55
32
36
37
38
38
38
38
38
38
38
37
36
38
38
38
37
35
34
32
6.88
10.05
11.11
11.52
12.90
12.32
10.84
11.82
13.30
14.29
15.24
15.67
14.29
14.29
16.02
14.71
15.29
15.88
15.88 13.15
3.96
6.66
6.42
5.22
5.89
4.82
5.43
5.21
5.78
6.86
5.73
7.78
7.41
9.52
11.70
11.16
12.02
12.92
12.92 7.72
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
5
5
5
5.56
6.05
6.32
6.14
6.45
6.81
7.23
7.40
8.07
7.92
8.74
8.83
8.52
8.20
10.08
10.74
11.25
12.52
12.44 8.36
6.77
6.72
6.99
6.03
6.53
7.73
8.12
8.67
9.24
8.50
9.63
9.21
9.25
9.19
9.67
11.02
10.01
10.66
10.68 8.91
38
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
40
37
38
40
40
40
40
40
39
39
4.22
5.43
5.96
6.56
7.39
7.79
8.51
8.45
9.54
9.44
9.56
9.73
9.63
10.63
11.77
12.78
13.81
14.02
13.64 9.37
4.34
5.20
6.04
5.82
6.14
6.84
7.22
7.39
8.09
7.72
8.55
8.77
8.90
10.34
11.16
12.06
12.75
12.68
12.14 9.21
57
58
59
60
62
62
62
60
60
60
61
61
61
60
60
58
56
56
55
8.15
8.42
7.07
6.74
6.74
6.27
6.58
6.90
8.78
8.48
9.39
8.39
9.06
8.13
9.09
8.53
10.70
9.63
9.63 8.23
6.94
7.96
7.67
7.13
7.42
7.20
6.97
6.72
7.92
7.05
7.57
7.32
7.28
6.94
8.16
7.52
6.48
5.28
5.28 6.90
10
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
10
10
10
9
10
11
11
11
5.25
6.27
7.12
8.44
8.93
9.66
10.90
10.88
9.81
10.27
11.01
10.80
10.38
10.25
9.67
8.82
9.56
10.29
10.29 9.38
4.87
5.62
6.70
7.42
7.97
8.50
8.37
8.43
8.32
8.05
8.61
8.68
7.09
7.25
5.69
5.44
5.43
6.72
6.72 7.28
24
26
26
26
26
25
25
26
26
25
23
23
25
25
26
25
24
24
24
4.25
4.34
5.51
5.58
6.27
6.70
6.51
6.51
5.96
6.11
5.95
6.26
5.76
6.00
6.96
7.79
8.20
9.01
9.28 6.43
4.48
5.12
5.56
5.87
6.40
7.51
6.84
6.43
5.31
5.66
5.34
4.69
5.11
5.55
5.39
5.74
6.81
7.69
7.51 6.05
34
35
37
37
36
36
36
36
37
36
37
34
38
38
37
34
33
32
32
6.28
7.68
8.47
8.49
8.21
10.14
11.08
11.10
11.75
11.04
12.19
12.40
12.79
11.93
12.58
12.71
12.65
14.29
13.24 11.07
5.95
7.54
7.33
6.25
6.65
7.85
7.98
8.57
9.47
8.01
7.97
9.13
9.27
9.58
9.31
9.31
9.43
10.52
10.16 8.66
23
27
28
30
33
33
33
32
32
32
32
32
32
33
33
31
30
28
26
3.91
5.37
5.19
4.52
5.07
5.58
5.75
6.90
7.55
7.46
7.62
7.42
8.48
9.53
10.15
11.76
12.85
13.00
13.00 7.90
7.46
7.36
7.82
7.05
6.73
7.82
8.18
8.93
10.72
10.64
10.01
9.07
8.96
9.54
11.22
12.82
14.32
14.52
14.52 10.29
18
20
20
20
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
20
21
20
20
19
19
19
19
5.01
5.90
6.48
6.78
7.34
7.83
8.30
8.41
8.88
8.89
9.30
9.41
9.22
9.37 10.40 11.10 11.90 12.55 12.42 8.89
5.59
6.21
6.59
6.43
6.88
7.44
7.60
7.69
8.09
7.89
8.30
8.38
8.29
8.82
9.39
9.97 10.13 10.59 10.42 8.48
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Figure 7.8: Growth in Mean Levels and Standard Deviations of ACSS over Time
(Yearly Averages)

Given that DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that “the effect of institutional
isomorphism is homogenization, the best indicator of isomorphic change is a decrease in
variation and diversity, which could be measured by lower standard deviations of the
values of selected indicators in a set of organizations” (p. 155), the growth of standard
deviations around ACSS can be seen as evidence of increased heterogeneity, not
homogeneity, at the industry level with regards to adoption of social, environmental and
other stakeholder initiatives. 30
This is not unlike the findings of Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho and Jackson (2004)
who found that, contrary to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) ‘iron cage’ hypothesis, the
degree of field level heterogeneity in the last twenty years has in fact increased, rather
30

Appendix E contains the tables and graphs for BCSS and DCSS. While the standard deviations in these
charts do not show as marked an increase over time as ACSS, it is clear nonetheless that the
homogenization of BCSS and DCSS over time by industry is also not occurring.
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than decreased. These authors argue that the macro level determinants of institutional
isomorphism predicted by DiMaggio and Powell have failed to materialize. Instead, in the
period between 1980-2000, “goal ambiguity has been reduced, industry has become less
structurated, dealings with the state have declined, resource dependence has diffused,
legitimate alternative models have proliferated, and managerial backgrounds have
become more diverse” (Hambrick et al., 2004: p. 326) resulting in more heterogeneous
industries at the turn of this century than anticipated. As a consequence, this
heterogeneity, they argue, has also increased the overall level of managerial discretion
across industries.
To illustrate, if industry membership was a significant determinant of firm level
CSS and isomorphic practices were in place, one might expect to observe growth curves
more in line with the hypothetical model in Figure 7.9, with greater initial levels of
variation, yet increasing similarity over time (decreasing standard deviations around the
mean). Further, the levels of CSS would vary significantly by industry.

Figure 7.9: Hypothetical Expected Growth in Mean Levels and Variation of ACSS
over Time by Industry in the Presence of Industry Effects and Isomorphism
25
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Rather, what this dissertation has shown is that the actual linear growth
trajectories between industries are not statistically different from each other such that no
one industry can be said to have a higher level or rate of adoption of ACSS over time than
another (Figure 7.10). Furthermore, instead of increased isomorphism over time, the
degree of variation between firms within industries has instead increased over time
(Figure 7.11). 31

Figure 7.10: Actual Linear Growth in Mean Levels of ACSS over Time by Industry

31

Note: Linear vs. cubic OLS growth curves shown for ease of illustration.
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Figure 7.11: Actual Linear Growth in Mean Levels of ACSS over Time by
Company

In summary, although the preliminary testing for patterns of change (Section 6.2)
suggested that industries may differ with regards to their initial levels and rates of change
of CSS over time, these variances were not consistently significant and none of the
random effects of the between industry linear rates of change were significant (Tables 6.5
to 6.7). In addition, compared to the variation between firms within industries, the
industry level variations were also not substantive. As such, while I anticipated that both
the industry level of managerial discretion and industry norms would strengthen the
relationship between executive orientation and CSS, with only 0.0 - 2.8% of the variance
attributable to industry, these hypotheses found only very limited support. These findings
do, however, directly answer part of the second research question posed in the
introduction of this dissertation: How do industry characteristics affect the relationship

212
between executive orientation and the CSS pursued by the firm over time? It appears that
the answer is: They don’t.
There may be several reasons for this counterintuitive finding. First, despite
institutional arguments that suggest firms operating in particular industries may face
different degrees of coercive, mimetic or normative isomorphic pressures (Campbell,
2007), extant research has previously found support for the heterogeneity of firm
responses to CSR issues, even within the same industry (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003;
Hambrick et al., 2004; Sharma et al., 1999; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Second, most
studies that have invoked the institutional argument in the CSR domain, nonetheless have
tested for industry effects using cross-sectional not longitudinal designs (Shropshire &
Hillman, 2007), thus excluding a critical element of institutional theory – the role of time.
Lastly, most of the research on institutional effects on firm level CSR have used
composite scores for CSR that include both negative and positive CSR activities (e.g.,
Padgett & Galán, 2010). These amalgamated scores may mask important differences
regarding the institutional determinants of corporate social responsibility vs. corporate
social irresponsibility (CSiR). While the first two of these arguments have been
developed elsewhere in this thesis, the last point merits some further discussion.
7.3.1 Institutional Pressures: The difference between CSR and CSiR
Within the CSR arena, the paradox of forces that drive industries towards
homogeneity (firms striving for legitimacy) vs. heterogeneity (firms striving for
differentiation) (Hambrick et al., 2004) may be partially explained by the divergent
conceptualizations of CSR (aggregate or disaggregate approaches) as discussed in
Chapter 2. Research that has relied primarily on aggregate measures of CSP in particular
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have often included both negative and positive CSR ratings in combination (e.g., Padgett
& Galán, 2010). As discussed, these amalgamated scores for CSS present several
conceptual as well as methodological issues (Strike et al., 2006).
Yet, one important assumption buried within this approach to CSR that has been
less discussed, is the assumption that a firm’s negative and positive approach to CSR lie
on the same continuum and thus share similar antecedents or outcomes (McGuire, Dow &
Argheyd, 2003). While this assumption has some attractive heuristic properties, a great
deal of the logic underlying institutional arguments toward homogeneity implicitly
invokes explanations for corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR), not corporate social
responsibility. In contrast, CSS, as conceptualized in this dissertation, is the strategic
choice to engage in social, environmental or other stakeholder issues and has thus been
modeled exclusively as firm engagement in CSR strengths (not concerns) as
recommended by recent research (Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Strike et al., 2006). The
lack of evidence for an industry effect may therefore be a reflection of the methods
employed which in turn sheds interesting new light on existing research.
To illustrate, the common assumption that industry is an important predictor of
CSR can be found in one of the earliest rationalizations for industry effects on firm level
CSP where the focus was explicitly on the potential negative implications of industry
association that stated: “depending on its characteristics, an industry may or may not
experience significant problems in a given social arena” (Waddock & Graves, 1997: p.
309, emphasis added). Similarly, it has been argued that firms in manufacturing
industries, by definition, face more environmental issues and product safety issues than
firms in service-oriented companies and, as a result, will be more corporately socially
responsible (Chen et al., 2008). Chatterji and Toeffel (2010) also found that firms in
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highly regulated industries are more likely to improve their environmental performance
after being poorly rated. While these industry effects may be true, the underlying
institutional mechanisms at play may be, in reality, serving to mitigate negative
externalities, rather than to promote positive CSR outcomes.
The legitimacy argument that is central to institutional theory explanations for a
firm’s “license to operate” also rests primarily on assumptions pertaining to CSiR, not
CSR. For example, it has been argued that firms in industries that have greater visibility
or that are more consumer-facing, may attract greater public scrutiny and are therefore
held to higher standards of corporate citizenship (Brammer & Millington, 2004; Gardberg
& Fombrun, 2006; Seifert, Morris & Bartkus, 2004). Legitimizing institutional pressures
guide firms to avoid “poor social and environmental ratings [that] can harm a company’s
performance and reputation” (Chatterji, Levine & Toffel, 2009: p. 126). These arguments,
however, do not necessarily transpose to pressures to pursue positive CSR programs.
This mirrors the long debate in business ethics about a firm’s negative vs. positive
responsibilities. Negative duties refer to an organization’s responsibility to ‘do no harm’,
with respect to stakeholders or the natural environment. In contrast, a firm’s positive
duties refer to obligations that reflect a commitment to help others achieve some good
(Swanson, 1995). It is possible that isomorphic pressures, as envisioned and endorsed by
institutional theorists, may have differential effects on industry level consensus regarding
CSR vs. CSiR issues. For example, coercive isomorphic pressures seem to work through
legislative and regulatory mechanisms to ensure protection of primarily negative rights.
Through the use of sanctions and fines, firms are encouraged not to pollute, not to
discriminate and not to abuse human rights. Yet, there are fewer coercive mechanisms
that encourage firms to support positive duties (e.g., corporate philanthropic contributions
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to the community are not legislated) and attempts to regulate are often met with great
opposition (e.g., affirmative action).

Mimetic and normative isomorphism may also

affect CSR and CSiR differentially.
Deephouse (1999), for example, argued that managers in an industry:
“develop cognitive consensus about the strategies that will lead to
success. Called 'industry recipes' by strategists, these strategic norms
resemble the governance structures, institutional logics, and institutional
templates of institutional theory. Strategic norms can develop about
different scope and resource commitments, such as diversification and
innovation.” (Deephouse, 1999: p.152)

It would be logical to assume that these strategic norms would also develop about
the legitimate scope of resource commitments around CSR issues. However, this
dissertation did not find support for ‘strategic norms’, ‘industry recipes’ or ‘cognitive
consensus’ around CSS as CSR strengths. Rather, it is possible that industry recipes about
appropriate courses of action have only developed around CSiR which represents a
‘stronger situation’, than around positive CSR initiatives, which may continue to present
as a ‘weak situation’ that allows for greater variability in firm responses (Mischel, 1977;
Mullins & Cummings, 1999). As McGuire, Dow and Argheyd (2003: p. 341) argued:
“variables that encourage ‘exemplary’ corporate performance may differ from those that
discourage dubious social performance”. It is feasible, then, from an institutional theory
perspective, that pursuing broader or deeper CSS does not offer the same legitimizing
benefits to a firm as does avoiding CSiR.
As such, normative isomorphic pressures may play a larger role as a determinant
of CSiR, rather than as a predictor of more positive conceptualizations of CSR, such as
CSS as argued in this dissertation. Strategic similarity may exist within the CSiR of firms
between industries, where coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphic pressures serve to
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constrain the range of acceptable firm behaviours (Deephouse, 1999), rather than
promote proactive engagement in CSS. Yet, an empirical test of this argument is left to
future research.
Having reviewed the findings of this thesis at multiple levels – the individual CEO
effect, firm level CSS and industry level observations about isomorphism, I now turn to a
necessary discussion about the study’s limitations as well as possible directions for future
research.

217

CHAPTER 8: LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As with all studies, this research project is not without limitations. First, the
longitudinal archival method itself, although designed to be as robust as possible,
nonetheless only indirectly tests the relationships between executive orientation and
corporate social strategy. Research conducted in the upper echelon tradition has often
been criticized for an overreliance on demographic proxies for testing the underlying
mechanisms between managerial cognitions and strategic choices (Boal & Hooijberg,
2000; Cannella & Monroe, 1997). However, the study designed here is meant to address
some of the prior limitations by taking both a longitudinal and multi-level approach,
integrating several new measures of executive orientation, as well as explicitly modeling
the role of external forces on strategic decision making thus heeding the call for more
contextualized models of positional strategic leadership (Carpenter et al., 2004).
This limitation, however, opens up many avenues for future research. For
example, despite the low anticipated response rates at the CEO level, one might consider
a survey methodology to more directly test some of the proposed relationships regarding
openness to change/experience with existing values scales (Schwartz, 2005), personality
inventories (Judge & Bono, 2000) or attitude towards change measures (Musteen et al.,
2006). Similarly, content analysis of company communications, books, speeches or press
stories may also allow for testing of managerial cognitions (e.g., Nadkarni & Barr, 2008)
especially underlying theories regarding CEO’s openness to experience or tolerance for
ambiguity (Cannella & Monroe, 1997; Mullins & Cummings, 1999). A deep qualitative
exploration of executive openness to change using structured or semi-structured
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interviews with CEOs about their perceptions and interpretations of CSR issues in
particular would likely continue to yield interesting insights (e.g., Cannella & Monroe,
1997; Sharma et al., 1999). One could also envision assessing executive openness to
experience/change in experiential learning exercises and simulations. Testing the
hypothesized relationships with alternate methodologies would thus help triangulate the
findings of this study as well as continue to delve into the ‘black box’ of executive
cognitions (Cannella & Monroe, 1997).
Another possible limitation of this dissertation regards the exclusive focus on the
CEO, rather than the larger unit of the top management team (TMT) or the broader
governing unit of the board of directors (BOD). Although some researchers in this area
have advocated for the study of TMTs instead of CEOs as superior predictors of firm
level strategies (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Carpenter et al., 2004), others “highlight
the pitfalls of using aggregate units of analysis when studying the influence of corporate
elites on corporate strategy” and suggest “a return to the simple CEO unit of analysis”
(Jensen & Zajac, 2004: p.507 & p.521) as the CEO unit of analysis appears to provide
adequate predictive validity (Jensen & Zajac, 2004).
This debate, however, also provides very interesting directions for future research:
Would the same relationships between executive orientation and corporate social strategy
hold for the members of the TMT? How would the heterogeneity of executive
orientations in the TMT affect the breadth, depth or overall nature of CSS pursued by the
firm over time? What is the role of the BOD in shaping the CSS of the firm? Does CEO
duality matter? Similarly, how important is CEO, TMT and BOD congruence on
openness to change in determining the corporate social strategies pursued? Including the
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important roles of the TMT and the BOD in future studies thus also warrants more
focused attention.
The nature of the variables tested herein also present a limitation in and of
themselves given that they necessarily present only an incomplete picture of an open
executive orientation. Although recent work has suggested that openness can be measured
as a combination of age, tenure and educational experience (Datta et al., 2003), how other
proxies for an open executive orientation (functional background, breadth of experience,
international experience etc.) may combine as either a formative or a reflexive construct
has yet to be determined. In addition, one can envision other potential experiences that
may also capture the domain of openness as an executive orientation, such as experience
across different organizations, or different industries, as well as experience as an outside
director on other BODs, especially not-for profit organizations (Geletkanycz &
Hambrick, 1997). Given that the hypothesized relationships between the predictor
variables and the dependent variables in this study showed different levels of empirical
support, a worthwhile future endeavour may include a finer-grained analysis of the
factors that determine an open executive orientation and a subsequent, more
parsimonious, test of CEO openness (as one variable) on CSS.
Furthermore, the study design necessitated aggregation of the CEO level variables
at the firm level. Although not found in the post-hoc analyses, it is nonetheless possible
that differences within firms on CEO openness to change that may accompany CEO
succession occasions could accelerate or decelerate the rate of adoption of CSS within
firms. For example, Datta et al. (2003) found that new CEO openness to change was
negatively related to a strategic persistence in a sample of CEO successions in the US
manufacturing industry, also finding that industry level managerial discretion attenuates
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this effect. Clustering techniques could be used to isolate ‘ideal’ types of incoming CEOs
and their effect on subsequent adoption of CSS further tested using alternate statistical
methodologies, such as logistic regression.
Lastly, the dataset used herein also necessarily limits the generalizability of the
findings to large, public firms in a U.S. context. Yet, Crossland and Hambrick (2007)
found that it is precisely in this context that variance in firm performance can be most
directly attributed to a firm’s chief executive (vs. German or Japanese contexts, for
example). In the US, CEOs have a far greater latitude of action; on a national level (not
just an industry level) American CEOs enjoy a greater degree of managerial discretion,
and as such, the US allows for the best context in which to perceive the CEO effect on
firm level outcomes. However, research has also suggested that “executive openmindedness toward change” is something that varies by country (Geletkanycz, 1997) and
thus, despite the small potential to find significant effects on corporate social strategy, an
international context would nonetheless be an interesting avenue for future studies.
In the end, the limitations of this study present many possible directions for future
research in this area. In addition, the data collected also offers a wide variety of
extensions to the current dissertation. For example, the relationship between executive
orientation and the depth measure of CSS may vary depending on the type of CSR
activity. To illustrate, it is possible that CEO openness to change values are related to a
deeper commitment to social issues such as diversity (e.g., programs that promote
women, minorities or gay/lesbian rights), while CEO conservation values are related to a
deeper commitment to social issues such as community relations (e.g. philanthropic
giving). For example, out of several types of CSR, Lerner and Fryxell (1994) only found
support for their hypotheses around CEO community orientation which was positively
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related to corporate philanthropy. Should this be the case here, then the relationship
between an open executive orientation and ACSS and DCSS might be dampened,
possibly explaining the lack of support for many of the hypothesized relationships.
Disaggregating the CSS measures thus may yield further interesting findings.
Similarly, as discussed in Section 7.3.1 the nature of the relationships proposed
and tested herein focused exclusively on CSS as a strategic choice to implement positive
CSR programs. No relationships were hypothesized regarding the relationship between
executive orientation and social, environmental or other stakeholder weaknesses.
However, this data has been gathered, allowing not only for future investigations into the
antecedents and outcomes of corporate social irresponsibility as well, but also for broader
longitudinal investigations into the degree of variability of CSiR between industries that
would allow for a more direct test of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) iron cage hypothesis.
New studies with regards to the different paths to greater CSS may also be undertaken
that directly test the stages approach to CSR (Maon et al., 2010). For example, the
database could be used to study if firms first engage in CSS by mitigating negative
externalities, then build a deep CSS in a particular area, before moving into different,
broader categories, or if other evolutionary paths are more predominant. Must a firm go
through stages, or can some firms be ‘born Devoted’? What role does executive
orientation play in these different trajectories?
Although not formally hypothesized, the RCM analyses also demonstrated some
interesting findings regarding some of the CEO level control variables that also point to
interesting avenues for future research. For example, gender was positively and
consistently associated with the rate of adoption of ACSS and DCSS over time (although
not a factor in BCSS) as has been found in other studies (Manner, 2010). Furthermore, the
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effect of CEO tenure on ACSS suggested that the longer the CEO tenure at the firm, the
higher the rate of adoption of ACSS, yet the greater the tenure in the role, the lower the
rate of adoption of ACSS. This paradox might be partially explained by stewardship
theory, which proposes that executive and organizational motives can be aligned and need
not adhere to the negative assumptions that underlie agency theoretic approaches to
governance (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). A stewardship theory of CSS may
thus also be a future extension.
Lastly, the executive biographies used in this dissertation have also been coded for
other potentially interesting factors that may effect issue perception, interpretation and
strategic choice regarding CSS including: founder status, elite education, political
intensity, worldview stability, military experience amongst others. Although no theories
have been developed regarding these variables and CSS, the database includes the
possibility to engage in theory development around these relationships as well as other
important firm level outcomes such as strategic persistence, conformity, change and
deviance.

223

CHAPTER 9: CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis yielded three primary results at the CEO, firm and industry levels.
First, the CEO effect on CSS ranges between 3-14% and evidence supports that some
aspects of an open executive orientation are indeed important determinants of initial
levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time. Specifically, firms with higher initial
levels of ACSS are led by CEOs with more liberal worldviews and output functional
backgrounds, while the rate of adoption of ACSS is also predicted by CEOs with output
functional backgrounds as well as breadth of functional experience. The predicted effects
of CEO international experience and educational specialization on CSS, however, did not
materialize. The findings also reveal that the overall firm level of CSS has not grown
substantively over the last two decades, with most firms in 2009 still engaging in a
Derivative CSS (shallow/narrow). Furthermore, unlike previous studies that confound
negative and positive CSR, this dissertation demonstrates that industry membership is not
an important determinant of the strategic choice of positive CSS, nor are institutional
pressures moderating factors in the executive orientation – CSS relationship.
This thesis thus makes several important theoretical contributions in the CSR,
upper echelons and institutional theory domains (Section 9.1). Furthermore, it provides
methodological contributions (Section 9.2), as well as yields important implications for
practice (Section 9.3). These specific contributions are detailed below.
9.1 Contributions to Theory
9.1.1 Contributions to Theory: CSR
The model of executive orientation and corporate social strategy tested here is a
direct response to Margolis and Walsh’s (2003) call to reorient CSR research away from
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theories that simply attempt to justify a firm’s response to CSR from an economic
perspective. Instead, the authors suggested that we should embrace the antimony inherent
in the economics vs. ethics debate and assume that “instrumental efficiency and human
beneficence, wealth maximization and the amelioration of social misery, and shareholder
rights and stakeholder rights all matter” (p. 283-284). Only then, can we build a
normative theory of the firm that acknowledges these competing tensions and objectively
assesses how firms are actually addressing these trade-offs.
Margolis and Walsh (2003) suggest that “a starting point for building such a
theory requires a systematic descriptive inquiry into corporations’ responses to calls for
an expanded role” (p.284) which includes deepening our understanding of how
companies perceive external stimuli, how they generate and evaluate response options,
how they select and implement a course of action and evaluate the consequences of these
efforts. This dissertation directly contributes to such a systematic descriptive inquiry by
examining how executive orientation in particular affects the choice of corporate social
strategy pursued by firms in different industries over time, finding that the CEO effect
ranges from 3-14% and that different dimensions of an open executive orientation are
important predictors of both initial levels and rates of adoption of ACSS, BCSS and
DCSS.
This dissertation also contributes to the literature on CSR by introducing a new
typology of CSS which differs from existing conceptualizations of CSR in several ways.
First, it allows for a finer-grained conceptualization of types of corporate social strategy
pursued by the firm. Where stakeholder management and social issue participation
models have previously been considered together (everything that lies “beyond economic
and legal requirements of the firm”), here I make the distinction that they may not be
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perceived as equivalent by the CEO of the firm. CEOs may choose to pursue (or not
pursue) very different CSS depending on the nature of the stakeholder or social issue
under consideration. Second, I highlight the role of choice in determining the depth and
breadth of corporate social strategy pursued. Previous research has treated CSP as an
achieved state without considering the endogenous choices made to arrive at this state
(Barnett, 2007). By including the choice of narrow vs. broad CSS, as well as shallow vs.
deep CSS, I incorporate the idea that investing in CSR is a strategic choice akin to other
resource commitment decisions (Waldman & Siegel, 2008). Lastly, by marrying the depth
of the CSS with the breadth of CSS, this typology moves beyond just a simple low/high
dichotomy of CSP. Rather, it allows for a more nuanced appreciation for firms that are
engaging in Disengaged, Derivative, Dedicated, Diffuse and Devoted CSS thus allowing
for future normative explorations into positively deviant or even supererogatory corporate
social strategies.
Importantly, by applying this typology to the growth of CSS over time, I find that,
despite increasing calls for businesses to address society’s mounting concerns, in the last
twenty years there has actually been little substantive growth in the adoption of CSR
initiatives by large US firms. Although the overall mean levels of ACSS have more than
doubled, from 5% in 1991 to 12% in 2009 (with similar patterns for BCSS and DCSS),
most firms in 2009 are still engaging in a Derivative CSS when it comes to social,
environmental and other stakeholder issues. Although significant variance exists in firm
responses over time, on the whole, the ‘call for an expanded role’ has largely been met
with ‘business as usual’.
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9.1.2 Contributions to Theory: Upper Echelons
This research also addresses the multiple calls for inquiry into the relationship
between strategic leadership and corporate social responsibility (Agle et al., 1999; Basu &
Palazzo, 2008; Laplume et al., 2008; Maon et al., 2008; Rose, 2007; Thomas & Simerly,
1994; Waldman et al., 2006a; Waldman & Siegel, 2008; Waldman et al., 2006b; Wood,
1991). Despite an astounding body of literature on the effects of CEO and TMT
psychographic and demographic experiences on firm financial performance, no
systematic inquiry into their effects on firm social performance over time has been
conducted to date. Rather, there are only a select handful of cross-sectional analyses
regarding executive orientation and CSR (e.g., Manner, 2010; Slater & Dixon-Fowler,
2009). This research thus heeds Wood’s call “to know more about how managers
perceive choices in their organizational and societal environments” (Wood, 1991: p. 702)
that affect the strategic choice of CSS.
In particular, this research also introduces a new measure of CEO worldview
which has hitherto not been applied in the study of upper echelons and was found here to
be a significant determinant in both initial and overall levels of ACSS and DCSS over
time. Rooted in extensive research in the fields of political science and psychology, the
ideological social cognitions that divide liberal vs. conservative orientations are readily
applicable to the study of executives and executive decision making. Barnett specifically
isolated cognition as a key determinant of CSR activity “that helps explain enduring
nonoptimal supplies of CSR by some firms” (Barnett, 2007: p. 812) and the finding that
CEO worldviews, as a reflection of openness to change and experience, can impact levels
of CSS over time is thus an important contribution.
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Walsh (1995) provides a useful framework for evaluating research on managerial
and organizational cognition which is pertinent to this thesis; he suggests that researchers
in this domain build theories that: (1) uncover the content and structure of cognitions, (2)
relate the use of managerial cognitions to consequences of substantive organizational
importance (e.g., the deployment of a firm's resources), (3) explore the developmental
origins of the cognitions and (4) be sensitive to group, organization, and even industry
levels of analysis (p.282).
With regards to Walsh’s (1995) first requirement, this dissertation investigates the
specific content and structural attributes of executive orientation used by CEOs when
evaluating complex and ambiguous issues involving CSR. At the individual level,
cognitive content includes individual level knowledge structure representations (e.g.,
screens, filters, frames of reference and other ‘givens’), use (e.g., selective perception,
strategic

choice)

and

development

(e.g.,

functional

experience,

educational

specialization). The model of an open executive orientation and CSS built and tested here
is based on previous research which has clearly established CEO cognitive
representations, use and development arguing that CEO psychological and demographic
experiences shape the filters used in the selective perception process resulting in
variations in strategic choices around CSR issues. The model also incorporates research
on the structural attributes of cognitions. By suggesting that the cognitions of certain
CEOs are more open as a result of different psychological attributes such as openness to
change values or personality traits such as openness to experience, the structural attributes
of an open executive orientation were found in CEOs liberal worldview, output functional
backgrounds and breadth of functional experiences.
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With regards to Walsh’s (1995) remaining requirements for theories of managerial
cognition, in this thesis, I have developed multiple hypotheses that specifically relate the
use of managerial cognitions to ‘consequences of substantive organizational importance’
(CSS) as well as uncovered the developmental origins of the relevant attributes of
executive orientation that are likely to impact this relationship. Lastly, the model of
executive orientation and CSS considered industry level variables that were shown to not
affect the relationship between executive orientation and CSS thus satisfying all four of
Walsh’s (1995) guidelines for theories of managerial cognition.
9.1.3 Contributions to Theory: Institutional Theory
Despite an extensive body of research that suggests that firm strategies tend to
resemble one another due to isomorphic pressures towards conformity (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983), this study found that, when it comes to CSS, variability, not similarity,
within industries is the norm. As argued in Section 7.3, this thesis therefore also
contributes to institutional theory in that it highlights the potential that CSR and CSiR
may follow different evolutionary paths rooted in divergent coercive, normative or
mimetic pressures affecting firm responses to negative vs. positive responsibilities. It is
possible, therefore, that pursing CSS may not yield the same legitimacy benefits as
avoiding CSiR, explaining the lack of evidence for isomorphism over time found in this
thesis.
The lack of industry effects, both in explaining overall variance, as well as in
moderating the relationship between executive orientation and CSS, also provides support
for the strategic choice perspective (Child, 1972) over the environmental determinism
perspective (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Despite the large body of research that argues
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that managerial ‘latitude of action’ is restricted in certain industries (Finkelstein et al.,
2009), this was not found to be the case for CSS. Rather, CSS may instead fall into what
Boyd and Gove (2006) called a “differentiated choice” environment, where firms have
managed to cultivate discretion despite a highly uncertain context. This dissertation thus has
the potential to inform institutional theory by integrating managerial discretion and
isomorphism arguments.

As one of the only studies of which I am aware that has mapped firm level growth
in CSS over time, this dissertation also contributes to institutional theory by explicitly
modeling a key variable implicit in theories of homogeneity or heterogeneity of firm
responses over time – time itself. Questions regarding strategic change, persistence,
deviance and conformity all require longitudinal designs to accurately capture the
dynamic nature of rates of change over time. This dissertation thus answers the multiple
calls for more explicit, longitudinal investigations into the institutional drivers of the CSR
development process within and between organizations (Brammer & Millington, 2008;
Maon et al., 2010; Short et al., 2006).
9.2 Contribution to Methods
This research also answers calls for more multilevel investigations of
organizational phenomena in general (Bamberger, 2008; Bies, Bartunek, Fort & Zald,
2007; Cannella & Holcomb, 2005; Hitt et al., 2007; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Empirical
tests of upper echelon models have typically been conducted at a single level of analysis
(Cannella & Holcomb, 2005) while corporate social responsibility necessarily “involves
an examination of corporate social agency at multiple levels of analysis: the micro level
(focusing on psychological and social psychological bases), the meso level (involving
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relational and network issues), and the macro level (involving political, economic,
institutional and societal dynamics)” (Bies et al., 2007: p. 789). The longitudinal, multi
level model built here is thus a contribution to multi-level theorizing and the use of RCM
in HLM6 to test the hypotheses is a contribution to multi-level methods which have only
just recently gained momentum in strategy research (e.g., Misangyi et al., 2006).
In addition, researchers have suggested that there is a paucity of longitudinal
studies not only in the upper echelon literature (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005), but in the
CSR literature as well (Agle et al., 1999). Rather, many empirical investigations rely on
cross-sectional data that make the study of change problematic (Shropshire & Hillman,
2007) or measure only the effect of short-term change in CSP, such as from time t to time
t+1 (Ruf, Muralidhar, Brown, Janney & Paul, 2001). By examining the corporate social
strategies of firms over 19 years, I contribute methodologically to research in this area
through growth curve modeling and direct tests of the patterns of change within CSS over
time. Following the guidelines set forth for longitudinal, random coefficient modeling
(Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002;
Singer & Willett, 2003), this thesis brings this new methodology into the upper echelon,
CSR and institutional literatures.
Lastly, by introducing new measures such as CEO liberal worldview as well as the
breadth (entropy) and depth (specialization) of CSS, this research also adds to
measurement of both executive orientations in the upper echelon field as well as to
corporate social performance in the CSR literature.
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9.3 Implications for Practice
Within the context of today’s ethical scandals, a deeper understanding of
individual, firm and industry level determinants of socially responsible strategies also has
important implications for practice. The calls for more ethical and more responsible
leadership as well as more enlightened corporate citizenship are pronounced (Paine, 2003;
Googins et al., 2007) and arguments have been made that a new corporate social
responsibility institutional environment has arrived (Waddock, 2008). Furthermore, a
recent study revealed that 93% of CEOs believe that sustainability issues, defined as
human rights, labour relations, environmental and governance issues, will be critical to
the future success of their businesses (UNGC & Accenture, 2010). Yet, little guidance is
available to help executives navigate the increasing calls to mitigate societal ills
(Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Peloza, 2009), leading to a proliferation, not homogenization,
of firm responses to CSR issues over time.
This dissertation thus contributes directly to practice by introducing a new
typology of CSS that can be used to help assess a firm’s current CSS profile as compared
to key competitors in their organizational field. As done in Figure 7.7, the breadth and
depth of one’s CSS can be mapped and compared to other firms in the industry. If some
strategies are presumed to proffer some form of competitive advantage, either through
direct revenue benefits from differentiation and cost advantages, or through indirect
means such as reputation or insurance, executives in organizations may look to firms
engaging in more Dedicated or Devoted CSS for best practices.
Furthermore, CEOs interested in accessing the market for capital now inherent in
SRI funds, may use the typology to make strategic choices to either increase the depth of
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their engagement in a particular CSS or broaden the scope of their CSS efforts into new
social, environmental or other stakeholder issues. For example, Chatterji and Toffel
(2010) claim that fifteen of the world’s top twenty five institutional financial managers
use the KLD rating system specifically, representing over $10B in investment capital.
Furthermore, Choi and Wang (2009) demonstrated that positive stakeholder relations (as
measured by the aggregate KLD score) in particular help create and sustain economic
rents for the firm over time. These results suggest that executives pay close attention to
SRI funds both in terms of access to capital as well as for the potential benefit to financial
performance; the typology presented in this dissertation can thus serve as a useful
strategic decision making tool in the CSR arena.
Traditional strategic arguments have also been made regarding the necessity of fit
between a firm’s strategy and changes in their operating environment (Porter, 1980;
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). The overall growth in CSS over time, while still relatively
small, nonetheless suggests that there are advantages to be had “by aligning
organizational factors with stakeholder needs and by recognizing the ongoing dynamic
nature of those demands”; the typology derived herein can thus also help executives
ensure alignment and “improve a firm’s responsiveness to external forces and changing
expectations.” (Shropshire & Hillman, 2007: p. 83).
Furthermore, this dissertation can also help managers understand their personal
role in shaping the CSS of their firms by providing support for the strategic choice view
that CEOs have an important influence on the strategic decisions taken at the firm (Child,
1972). Given that industry level factors were not found to be a significant influence on the
initial levels or rates of adoption of CSS over time, situational determinism is a less
tenable rationale for inaction. In conjunction with parallel research that has demonstrated
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the negative financial consequences to a Disengaged CSS in particular (Mazutis, 2010,
2011), increasing one’s self-awareness about the nature of the relationship between
executive orientation and CSS thus also has important implications for the firm.
Although previous research has suggested that individual worldviews, knowledge
structures or cognitive paradigms are relatively fixed (Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001),
there is some evidence that self-reflection itself can be an experience that changes the
representations of stimuli in cognitive structures (Schmidt, McAdams & Foster, 2009;
Walsh, 1995). This suggests that if CEOs have an increased awareness of the impacts of
an open executive orientation on CSS, this act of self-reflection may in and of itself affect
the filtering process of strategic choice under conditions of bounded rationality. Such a
broadened perspective of the consequences of executive orientation may thus potentially
serve to broaden executive perceptions of potential strategic choices regarding corporate
social strategies available to the CEO and to the firm.
The results of this dissertation thus also have implications for recruiting and
promotion practices within firms that are embracing the call for greater corporate
engagement in addressing pressing stakeholder and social issues (Margolis and Walsh,
2003). Should the question of proactive CSR become an agenda item in the boardroom,
for cost, benefit, reputation, insurance, access to capital or any other reason, CEO hiring
committees may be wise to consider the characteristics of an open executive orientation
required for deeper or broader engagement in CSS. Ensuring fit between executive
orientation and organizational goals is a critical function of the board of directors (Datta
& Rajagopalan, 1998).
Lastly, this research has the potential to also contribute to policy, by explicitly
modeling the role of institutional norms and managerial discretion in the variation of CSS
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pursued by firms in different industries. Given that no support was found for industry
level moderators of the executive orientation→ CSS relationship,

policy makers are in

the unique position to be able to introduce regulations or other controls which may move
the levels and rates of adoption of CSS of entire industries in a positive direction.
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION

In a recent dialogue in Leadership Quarterly, Siegel (2008) argued that: “a firm's
decision to engage in social responsibility should be viewed as a strategic choice...as an
investment decision” (Waldman & Siegel, 2008). Similarly, I have argued herein that a
firm’s decision to pursue a broad or deep corporate social strategy is a strategic decision
which is at the discretion of a firm’s senior executives and that this decision will be
influenced by the executive orientation of the CEO.
Having developed a theoretical model that proposes how CEO worldview,
functional background, educational background and international experience which are
reflective of an open executive orientation are related to corporate social strategy over
time, this research bridges the strategic leadership and CSR literatures, answering the
numerous calls for greater research into this relationship. The primary contributions of
this research are therefore threefold. First, I make a contribution to the upper echelon and
CSR literatures by making the link between CEO executive orientation and corporate
social strategies explicit. Second, I fill a gap in the CSR literature that has largely
bypassed the important role of the CEO in determining a firm’s response to social issues
and that has been largely bereft of longitudinal and multi-level theories of the
determinants of CSS. Lastly, I test the relationship between strategic leadership and CSS
empirically using RCM and new methodologies (HLM), thus also making a contribution
to methods in the field. In so doing, this research project provides new insights into why
CEOs and firms differ with respect to the social issues they choose to pursue and the
nature of the strategies they use to address these issues.
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This study of executive orientation and corporate social responsibility is thus
motivated by a broader research agenda that is aimed at uncovering the determinants of
positively deviant or even supererogatory corporate social strategies. By looking into the
executive orientations that might affect corporate response to societal ills, I construct
detailed CEO and firm profiles of organizations that have chosen Dedicated or Devoted
CSS despite the challenge of “promoting social justice in a world in which this
shareholder wealth maximization paradigm reigns” (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; p. 273).
The shareholder primacy norm is thus central not only to the research question
probed herein, but also to the researchers themselves working in this domain. Despite the
fact that the study of economics was originally intended to provide theories of social not
individual welfare maximization, a recent review of all the management literature in the
last 45 years showed that the majority of all empirical work has focused on financial
performance as a dependent variable, with human welfare as an outcome dropping from
32% of all publications in 1978 to 19% in 1999 (Walsh, Weber & Margolis, 2003). Walsh
et al. (2003) outlined the path management scholarship has taken to this “imbalanced
research agenda” and called for researchers to return to the roots of the Academy of
Management’s mandate, as defined over fifty year ago (p.859):
“The general objective of the Academy shall be therefore to foster: a) a
philosophy of management that will make possible the accomplishment
of the economic and social objectives of an industrial society with
increasing efficiency and effectiveness: the public’s interests must be
paramount in any such philosophy, but adequate consideration must be
given to the legitimate interests of capital and labor. . . .
. . . Editor’s preface, Journal of the Academy of Management, 1958, 1(1):
5–6.”
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It was therefore the intention of this research project to heed this historical
interpretation of the purpose of management scholarship and help refocus the strategy
lens away from what Ghoshal (2005) described as the negative self-fulfilling ‘ideologybased gloomy vision’ of existing economic theories of the firm. In the end, having
developed a theoretical model and tested the hypothesized relationships between an open
executive orientation and CSS, I hope to have contributed to a better understanding of the
relationship between strategic leadership and the observable variations in CSS pursued by
firms over time. In so doing, I have uncovered a significant CEO effect as well as detailed
the characteristics of an open executive orientation that, despite the pervasiveness of the
shareholder primacy norm, have allowed some firms to choose, nonetheless, to engage in
greater levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time.
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APPENDIX A: List of Studies using KLD Data

Study

Sample Size and
Timing

Methods

Construct

Operationalization

Main Findings

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

8 dimensions (5 'stakeholder
relations' categories: community,
employee relations, environment,
product and diversity + 3 'external
pressure': military contracting,
nuclear power and involvement in
South Africa), scale of -2 to +2;
weighted

High CSP values are positively
related to high levels of institutional
ownership

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

5 dimensions: community, diversity,
employee relations, environment,
product quality; Sum (-2 to +2 scale)

CSP is related to a firm's reputation
and attractiveness as an employer,
suggesting that a firm's CSP may
provide a competitive advantage in
attracting applicants.

CSR as Independent Variable

Graves &
Waddock (AMJ,
1994)

Turban &
Greening (AMJ,
1996)

Waddock &
Graves (SMJ,
1997)

Agle, Mitchell
& Sonnenfeld
(AMJ, 1999)

n=453 firms;
1990

n=160 firms; data
from 1992-1993

n=469 firms;
1990

n=80 firms; 19961997 (avg)

regression, crosssectional

regression, crosssectional

regression, crosssectional

correlation,
regression, crosssectional

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

CSP positively related to prior
financial performance; CSP
(communities and environment) lead
to better financial performance

Stakeholder attributes (power,
legitimacy, urgency) affect the
degree to which top managers give
priority to stakeholders; But CEO
values have no moderating effect
and there is no relationship between
stakeholder salience and
performance.
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8 dimensions (5 'stakeholder
relations' categories: community,
employee relations, environment,
product and diversity + 3 'external
pressure': military contracting,
nuclear power and involvement in
South Africa), scale of -2 to +2;
weighted
4 measures of corporate social
performance: employee relations,
(including diversity), community
relations, environment, and
products; five-point scale ranging
from -2 to +2; plus one overall
measure of CSP, which was the
aggregate of the four measures
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Study

Sample Size and
Timing

Methods

Construct

Operationalization

Main Findings

pooled time series
model; OLS
regression

Stakeholder
Relationships

5 dimensions treated separately:
employee relations, diversity,
community relations, the natural
environment, product safety/quality

Only employee relations and
product/safety quality are positively
related to firm financial performance

Stakeholder
performance

5 dimensions: employee relations,
diversity, community relations, the
natural environment, product
safety/quality. Sum of concerns and
strengths (-2 to +2 scale)

BTL companies outperform nonBTL companies on all measures of
stakeholder and financial
performance

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

CSP is a dummy variable, with a
value of 1 if a firm is included in the
DSI 400 in a given year (for
having passed the “social screen”); 0
otherwise.

CSR has a neutral impact on
financial performance when R&D is
controlled for

Stakeholder
Management (SM)
vs. Social Issue
Participation (SIP)

SM = employee relations, diversity,
community relations, the
environment and product issues; SIP
= other, alcohol/tobacco/gambling
exclusionary screens, non-US
concerns over investment in Burma
& Mexico. Sum of concerns and
strengths (-2 to +2 scale)

SM leads to improved shareholder
value, while social issue
participation is negatively associated
with shareholder value; when
disaggregated, only community
relations positively related to MVA

CSR as Independent Variable (cont’d)

Berman, Wicks,
Kotha, Jones
(AMJ, 1999)

n= 486 firm year
observations; 81
Fortune 500
companies x 6
years (19911996)

Graves &
Waddock
(B&SR, 2000)

n=11 matched
pairs of Built to
Last (BTL)
companies; 19911997

descriptive
statistics; t-tests

n = 524 firms
(from 1991-1996)

correlation,
regression, crosssectional

McWilliams &
Siegel (SMJ,
2000)

Hillman &
Keim (SMJ,
2001)

n= 308 firms,
multiple
industries, data
from 1994, 1995
and 1996

correlation,
regression, crosssectional
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Sample Size and
Timing

Methods

Construct

Operationalization

Main Findings

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

8 dimensions (5 'stakeholder
relations' categories: community,
employee relations, environment,
product and diversity + 3 'external
pressure': military contracting,
nuclear power and involvement in
South Africa), scale of -2 to +2;
weighted

Change in CSP is positively
associated with growth in sales for
the current and subsequent year
(short-term benefits from
improving CSP). ROS positively
related to change in CSP for the
third financial period, indicating that
long-term financial benefits may
exist when CSP is improved.

Stakeholder
Management (SM)

5 dimensions: employee relations,
community, diversity,
environmental impact and product
safety/quality; Summed (-2 to +2
scale)

Significant, negative main effect of
SM on CEO salaries (CEO's may
jeopardize personal wealth by
pursuing stakeholder issues)

CSR as Independent Variable (cont’d)

Ruf, Muralidhar,
Brown, Janney
& Paul (JBE,
2001)

n = 496; 1991 1992

Coombs &
Gilley (SMJ,
2005)

n=406 firms
(&CEOs);
unbalanced panel
1995-2001 (total
of 2,297
observations)

regression; crosssectional

regression with
panel estimates

regression

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

Garcia-Castro,
Canela & Arino
(B&S online,
2008)

n=658 firms;
1998-2005

multiple year
regressions

Stakeholder
Management

MNEs engaged in intermediate
levels of CSP achieve
lower levels of multinationality than
firms operating at
either anchor of the social
performance continuum.

Negative effects of stakeholder
management on shareholder value in
the short run but positive effects
over the long run
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Bouquet &
Deutsch (JBE,
2008)

n= 4244 firmyears, 813 firms,
avg of 5.3 years
(1991-2003)

8 dimensions: community relations,
employee
relations, environmental
performance, product
characteristics, treatment of women
and minorities, investment in areas
involved in human rights
controversies, investment in firms
that rank poorly on social
performance; Summed (-2 to +2
scale)
5 dimensions: employee relations,
customer/product issues, community
relations, diversity issues,
environmental issues); summed;
equal weights index -1 to +1
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Main Findings

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

All 8 dimensions; weighted
(categories with more subcategories
receiving proportionately greater
weight); Summed

Stakeholder
relations

5 dimensions: employee relations,
diversity, community relations, the
natural environment, product
safety/quality. Sum of concerns and
strengths for each dimension
separately; aggregate computed as
average of 5 dimensions

CSP most strongly affects
performance in low innovation firms
and in industries with little
differentiation
Good stakeholder relations are
positively associated with the
persistence of superior financial
performance and negatively related
to with the persistence of inferior
financial performance; when
disaggregated, employee relations
and product quality most critical to
persistent superior performance ,
diversity and product quality help in
overcoming inferior financial
performance more quickly

CSR Participation:
ICSR + TCSR
(Institutional vs.
Technical CSR)

6 dimensions (community, corporate
governance, employee relations,
environment, diversity, product
quality); Binary - CSR participation
= 1 for any positive item and zero
otherwise; ICSR participation = 1 if
positive item for any community or
diversity dimension, 0 otherwise;
TCSR participation = 1 positive
item for governance, employee
relations or product, zero otherwise.
Single CSR negative level score
sum of total negative items across 6
dimensions

CSR as Independent Variable (cont’d)
Hull &
Rothenberg
(SMJ, 2008)

n=69 firms with
all data available
from 1998-2001

regression; crosssectional

Choi & Wang
(SMJ, 2009)

n = 4,113 firmyear
observations; 518
firms, 11 years
(1991-2001)

first-order
autoregressive
model; firm fixed
effects with
adjustment

Godfrey, Merrill
& Hansen (SMJ,
2009)

n=160 firms with
data from 19912002

event study

Institutional CSR ("aimed at
secondary stakeholders or society at
large) provides insurance like
benefit, with participation in
Technical CSR (activities targeting a
firm's trading partners) yields no
benefits.
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CSR as Dependent Variable

split 5 dimensions into 2: people
dimension (community, employee
relations, and women and minorities
ratings) and product quality
dimension (product quality and
natural environment ratings).

Pension fund equity positively
related to both a people and a
product quality dimension of CSP,
but mutual and investment bank
funds exhibited no direct
relationship with CSP. Outside
director representation positively
related to both CSP dimensions. Top
management equity positively
related to the product quality
dimension but unrelated to the
people dimension of CSP
Incentives have no significant
relationship with strong social
performance. Salary and long-term
incentives have a positive
association with weak social
performance

Johnson &
Greening (AMJ,
1999)

n= 252 firms;
1991-1993

SEM

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP):
People dimension
vs. product quality
dimension

McGuire, Dow
& Argheyd
(JBE, 2003)

n=374 firms;
1999

regression; crosssectional

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

4 dimensions: employee,
community, product, environmental;
Strengths and weaknesses separate

Deckop,
Merriman &
Gupta (JOM,
2006)

n=313 firms;
2000-2002

correlation,
regression, crosssectional

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

6 dimensions: employee relations,
product quality and safety,
community relations, natural
environment, human rights, and
diversity; Summed (0/1 scale)

Short-term CEO pay focus was
negatively related to CSP, whereas a
long-term focus was positively
related to CSP

Strike, Bansal &
Gao (JIBS,
2006)

n=2,442
observations (222
firms x 10 years 1993-2003)

time-series crosssectional data
analysis; general
least-square
(GLS)

Corporate Social
Responsibility and
Corporate Social
Irresponsibility

7 qualitative categories: The values
of strengths were summed to
represent CSR, and the values of
concerns were summed to represent
CSiR (0,1 data)

Significant, positive linear
relationship between
international diversification and
CSR and CSiR
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Corporate Social
Responsibility:
Strategic CSR vs.
Social CSR

8 dimensions: Strategic CSR was
indicated by environmental, product
quality, other, employee relations,
and military; Social CSR was
represented by the community and
diversity indicators; strengths and
weaknesses Summed (-2 to +2
scale)

CEO intellectual stimulation (but
not CEO charismatic leadership) is
significantly associated with
‘strategic’ CSR

CSR as Dependent Variable (cont’d)

Waldman,
Siegel &
Javidan (JOMS,
2006)

David, Bloom &
Hillman (SMJ,
2007)

Shropshire &
Hillman (B&S,
2007)

n=56 firms
(1991-1996)

n=218 firms
(1,307
shareholder
proposals); 19921998

n=158 firms,
1,083 firm-year
observations
(1992-1999)

regression

HLM, but report
OLS regression
results

logistic regression

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

5 dimensions: community, diversity,
employee relations, environment,
product quality; Summed

Stakeholder
Management

5 dimensions: employee relations,
community, diversity,
environmental impact and product
safety/quality; Summed (-2 to +2
scale) and then measure of
significant change dummy 1/0 if +/2 change in aggregate KLD score

Shareholder proposal activism
reduces CSP; managers are more
likely to settle proposals filed by
‘salient’ shareholders
(i.e., those with power, legitimacy,
and urgency), Settlement with
salient shareholders, however, also
reduces CSP.
An industry shift in SM increases
the likelihood of significant change
in focal firm SM; organizational
age, size, risk increase likelihood of
significant change in SM; level of
managerial discretion is positively
associated with significant change in
SM; owner-manager controlled
firms less likely to experience broad
shifts in SM; CEO succession does
not increase likelihood of SM
change
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Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

three dimensions separately and
summed (employee relations,
environment, and product safety);
weaknesses only

Firms with worse social
performance in environmental and
product safety areas (but not
employee relations) are more likely
to make charitable contributions and
their giving is larger than better
performers

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

5 dimensions: employee relations,
community, diversity,
environmental impact and product
safety/quality; both summed (-2 to
+2 scale) and separate strengths and
weaknesses

Corporate Attention
to Stakeholders

Strengths across 5 dimensions:
community, minorities, employees,
the naturalenvironment, and
customers; Use binary DV = 1 if
firm has been rated as having at
least one strength across the five
dimensions, 0 otherwise; Also done
for each dimension separately

CSR as Dependent Variable (cont’d)

Chen, Patten &
Roberts (JBE,
2008)

Slater & DixonFowler (JBE,
2008)

Kacperczyk
(SMJ, 2009)

n=384 firms;
1998-2000 (1,152
observations)

n= 393 firms (&
CEOs), 2004

n=878 firms;
1991-2002

chi-squared
statistics;
regression

regression, crosssectional

random effects
logistic regression

CEO international assignment
experience positively related to
CSP, moderated by functional
background (marketing & sales)
both total and strengths; not related
to negative CSP
An exogenous increase in takeover
protection leads to highercorporate
attention to community and the
natural environment, but has no
impact on corporate attention to
employees, minorities, and
customers. Additional analyses
show that firms that increase their
attention to stakeholders experience
an increase in long-term shareholder
value
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CSR

Used KLD institutional strengths
(community, diversity) and technical
strengths (product, government and
employee issues)

The number of women on the board
has a positive relationship with CSR
strength ratings
Firms that initially received poor
KLD ratings subsequently improved
their environmental performance
more than other firms, and this
difference is driven by firms in
highly regulated industries and by
firms with more low-cost
opportunities to exploit.

CSR as Dependent Variable (cont’d)
Bear, Rahman &
Post (JBE,
2010)

n= 51 firms
(2009)

OLS regression

Chatterji &
Toffel (SMJ,
2010)

n=598 firms
(1999-2004) =
2,412 firm year
observations

OLS regression
with fixed effects

Environmental
Ratings

Only Environmental category: initial
ratings poor (only concerns); initial
ratings good or mixed (either only
strengths, mixed strengths and
concerns or no strengths or
concerns)

FernándezKranz & Santaló
(JEMS, 2010)

n=6,206 firm year
observations
(3,630 firms
unbalanced panel:
1994-2005)

regressions

CSR Performance

Difference between KLD Strengths
and Concerns across all areas (56
CSR ratings)

Firms in more competitive industries
have better social ratings

Corporate Social
Performance (CSP)

7 dimensions: employee relations,
community, diversity, natural
environment, human rights, product
and corporate governance; both
summed and separate strengths and
weaknesses

CEOs with bachelor degrees in
humanities, with a breadth of career
experience and who are female are
positively related to KLD strengths;
CEOs with a bachelor degree in
economics are negatively related to
KLD strengths; CEO characteristics
not related to KLD weaknesses

Manner (JBE,
2010)

n=650 firms,
(&CEOs) 2006

regression
(negative binomial
& poisson); crosssectional
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R&D intensity positively affects
CSR; this relationship is significant
in manufacturing industries, but
non-significant in nonmanufacturing industries

CSR as Dependent Variable (cont’d)

Padgett & Galan
(JBE, 2010)

3 models (19912007): 5,799 obs.
and 1,217 firms,
2,724 obs.
and 575 firms
(manuf. only)
and,
3,075 obs. and
642 firms (non
manuf.)

regression (panel
data; fixed effects)

CSR

Same as Hillman & Keim (2001);
changed 0/1 to -2 to +2 scale; also
used log of sum of strengths +1 for
robustness

Slater & DixonFowler (AMLE,
2010)

n= 416firms (&
CEOs), 2004

ANCOVA

Corporate
Environmental
Performance (CEP)

KLD strengths and weakness for
environmental category: composite
score

Positive relationship between CEOs
with MBAs and CEP

Fong (JBR,
2010)

n=835
observations
between 194
CEOs in 19
industries (19911999)

HLM

Stakeholder
Management

KLD strengths and weaknesses
summed

When a CEO is overpaid, SM
increases; when a CEO is underpaid,
SM decreases

12 measures from 6 social issues:
communities, diversity, employee
relations, natural environment,
product safety/quality, corporate
governance; Strengths and
Weaknesses separate (normalized)

Find four distinct latent constructs
underlying KLD database
(institutional strength/weakness;
technical strength/weakness);
positive and negative social action
are both empirically and
conceptually distinct constructs and
should not be combined in future
research

CSR as Other

Mattingly &
Berman (B&S,
2006)

n= 293 firms; 5
years of data
1998-2002

EFA, principal
components

Corporate social
action
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Social Performance

5 dimensions: employee relations,
product issues, community relations,
diversity, environmental issues:
Strengths - Weaknesses; all given
equal weight

The endogeneity of social strategic
decisions could be driving most of
the empirical findings on the effect
of social performance on financial
performance

CSR as Other (cont’d)
Garcia-Castro,
Arino & Canela
(JBE, 2010)

n=658 firms;
1991-2005

OLS regression,
fixed effect with
instrumental
variable
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APPENDIX B: KLD Dimensions and Items
Category

Definition

Community
Generous Giving
(COM-str-A)

The company has consistently given over 1.5% of trailing three-year net earnings before taxes (NEBT) to charity,
or has otherwise been notably generous in its giving.

Innovative Giving
(COM-str-B)

The company has a notably innovative giving program which supports nonprofit organizations particularly those
promoting self-sufficiency among the economically disadvantaged. Companies that permit non-traditional
federated charitable giving drives in the workplace are often noted in this section as well.

Support for Housing
(COM-str-C)

The company is a prominent participant in public/private partnerships that support housing initiatives for the
economically disadvantaged, e.g., the National Equity Fund or the Enterprise Foundation.

Support for Education (COMstr-D)

The company has either been notably innovative in its support for primary or secondary school education,
particularly for those programs that benefit the economically disadvantaged, or the company has prominently
supported job-training programs for youth. KLD began assigning this strength in 1994.

Indigenous Peoples Relations
(COM-str-E)

The company has established relations with indigenous peoples in the areas of its proposed or current operations
that respect the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of the indigenous peoples. KLD
began assigning this strength in 2000. In 2002 KLD moved this strength rating into the Human Rights area.

Non-US Charitable Giving
(COM-str-F)

The company has established substantial, innovative charitable giving programs outside the U.S. In 2002 KLD
stopped assigning strengths for Non-U.S. charitable giving in the Non-U.S. category, companies with exemplary
giving programs outside the U.S. are tracked in the Community area.

Other Strength
(Com-str-X)

The company has an exceptionally strong volunteer program, in-kind giving program, or other particularly strong
community program.
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Category

Definition

Corporate Governance
Limited Compensation
(CGOV-str-A).

The company has recently awarded notably low levels of compensation to its top management or its board
members. The limit for a rating is total compensation of less than $500,000 per year for a CEO or $30,000 per
year for outside directors. In 1999 the threshold rose to its current level from $400,000 and $25,000, which
represented a 1997 rise from $200,000 and $15,000.

Ownership Strength (CGOVstr-C)

The company owns between 20% and 50% of another company KLD has cited as having an area of social
strength, or is more than 20% owned by a firm that KLD has rated as having social strengths. When a company
owns more than 50% of another firm, it has a controlling interest, and KLD treats the second firm as if it is a
division of the first.

Diversity
CEO (DIV-str-A)

The company's chief executive officer is a woman or a member of a minority group.

Promotion (DIV-str-B)

The company has made notable progress in the promotion of women and minorities, particularly to line
positions with profit-and-loss responsibilities in the corporation.

Board of Directors
(DIV-str-C)

Women, minorities, and/or the disabled hold four seats or more (with no double counting) on the board of
directors, or one-third or more of the board seats if the board numbers less than 12.

Family Benefits
(DIV-str-D)

The company has outstanding employee benefits or other programs addressing work/family concerns, e.g.,
childcare, elder care, or flextime.

Women/Minority Contracting
(DIV-str-E)

The company does at least 5% of its subcontracting, or otherwise has a demonstrably strong record on
purchasing or contracting, with women- and/or minority-owned businesses.

Employment of the Disabled
(DIV-str-F)

The company has implemented innovative hiring programs, other innovative human resource programs for the
disabled, or otherwise has a superior reputation as an employer of the disabled.
The company has implemented notably progressive policies toward its gay and lesbian employees. In
particular, it provides benefits to the domestic partners of its employees. KLD began assigning strengths for
this issue in 1995.

Progressive Gay/Lesbian
Policies (DIV-str-G)

The company has made noteworthy diversity achievements that do not fall under other KLD categories.
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Other Strength (DIV-str-X)
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Category
Employee Relations
Strong Union Relations
(EMP-str-A)

Definition

The company has a history of notably strong union relations.

No-Layoff Policy (EMP-str-B)

The company has maintained a consistent no layoff policy. KLD has not assigned strengths for this issue since
1994.

Cash Profit Sharing (EMP-strC)

The company has a cash profit-sharing program through which it has recently made distributions to a majority
of its workforce.

Employee Involvement
(EMP-str-D)

The company strongly encourages worker involvement and/or ownership through stock options available to a
majority of its employees, gain sharing, stock ownership, sharing of financial information, or participation in
management decision-making.

Strong Retirement Benefits
(EMP-str-F)
Health and Safety Strength.
(EMP-str-G)
Other Strength (EMP-str-X)

The company has a notably strong retirement benefits program.
The company is noted by the US Occupational Health and Safety Administration for its safety programs. KLD
began assigning strengths for this issue in 2003.
The company has a good employee safety record or demonstrates other noteworthy commitments to its
employees’ well being.

Environment

Pollution Prevention (ENVstr-B)

The company has notably strong pollution prevention programs including emissions reductions and toxic-use
reduction programs.

Recycling (ENV-str-C)

The company either is a substantial user of recycled materials as raw materials in its manufacturing processes,
or a major factor in the recycling industry.
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Beneficial Products and
Services (ENV-str-A)

The company derives substantial revenues from innovative remediation products, environmental services, or
products that promote the efficient use of energy, or it has developed innovative products with environmental
benefits. (The term “environmental service” does not include services with questionable environmental effects,
such as landfills, incinerators, waste-to-energy plants, and deep injection wells.) Through 1994, “substantial
revenues” was specified as more than 4% of total revenues.
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Category

Definition

Environment (cont’d)

Alternative Fuels (ENV-str-D)

The company derives substantial revenues from alternative fuels. The term “alternative fuels” includes natural
gas, wind power, and solar energy. The company has demonstrated an exceptional commitment to energy
efficiency programs or the promotion of energy efficiency.

Communications (ENV-str-E)

The company is a signatory to the CERES Principles, publishes a notably substantive environmental report, or
has notably effective internal communications systems in place for environmental best practices. KLD began
assigning strengths for this issue in 1996.

Property, Plant, and
Equipment (ENV-str-F)

The company maintains its property, plant, and equipment with above average environmental performance for
its industry. KLD has not assigned strengths for this issue since 1995.

Other Strength (ENV-str-X)

The company demonstrates a strong environmental attribute not addressed by KLD ratings categories.

Human Rights
Positive Record in South
Africa (HUM-str-A)

The company’s social record in South Africa is noteworthy. KLD only assigned strengths in this category in
1994 and 1995.

Indigenous Peoples Relations
(HUM-str-D)

The company has established relations with indigenous peoples in the areas of its proposed or current
operations that respect the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of the indigenous
peoples. KLD began assigning this strength in 2000.

Labor Rights Strength (HUMstr-G)

The company has outstanding transparency on overseas sourcing disclosure and monitoring, or has
particularly good union relations outside the U.S. KLD began assigning this strength in 2002.

Other Strength (HUM-str-X)

The company's non-U.S. operations have been praised for their community relations, employee relations,
environmental impact, or product innovation.
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Category

Definition

Product
Quality (PRO-str-A)

The company has a long-term, well-developed, company-wide quality program, or it has a quality program
recognized as exceptional in U.S. industry.

R&D/Innovation (PRO-str-B)

The company is a leader in its industry for research and development (R&D), particularly by bringing notably
innovative products to market.

Benefits to Economically
Disadvantaged (PRO-str-C)

The company has as part of its basic mission the provision of products or services for the economically
disadvantaged.

Other Strength (PRO-str-X)

No definition
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APPENDIX C: Representative Sample of Studies Using Demographic Proxies for Managerial Cognitions

Study

Variable

Method of
Measurement

Operationalization

Main Findings

Survey
Questionnaire

Multiple item scale including questions such
as: "overall, do you consider yourself to be a
liberal or conservative?", "it is a bad idea to
mix business goals with concerns for social
justice", "we need government to protect us
from the damage to the natural environment
that results from unregulated markets"

Sharp cleavages in the stakeholder/shareholder
debate reflected in political sympathies;
egalitarians more likely to endorse
accountability to stakeholders, conservatives
more likely to endorse an accountability regime
centered around shareholders.

Survey

Normative belief and cause-effect belief
statements

Beliefs of upper echelon executive not related to
functional background but are related to the
beliefs of other members of the organization's
upper echelon team

Content Analysis

Centrality of concepts within letters to
shareholders (LTS); proactive vs.
deterministic environment-strategy logics

Content Analysis

Frequency of word count in LTS

CEO WORLDVIEW

Tetlock (2000)

Chattopadhyay et al.
(1999)

Nadkarni & Barr
(2008)

Kaplan (2008)

Dennis et al. (2009)

Ideological
worldview

Executive beliefs
Managerial
cognition
(attention focus
and causal logic)
Managerial
cognition
(attention focus)
CEO attitude,
perceived
pressures, moral
obligation, selfidentity

Survey

Scale items

Managerial cognition (attention and causal
logic) mediates the relationship between
industry velocity and the speed of strategic
response
CEO attention to a new technology is associated
with subsequent increases in a firm's investment
in that technical domain
Economic attitude, political pressure, moral
obligation and perceived control over
philanthropy not related to corporate
philanthropy
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Study

Variable

Method of
Measurement

Operationalization

Main Findings

No support that a generalized functional
background contributes more to firm
performance in cases of high levels of
international interdependence.
High CSP firms have significantly greater
proportion of executives with backgrounds in
output functions; Low CSP firms have a
significantly greater proportion of executives in
throughput functions.

CEO FUNCTIONAL EXPERIENCE
Survey
Questionnaire;
cluster analysis

Functional areas of your career divided into
4 clusters: broad-based, marketing
management, technical management, core
business cluster

Thomas & Simerly
(1994)

Functional
Background

Archival Data

Output (marketing, R&D) vs. throughput
experience (finance, engineering,
manufacturing)

Hermann & Datta
(2003)

Functional
Background

Archival Data

Output (sales/marketing, product R&D and
entrepreneurship) vs. throughput
(production, operations, finance, accounting,
data processing, IS and process R&D)

No relationship between TMT functional
heterogeneity and expansiveness of firm's
global strategic posture

Survey as part of
experiment

How many years of work experience divided
by percentage by area; Collapsed into 7
areas: finance/accounting, HR,
production/operations, IS, marketing/sales,
R&D, general management

Amount of experience in a functional area
unrelated to that functional area being
represented in managers' belief structures or
perceptions

Survey as part of
experiment

Based on Walsh (1988) formula: square root
of (the sum of the number of years worked
in a particular functional area divided by the
total number of years of work experience)
squared

Managers' information processing only
somewhat influenced by functional experience directs attention away from unrelated areas
rather toward related areas; The more restricted
the observational goals of decision makers, the
more selective their perceptions will be

Survey

Exposure to 8 functional disciplines:
finance, accounting, HR,
production/operations, law/general counsel,
marketing/sales, R&D, general management

Experience in a functional track is positively
related to executive commitment to the status
quo (CSQ)

Beyer et al. (1997)

Functional
Experience

Beyer et al. (1997)

Breadth of
Functional
Experience

Geletkanycz & Black
(2001)

Functional
Experience
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Roth (1995)

Functional
Experience
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Study

Method of
Measurement

Variable

Operationalization

Main Findings

CEO FUNCTIONAL EXPERIENCE (cont’d)
Total number of different functional areas
respondents reported to have worked over
the course of their careers
Number of years executive has spent in each
of 8 major functional areas: general
administration, personnel, production and
operations, R&D, finance, accounting,
marketing and sales.

Geletkanycz & Black
(2001)

Functional
Diversity

Survey

Functional diversity is negatively related to
CSQ

Chattopadhyay et al.
(1999)

Functional
Background

Survey

Carpenter &
Fredrickson (2001)

Functional
Background

Archival Data

Percentage in marketing, distribution, sales,
R&D, production, engineering,
finance/accounting, law, or general.

TMT functional heterogeneity not related to
expansiveness of firm's global strategic posture

Archival Data

Number of years of schooling; specialization
of the highest obtained university degree
categorized as arts, sciences, engineering,
business/economics, law.

Firms most likely to undergo strategic change
have top management teams characterized
by relatively short organizational tenure, high
educational level and academic training in the
sciences.

Educational level of CEO successors not related
to preference mode of foreign market entry

Functional background not related to executive
beliefs

CEO EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Wiersema & Bantel
(1992)

Educational level;
Educational
specialization

Herrmann & Datta
(2003)

Education level

Archival Data

Number of years of schooling (7 point scale:
1 -high school, 2-attended college, 3undergraduate degree, 4-attended graduate
school, 5 -master's degree, 6- attended
doctoral program, 7 -doctorate

Carpenter &
Fredrickson (2001)

Educational
Background

Archival Data

Used Wiersema and Bantel

Geletkanycz & Black
(2001)

Educational Level

Survey

Hold an MBA
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TMT educational heterogeneity positively
related to expansiveness of firm's global
strategic posture
No support that MBA degree is negatively
related to CSQ or that MBA degree moderates
relationship between functional experience and
CSQ
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Study

Variable

Method of
Measurement

Operationalization

Main Findings

Likert scale on 2 questions: 1) experience in
international function or in function with
international responsibilities, 2) time spent
on overseas assignments

CEOs with international experience abroad have
a stronger positive impact on firm performance
in the case of high international
interdependence.

Total number of years spent abroad on
assignment, in higher education, and/or in a
firm's international division
The percentage of team members' total years
of experience accrued in international
assignments.

International experience of CEO successors
positively associated with preference for full
control foreign market entry mode
international experience of TMT positively
related to expansiveness of firm's global
strategic posture

CEO INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
Roth (1995)

International
Background

Survey
Questionnaire

Herrmann & Datta
(2003)

International
Experience

Archival Data

Carpenter &
Fredrickson (2001)

International
Experience

Archival Data

Thomas & Simerly
(1994)

Tenure

Archival Data

2 measures: 1) number of years in the
organization, 2) number of years as CEO

CEOs of high CSP firms have longer tenures in
the company than CEOs of low CSP firms.
They have also been in the organization longer.

Wiersema & Bantel
(1992)

Organizational
tenure

Archival Data

Number of years in the organization; split
into dummy variable low tenure/high tenure

Low average organizational tenure of TMT
positively related to change in corporate
strategy (diversification)

Herrmann & Datta
(2003)

Position tenure

Archival Data

Number of years CEO has held that position

Position tenure of CEO successors positively
associated with preference for full-control
foreign market entry modes

Number of years a chief executive has been
in office.

CEO tenure has inverted U shape relationship to
firm performance in stable industries
but in dynamic industries, CEO tenure and
performance are negatively related
(performance deteriorates immediately)

CEO TENURE

Henderson, Miller &
Hambrick (2006)

Tenure

Archival Data
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APPENDIX D: ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry
Mining and Construction
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APPENDIX D: ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Food, Textiles & Apparel
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APPENDIX D: ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Forest, Paper, Publishing
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APPENDIX D: ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves By Industry - Refining, Rubber & Plastic
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APPENDIX D: ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Steel & Heavy Manufacturing
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APPENDIX D: ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Computers, Automotive, Aerospace
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APPENDIX D: ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Transportation
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APPENDIX D: ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Telephone/Utilities
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APPENDIX D: ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry – Wholesale/Retail
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APPENDIX D: ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Financial
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APPENDIX D: ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Hotel, Entertainment & Service
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APPENDIX E: Growth in Mean Levels and Standard Deviations over Time by Industry
BCSS
Industry/Year
Mining/Construction

Food/Textiles/Apparel

Forrest/Paper/Publishing

Chemicals/Pharma

Refining/Rubber/Plastic

Steel/Heavy Manufacturing

Computers/Auto/Aero

Transportation

Telephone/Utilities

Wholesale/Retail

Financial

Hotel/Entertainment/Services

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Avg.
0.15
0.18
0.19
0.13
0.17
0.24
0.21
0.12
0.19
0.18
0.19
0.22
0.34
0.23
0.26
0.39
0.56
0.65
0.64 0.27
0.30
0.32
0.32
0.28
0.31
0.38
0.33
0.26
0.35
0.30
0.34
0.36
0.42
0.37
0.41
0.42
0.45
0.55
0.57 0.40
14
15
14
15
16
16
16
16
16
15
16
16
16
16
16
14
14
14
13
0.34
0.35
0.37
0.49
0.56
0.46
0.46
0.42
0.39
0.50
0.49
0.49
0.44
0.41
0.44
0.55
0.58
0.55
0.58 0.46
0.42
0.44
0.44
0.46
0.45
0.47
0.47
0.41
0.42
0.43
0.43
0.47
0.45
0.45
0.46
0.51
0.50
0.61
0.62 0.46
23
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
23
23
20
19
0.31
0.34
0.35
0.36
0.43
0.43
0.45
0.48
0.56
0.55
0.48
0.45
0.44
0.44
0.55
0.64
0.70
0.60
0.61 0.48
0.49
0.52
0.54
0.54
0.53
0.49
0.50
0.48
0.50
0.50
0.47
0.48
0.50
0.48
0.50
0.55
0.52
0.57
0.57 0.52
27
30
30
31
32
32
32
32
32
32
31
30
32
32
32
30
27
28
28
0.34
0.46
0.44
0.57
0.59
0.59
0.60
0.59
0.61
0.59
0.60
0.68
0.63
0.62
0.66
0.71
0.77
0.83
0.80 0.61
0.53
0.49
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.51
0.56
0.55
0.54
0.53
0.53
0.53
0.55
0.52
0.51
0.52
0.55
0.54
0.54 0.53
32
36
37
38
38
38
38
38
38
38
37
36
38
38
38
37
35
34
32
0.40
0.53
0.64
0.79
0.81
0.78
0.52
0.51
0.52
0.59
0.77
0.66
0.74
0.68
0.81
0.77
0.91
0.91
0.91 0.69
0.53
0.54
0.49
0.42
0.46
0.42
0.38
0.37
0.37
0.44
0.44
0.51
0.54
0.65
0.59
0.65
0.59
0.59
0.59 0.49
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
5
5
5
0.34
0.38
0.36
0.43
0.45
0.43
0.43
0.42
0.44
0.41
0.44
0.45
0.41
0.46
0.57
0.56
0.61
0.69
0.69 0.47
0.51
0.52
0.50
0.54
0.54
0.51
0.51
0.53
0.53
0.48
0.53
0.51
0.47
0.49
0.56
0.57
0.52
0.50
0.50 0.52
38
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
40
37
38
40
40
40
40
40
39
39
0.30
0.37
0.38
0.47
0.52
0.51
0.55
0.51
0.56
0.56
0.57
0.61
0.59
0.59
0.66
0.69
0.72
0.72
0.72 0.56
0.39
0.44
0.45
0.46
0.46
0.53
0.53
0.48
0.49
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.53
0.52
0.56
0.57
0.57
0.57
0.56 0.51
57
58
59
60
62
62
62
60
60
60
61
61
61
60
60
58
56
56
55
0.44
0.45
0.45
0.45
0.48
0.38
0.38
0.39
0.55
0.48
0.54
0.56
0.55
0.42
0.47
0.45
0.70
0.67
0.67 0.50
0.50
0.57
0.57
0.64
0.58
0.48
0.48
0.47
0.51
0.43
0.41
0.45
0.44
0.49
0.50
0.54
0.47
0.40
0.40 0.48
10
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
10
10
10
9
10
11
11
11
0.32
0.46
0.44
0.59
0.58
0.57
0.68
0.68
0.59
0.59
0.62
0.60
0.68
0.58
0.49
0.48
0.59
0.67
0.67 0.57
0.44
0.45
0.49
0.59
0.51
0.53
0.45
0.51
0.46
0.44
0.48
0.46
0.40
0.42
0.41
0.39
0.43
0.39
0.39 0.46
24
26
26
26
26
25
25
26
26
25
23
23
25
25
26
25
24
24
24
0.27
0.26
0.33
0.37
0.39
0.36
0.37
0.34
0.29
0.26
0.27
0.27
0.23
0.21
0.24
0.24
0.28
0.35
0.35 0.30
0.41
0.43
0.50
0.53
0.55
0.54
0.52
0.46
0.45
0.40
0.38
0.39
0.35
0.36
0.37
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.46 0.44
34
35
37
37
36
36
36
36
37
36
37
34
38
38
37
34
33
32
32
0.37
0.42
0.39
0.56
0.50
0.56
0.61
0.57
0.60
0.64
0.70
0.63
0.57
0.53
0.57
0.57
0.52
0.61
0.59 0.56
0.42
0.48
0.46
0.47
0.48
0.40
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.42
0.43
0.48
0.47
0.49
0.46
0.48
0.49
0.51
0.52 0.46
23
27
28
30
33
33
33
32
32
32
32
32
32
33
33
31
30
28
26
0.22
0.28
0.22
0.21
0.25
0.26
0.26
0.31
0.31
0.25
0.24
0.25
0.25
0.32
0.37
0.50
0.49
0.48
0.48 0.31
0.45
0.49
0.47
0.45
0.43
0.44
0.44
0.48
0.44
0.46
0.43
0.43
0.40
0.47
0.47
0.49
0.49
0.53
0.53 0.46
18
20
20
20
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
20
21
20
20
19
19
19
19
0.31
0.37
0.37
0.45
0.47
0.47
0.48
0.47
0.48
0.48
0.49
0.50
0.48
0.47
0.52
0.56
0.61
0.64
0.63 0.49
0.44
0.47
0.48
0.51
0.50
0.50
0.50
0.49
0.48
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.49
0.49
0.51
0.52
0.52
0.53
0.53 0.50
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Yearly Averages

Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
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APPENDIX E: Growth in Mean Levels and Standard Deviations over Time by Industry
DCSS
Industry/Year
Mining/Construction

Food/Textiles/Apparel

Forrest/Paper/Publishing

Chemicals/Pharma

Refining/Rubber/Plastic

Steel/Heavy Manufacturing

Computers/Auto/Aero

Transportation

Telephone/Utilities

Wholesale/Retail

Financial

Hotel/Entertainment/Services

1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Avg.
0.08
0.12
0.15
0.18
0.15
0.16
0.18
0.22
0.23
0.22
0.23
0.22
0.18
0.16
0.16
0.16
0.22
0.25
0.25 0.19
0.10
0.11
0.11
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.09
0.16
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.18
0.14
0.12
0.12
0.11
0.14
0.13
0.13 0.13
14
15
14
15
16
16
16
16
16
15
16
16
16
16
16
14
14
14
13
0.16
0.18
0.24
0.24
0.27
0.27
0.28
0.25
0.21
0.21
0.22
0.22
0.24
0.24
0.27
0.31
0.31
0.30
0.31 0.25
0.16
0.15
0.21
0.15
0.17
0.22
0.26
0.20
0.12
0.15
0.17
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.20
0.19 0.18
23
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
24
23
23
20
19
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.15
0.17
0.19
0.23
0.23
0.23
0.24
0.25
0.26
0.23
0.23
0.25
0.27
0.32
0.31
0.30 0.22
0.13
0.14
0.14
0.12
0.15
0.13
0.15
0.17
0.17
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.20
0.19 0.17
27
30
30
31
32
32
32
32
32
32
31
30
32
32
32
30
27
28
28
0.17
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.25
0.26
0.28
0.29
0.31
0.30
0.32
0.37
0.35
0.37
0.39
0.39 0.28
0.16
0.15
0.16
0.14
0.15
0.14
0.15
0.14
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.17
0.21
0.24
0.22
0.20
0.18
0.19 0.18
32
36
37
38
38
38
38
38
38
38
37
36
38
38
38
37
35
34
32
0.23
0.33
0.36
0.29
0.37
0.41
0.34
0.40
0.42
0.43
0.42
0.47
0.38
0.38
0.35
0.31
0.28
0.28
0.28 0.36
0.05
0.13
0.14
0.08
0.11
0.27
0.10
0.14
0.14
0.12
0.10
0.15
0.09
0.16
0.16
0.14
0.20
0.20
0.20 0.15
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
6
5
5
5
0.17
0.18
0.20
0.17
0.20
0.19
0.20
0.20
0.23
0.25
0.25
0.26
0.26
0.23
0.29
0.29
0.31
0.34
0.34 0.24
0.18
0.17
0.17
0.14
0.17
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.23
0.21
0.21
0.21
0.21
0.22
0.19
0.19
0.18
0.19
0.19 0.20
38
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
41
40
37
38
40
40
40
40
40
39
39
0.14
0.17
0.19
0.20
0.24
0.23
0.24
0.25
0.26
0.28
0.27
0.27
0.25
0.27
0.29
0.30
0.31
0.32
0.32 0.25
0.13
0.15
0.18
0.16
0.16
0.19
0.17
0.18
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.20
0.17
0.21
0.21
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.21 0.19
57
58
59
60
62
62
62
60
60
60
61
61
61
60
60
58
56
56
55
0.26
0.25
0.19
0.18
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.24
0.25
0.27
0.28
0.24
0.23
0.24
0.27
0.26
0.29
0.29
0.29 0.25
0.10
0.16
0.15
0.13
0.20
0.22
0.21
0.23
0.24
0.22
0.23
0.20
0.16
0.16
0.21
0.20
0.17
0.15
0.15 0.18
10
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
11
10
10
10
9
10
11
11
11
0.18
0.18
0.20
0.20
0.23
0.24
0.29
0.25
0.25
0.27
0.29
0.30
0.28
0.28
0.30
0.28
0.29
0.28
0.28 0.26
0.12
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.16
0.16
0.21
0.16
0.19
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.13
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.14
0.17
0.17 0.16
24
26
26
26
26
25
25
26
26
25
23
23
25
25
26
25
24
24
24
0.15
0.15
0.17
0.17
0.20
0.27
0.24
0.19
0.18
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.20
0.21
0.25
0.28
0.28
0.29
0.30 0.22
0.14
0.14
0.13
0.13
0.15
0.32
0.27
0.14
0.12
0.15
0.16
0.13
0.15
0.17
0.18
0.18
0.19
0.21
0.20 0.18
34
35
37
37
36
36
36
36
37
36
37
34
38
38
37
34
33
32
32
0.25
0.26
0.31
0.24
0.23
0.25
0.28
0.30
0.30
0.27
0.29
0.31
0.33
0.32
0.34
0.33
0.35
0.37
0.34 0.30
0.21
0.21
0.24
0.15
0.15
0.16
0.16
0.19
0.20
0.15
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.21
0.21
0.19
0.20
0.21
0.19 0.19
23
27
28
30
33
33
33
32
32
32
32
32
32
33
33
31
30
28
26
0.10
0.16
0.15
0.13
0.15
0.16
0.16
0.18
0.19
0.20
0.22
0.22
0.26
0.26
0.27
0.31
0.32
0.32
0.32 0.21
0.15
0.17
0.15
0.15
0.15
0.17
0.18
0.16
0.22
0.23
0.22
0.21
0.23
0.21
0.20
0.22
0.23
0.21
0.21 0.20
18
20
20
20
21
21
21
21
21
21
21
20
21
20
20
19
19
19
19
0.16
0.18
0.20
0.19
0.22
0.23
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.25
0.26
0.27
0.26
0.26
0.29
0.29
0.31
0.32
0.32 0.25
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.14
0.16
0.20
0.19
0.17
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.19
0.20
0.19
0.19
0.20
0.19 0.18

291

Yearly Averages

Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev
N
Mean
St. Dev

292

APPENDIX E: Growth in Mean Levels and Standard Deviation of over Time (Yearly Averages)
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